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A MEMOIR 



THE LAST YEAR 



WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE, 



CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, 

CONTAINING 

AN ACCOUNT OF THE OPERATIONS OF HIS COMMANDS 
IN THE YEARS 1804 AND 1865. 



BY 

NT-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY 



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PRINTED BY LOVELL & GIBSON, YONGE STREETjSc % Mi 15 



186G. 



A MEMOIR 



THE LAST YEAR 



WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE, 



CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, 



CONTAINING 



AN ACCOUNT OF THE OPERATIONS OF HIS COMMANDS 
IN THE YEARS 1864 AND 1865. 



by i ;< 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JUBAL AT EARLY, 

OF THE PROVISIONAL ARMY OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES. 



C-a tfje JEmorg ef tfje ^ercnc ©eatr^nfjo fell l^tiiia for ILifrertg, 3&i'sfjt, ants Suatire. 



"D^O VINDICEr 



PRINTED BY LOVELL & GIBSON, YONGE ST&EET. 
1866. 



PBEFACE. 



Under a solemn sense of duty to my unhappy country, and 
to the brave soldiers who fought under me, as well as to 
myself, the following pages have been written. 

When the question of practical secession from the United 
States arose, as a citizen of the State of Virginia, and a 
member of the Convention called by the authority of the 
Legislature of that State, I opposed secession with all the 
ability I possessed, with the hope that the horrors of civil war 
might be averted, and that a returning sense of duty and 
justice on the part of the masses of the Northern States, 
would induce them to respect the rights of the people of the 
South. While some Northern politicans and editors, who sub- 
sequently took rank among the most unscrupulous and vindic- 
tive of our enemies, and now hold me to be a traitor and rebel, 
were openly and sedulously justifying and encouraging seces- 
sion, I was labouring honestly and earnestly to preserve the 
Union. 

As a member of the Virginia Convention, I voted against 
the ordinance of secession on its passage by that body, with 
the hope that, even then, the collision of arms might be avoi- 
ded, and some satisfactory adjustment arrived at. The adoption 
of that ordinance wrung from me bitter tears of grief; but 1 
at once recognized my duty to abide the decision of my native 
State, and to defend her soil against invasion. Any scruples 
which I may have entertained as to the right of secession, 
were soon dispelled by the mad, wicked, and unconstitutional 
measures of the authorities at Washington, and the frenzied 



iv 



PREFACE. 



clamour of the people of the North for war upon their former ■ 
brethren of the South. I then, and ever since have, regarded 
Abraham Lincoln, his counsellors and supporters, as the real 
traitors who had overthrown the constitution and government 
of the United States, and established in lieu thereof an odioas 
despotism ; and this opinion I entered on the journal of the 
Convention when I signed the ordinance of secession. I 
recognized the right of resistance and revolution as exercised 
by our fathers in 1776, and, without cavil as to the name by 
which it was called, 1 entered the military service of my State, 
willingly, cheerfully, and zealously. 

When the State of Virginia became one of the Confederate 
States, and her troops were turned over to the Confederate 
Government, I embraced the cause of the whole Confederacy 
with equal ardour, and continued in the service, with the de- 
termination to devote all the energy and talent I possessed 
to the common defence. I fought through the entire war, 
without once regretting the course I had pursued ; with an 
abiding faith in the justice of our cause ; and I never saw the 
moment when I would have been willing to consent to any 
compromise or settlement short of the absolute independence 
of my country. 

It was my fortnne to participate in most of the great military 
operations in which the army in Virginia was engaged, both 
before and after General Lee assumed the command. In the 
last year of this momentous struggle, I commanded, at differ- 
ent times, a division and two corps of General Lee's Army, 
in the campaign from the Rapidan to James River, and, sub- 
sequently, a separate force which marched into Maryland, 
threatened Washington City, and then went through an event- 
ful campaign in the Valley of Virginia. No detailed reports 
of the operations of these different commands were made 



PREFACE. 



V 



before the close of the war, and the campaign in Maryland 
and the Valley of Virginia has been the subject of much com- 
ment and misapprehension. I have now written a narrative 
of the operations of all my commands during the closing year 
of the war, and lay it before the world as a contribution to 
the history of our great struggle for independence. In giving 
that narrative, I have made such statements of the positions 
and strength of the opposing forces in Virginia, and such re- 
ference to their general operations, as were necessary to en- 
able the reader to understand it ; but I do not pretend to 
detail the operations of other commanders. 

I have not found it necessary to be guilty of the injustice 
of attempting to pull down the reputation of any of my fellow 
officers, in order to build up my Own. My operations and my 
campaign stand on their own merits, whatever they may be. 
Nor, in anything I may have found it necessary to say in re- 
gard to the conduct of my troops, do I wish to be understood 
as, in any way, decrying the soldiers who constituted the 
rank and file of my commands. I believe that the world has 
never produced a body of men superior, in courage, patriot- 
ism, and endurance, to the private soldiers of the Confederate 
armies. I have repeatedly seen those soldiers submit, with 
cheerfulness, to privations and hardships which would appear 
to be almost incredible ; and the wild cheers of our brave 
men, (which were so different from the studied hurrahs of 
the Yankees,) when their thin lines sent back opposing hosts 
of Federal troops, staggering, reeling, and flying, have often 
thrilled «very fibre in my heart. I have seen, with my own 
eyes, ragged, barefooted, and hungry Confederate soldiers 
perform deeds, which, if performed in days of yore by mailed 
warriours in glittering armour, would have inspired the harp 

of the minstrel and the pen of the poet. 
B 



y : PREFACE. 



I do not aspire to the character of a historian, but, having 
been a witness of and participator in great events, I have given 
a statement of what I saw and did, for the use of the future 
historian. Without breaking the thread of my narrative, as 
it proceeds, I have given, in notes, comments on some of 
the errors and incousistencies committed by the commander 
of the Federal army, General Grant, and the Federal Se- 
cretary of War, Mr. Stanton, in their reports made since 
the close of the war ; also some instances of cruelty and 
barbarity committed by the Federal commanders, which 
were brought to my immediate attention, as well as some 
other matters of interest. 

As was to have been expected, our enemies have flooded 
the press with sketches and histories, in which all the appli- 
ances of a meretricious literature have been made use of, 
to glorify their own cause and its supporters, and to blacken 
ours. But some Southern writers also, who preferred the 
pen to the sword or musket, have not been able to resist the 
temptation to rush into print ; and, accordingly, carping crit- 
icisms have been written by the light of after events, and 
even histories of the war attempted by persons, who imagined 
that the distinctness of their vision was enhanced by distance 
from the scene of conflict, and an exemption from the dis- 
turbing elements of whistling bullecs and bursting shells. Per- 
haps other writers of the same class may follow, and various 
speculations be indulged in, as to the causes of our disasters. 
As for myself, I have not undertaken to speculate as to the causes 
of our failure, as I have seen abundant reason for it in the tre- 
mendous odds brought against us. Having had some means of 
judging, I will, however, say that, in my opinion, both Presi- 
dent Davis and General Lee, in their respective spheres, did 
all for the success of our cause which it was possible for mor- 



PREFACE. 



vii 



tal men to do ; and it is a great privilege and comfort for me 
so to believe, and to have been able to bring with me into 
exile a profound love and veneration for those great men. 

In regard to my own services, all I have to say is, that I 
have the consciousness of having done my duty to my coun- 
try, to the very best of my ability, and, whatever may be my 
fate, I would not exchange that consciousness for untold mil- 
lions. I have come into exile rather than submit to the yoke 
of the oppressors of my country ; but I have never thought of 
attributing aught of blame or censure to those true men who, 
after having nobly done their duty in the dreadful struggle 
through which we parsed, now, that it has gone against us, 
remain to share the misfortunes of their people, and to aid 
and comfort them in their trials ; on the contrary, I appreciate 
and honour their motives. I have not sought refuge in another 
land from insensibility to the wrongs and sufferings of my own 
country ; but I feel deeply and continually for them, and could 
my life secure the redemption of that country, as it has been 
often risked, so now it would be as freely given for that object. 

There were men born and nurtured in the Southern States, 
and some of them in my own State, who took sides with our 
enemies, and aided in desolating and humiliating the land of 
their own birth, and of the graves of their ancestors. Some 
of them rose to high positions in the United States Army, and 
others to high civil positions. I envy them not their dearly 
bought prosperity. I had rather be the humblest private sol- 
dier who fought in the ranks of the Confederate Army, and 
now, maimed and disabled, hobbles on his crutches from 
house to house, to receive his daily bread from the hands of 
the grateful women for whose homes he fought, than the 
highest of those renegades and traitors. Let them enjoy the 
advantages of their present positions as best they may ! for 



viii 



PREFACE* 



the deep and bitter execrations of an entire people now attend 
them, and an immortality of infamy awaits them. As for 
all the enemies who have overrun or aided in overrunning 
my country, there is a wide and impassable gulf between us 7 
in which I see the blood of slaughtered friends, comrades, and 
countrymen, which all the waters in the firmament above and 
the seas beneath cannot wash away. Those enemies have 
undertaken to render our cause odious and infamous ; and 
among other atrocities committed by them in the effort to do 
so, an humble subordinate, poor Wirz, has been selected as a 
victim to a fiendish spirit, and basely murdered under an 
executive edict, founded on the sentence of a vindictive and 
illegal tribunal. Let them continue this system 1 they are 
but erecting monuments to their own eternal dishonour, and 
furnishing finger posts to guide the historian in his researches. 
They may employ the infamous Holt, with his " Bureau of 
Military Justice," to sacrifice other victims on the altars of 
their hatred, and provost marshals, and agents of the " Freed- 
man's Bureau " may riot in all the license of petty tyranny, but 
our enemies can no more control the verdict of impartial his- 
tory, than they can escape that doom which awaits them at 
the final judgment. 

During the war, slavery was used as a catch word to 
arouse the passions of a fanatical mob, and to some extent the 
prejudices of the civilized world were excited against us ; but 
the war was not made on our part for slavery. High digni- 
taries in both church and state in Old England, and puritans 
in New England, had participated in the profits of a trade, by 
which the ignorant and barbarous natives of Africa were 
brought from that country ,and sold into slavery in the Amer- 
ican Colonies. The generation in the Southern States which 
defended their country in the late war, found amongst them^ 



PREFACE. 



ix 



jn a civilized and christianized condition, 4,000,000 of the de- 
scendants of those degraded Africans. The Almighty Crea- 
tor of the Universe had stamped them, indelibly, with a 
different colour and an inferior physical and mental organ- 
ization. He had not done this from mere caprice or whim, 
but for wise purposes. An amalgamation of the races was in 
contravention of His designs, or He would not have made 
them so different. This immense number of people could not 
have been transported back to the wilds from which their an- 
cestors were taken, or if they could have been, it would have 
resulted in their relapse into barbarism. Reason, common 
sense, true humanity to the black, as well as the safety of the 
white race, required that the inferior race should be kept in a 
state of subordination. The condition of domestic slavery, as 
it existed in the South, had not only resulted in a great im- 
provement in the moral and physical condition of the negro 
race, but had furnished a ciass of labourers as happy and con- 
tented as any in the world, if not more so. Their labour had 
not only developed the immense resources of the immediate 
counlry in which they were located, but was the main source 
of the great prosperity of the United States, and furnished the 
means for the employment of millions of the working classes 
in other countries. Nevertheless, the struggle made by the 
people of the South was not for the institution of slavery, but 
for the inestimable right of self-government, against the dom- 
ination of a fanatical faction at the North ; and slavery was 
the mere occasion of the development of the antagonism be- 
tween the two sections. That right of self-government has 
been lost, and slavery violently abolished. Four millions of 
blacks have thus been thrown on their own resources, to 
starve, to die, and to relapse into barbarism ; and incon- 
ceivable miseries have been entailed on the white race. 



\ 



X 



PREFACE. 



The civilized world will find, too late, that its philanthropy- 
has been all false, and its religion all wrong on this subject ; 
and the people of the United States will find that, under the 
pretence of " saving the life of the nation, and upholding the 
old flag," they have surrendered their own liberties into the 
hands of that worst of all tyrants, a body of senseless fanatics. 

When the passions and infatuations of the day shall have 
been dissipated by time, and all the results of the late war 
shall have passed into irrevocable history, the future chron- 
icler of that history will have a most important duty to per- 
form, and posterity, while pouring over its pages, will be lost 
in wonder at the follies and crimes committed in this gen- 
eration. 

My narrative is now given to the public, and the sole merit 
I claim for it is that of truthfulness. In writing it, I have 
received material aid from an accurate diary kept by Lieu- 
tenant William W. Old, aide to Major General Edward 
Johnson, who was with me during the campaign in Maryland 
and the Shenandoah Valley until the 12th of August, 1864, 
and the copious notes of Captain J. Hotchkiss, who acted 
as Topographical Engineer for the 2nd Corps and the Army 
of the Valley District, and recorded the events of each day, 
from the opening of the campaign on the Rapidan in May, 
1864, until the affair at Waynesboro in March, 1865. 



November, 1866. 



J. A. EARLY. 



CONTENTS. 



CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA FROM THE RAPIDAN TO JAMES' RIVER 

Page 



Introduction IS 

Battles of the Wilderness — Operations of Early's Division 16 

Battles of Spottsylvania Court House — Operations of Hill's Corps 22 

Hanover Junction — Operations of Early's Division 28 

Battles of Cold Harbour — Operations of E well's Corps 30 

CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND AND THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA. 

Introduction 37 

March to Lynchburg and Pursuit of Hunter 42 

March down the Valley and Operations in the Lower Valley and 

Maryland 51 

Battle of Monocacy 57 

Operations in front of Washington and recrossing the Potomac 59 

Return to the Valley and Operations there ... 66 

Battle of Kernstown 69 

Expedition into Maryland and Pennsylvania— Burning of Chambers- 
burg 70 

Retreat to Fisher's Hill and subsequent Operations until the Battle 

of Winchester 75 

Battle of Winchester 89 

Affair at Fisher's Hill 98 

Retreat up the Valley and Operations until the Battle of Cedar Creek. 100 

Battle of Cedar Creek or Belle Grove 105 

Close of the Valley Campaign 121 

Operations in 1865 129 

Conclusion 137 

APPENDIX. 

A. Letter from General Lee , 139 

B. Statistics showing the relative strength of the two Sections during 

the War , 141 



E U B A T A 4 



Page 20, line 18 from the top, for Johnston's read Johnson's. 

Page 24, line 28 from the top, and bottom line of note, for Malone read 
Mahone. 

Page 40, line 2 from the top, for Kearnstown read Kernstown. 

Page *13, lines 1 and 8 from the top, for Rodes' Ramseur's read Rodes' 
and Ramseur's. 

Page V8, line 13 from the top> for 28th read 20th* 



CAMPAIGN EST VIRGINIA, 

FROM THE 

RAPIDAN TO JAMES RIVER. 



INTRODUCTION. 

On the 3rd of May, 1864, the positions of the Confederate 
Army under General Lee, and the Federal Army under Lieu- 
tenant-General Grant, in Virginia, were as follows : General 
Lee held the southern bank of the Rapidan River, in Orange 
County, with his right resting near the mouth of Mine Run, 
and his left extending to Liberty Mills on the road from 
Gordonsville (via Madison Court House) to the Shenandoah 
Valley ; while the crossings of the river on the right, and the 
roads on the left were watched by cavalry : Ewell's corps 
was on the right, Hill's on the left, and two divisions of Long- 
street's corps were encamped in the rear, near Gordonsville. 
Grant's army (composed ol the Army of the Potomac under 
Meade, and the 9th corps under Burnside,) occupied the north 
banks of the Rapidan and Robinson rivers ; the main body 
being encamped in Culpepper County, and on the Rappa- 
hannock River. 

I am satisfied that General Lee's army did not exceed 
50,000 effective men of all arms. The report of the Federal 
Secretary of War, Stanton, shows that the/* available force 
present for duty, May 1st 1884," in Grant's army, was 141,166, 
to wit : In the Army of the Potomac 120,386, and in the 9th 
corps 20,780. The draft in the United States was being 
energetically enforced, and volunteering had been greatly 
c 



14 



INTRODUCTION". 



stimulated by high bounties. The North-Western States had 
tendered large bodies of troops to serve one hundred days, in 
order to relieve other troops on garrison and local duty, and 
this enabled Grant to put in the field a large number of troops 
which had been employed on that kind of duty. It was known 
that he was receiving heavy reinforcements up to the very time 
of his movement on the 4th of May, and afterwards ; so that 
the statement of his force on the 1st of May, by Stanton, does 
not cover the whole force with which he commenced the 
campaign. Moreover, Secretary Stanton's report shows that 
there were, in the Department of Washington and the Middle 
Department, 47,751 available men for duty, the chief part of 
which, he says, was called to the front after the campaign 
began, " in order to repair the losses of the Army of the Poto- 
mac;" and Grant says that, at Spottsylvania Court House, 
"the ISth, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th [of May,] were con- 
sumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of reinforce- 
ments from Washington." His army, therefore, must have 
numbered very nearly, if not quite, 200,000 men, before a 
junction was effected with Butler. 

On the 4th of May, it was discovered that Grant's Army 
was moving towards Germana Ford on the Rapidan, which 
was ten or twelve miles from our right. This movement had 
begun on the night of the 3rd, and the enemy succeeded in 
seizing the ford, and effecting a crossing, as the river was 
guarded at that point by only a small cavalry picket. The 
direct road from Germana Ford to Richmond passes by 
Spottsylvania Court House, and when Grant had effected his 
crossing, he was nearer to Richmond than General Lee was. 
From Orange Court House, near which were General Lee*s 
headquarters, there are two nearly parallel roads running 
eastwardly to Fredericksburg — the one which is nearest to the 
river being called " The old Stone Pike," and the other "The 
Plank Road." The road from Germana Ford to Spottsylvania 
Court House, crosses the old Stone Pike at the " Old Wilder- 
ness Tavern," and two or three miles further on, it crosses the 
Plank Road. 



INTRODUCTION. 



15 



As soon as It was ascertained that Grant's movement was a 
serious one, preparations were made to meet him, and the 
troops of General Lee's Army were put in motion — Ewell's 
corps moving on the old Stone Pike, and Hill's corps on the 
Plank Road ; into which latter road Longstreet's force also 
came, from his camp near Gordonsville. 

E well's corps, to which my division belonged, crossed 
Mine Run, and encamped at Locust Grove, four miles be- 
yond, on the afternoon of the 4th. When the rest of the corps 
moved, my division and Ramseur's brigade of Rodes' division 
were left to watch the fords of the Rapidan, until relieved 
by cavalry. As soon as this was done, I moved to the posi- 
tion occupied by the rest of the corps, carrying Ramseur with 
me. 

Ewell's corps contained three divisions of infantry, to wit : 
Johnson's, Rodes', and my own (Early's). At this time, one 
of my brigades (Hoke's) was absent, having been with Hoke 
in North Carolina ; and I had only three present, to wit : 
Hays', Pegram's, and Gordon's. One of Rodes' brigades 
(R. D. Johnston's) was at Hanover Junction. I had about 
4,000 muskets for duty ; Johnson about the same number ; 
and Rodes (including Johnston's brigade) about 6,000. 



BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, 



OPERATIONS OF EARLY'S DIVISION. 

On the morning of the 5th, E well's corps was put in motion., 
my division bringing up the rear. A short distance from the 
Old Wilderness Tavern, and just in advance of the place 
where a road diverges to the lelt from the old Stone Pike to 
the Germana Ford road, the enemy, in heavy force, was en- 
countered, and Jones' brigade, of Johnson's division, and 
Battle's brigade, of Rodes' division, were driven back in some 
confusion. My division was ordered up, and formed across the 
pike ; Gordon's brigade being on the right of the road. This 
brigade, as soon as it was brought into line, was ordered for- 
ward, and advanced, through a dense pine thicket, in gallant 
style. In conjunction with Daniels', Doles', and Ramseur's 
brigades, of Rodes' division, it drove the enemy back with 
heavy loss, capturing several hundred prisoners, and gaining 
a commanding position on the right. Johnson, at the same 
time, was heavily engaged in his front ; his division being on 
the left of the pike, and extending across the road to the Ger- 
mana Ford road, which has been mentioned. After the ene- 
my had been repulsed, Hays' brigade was sent to Johnson's 
left, in order to participate in a forward movement ; and it 
did move forward, some half-a-mile or so, encountering the 
enemy in force ; but, from some mistake, not meeting with 
the expected co-operation, except from one regiment of Jones' 
brigade (the 25th. Va.), the most of which was captured, it 
was drawn back to Johnson's line, and took position on his 
left. 

Pegram's brigade was subsequently sent to take position 
on Hays' left ; and, just before night, a very heavy attack 
was made on its front, which was repulsed with severe loss 
to the enemy. In this affair, General Pegram received a 



BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS. 



17 



severe wound in the leg, which disabled him for the field for 
some months. 

Daring the afternoon there was heavy skirmishing along 
the whole line, several attempts having been made by the 
enemy, without success, to regain the position from which he 
had been driven ; and the fighting extended to General Lee's 
right, on the Plank Road. Gordon occupied the position 
which he had gained, on the right, until after dark, when he 
was withdrawn to the extreme left, and his place occupied by 
part of Rodes' division. 

The troops encountered, in the beginning of the fight, con- 
sisted of the 5th. corps, under Warren ; but other troops were 
brought to his assistance. At the close of the day, Ewell's 
corps had captured over a thousand prisoners, besides inflict- 
ing on the enemy very heavy losses in killed and wounded. 
Two pieces of artillery had been abandoned, by the enemy, 
just in front of .the point at which Johnson's right and Rodes' 
left joined, and were subsequently secured by our troops. 

After the withdrawal of Gordon's brigade from the right, 
the whole of my division was on the left of the road diver- 
ging from the pike, in extension of Johnson's line. All my 
brigades had behaved handsomely; and Gordon's advance, 
at the time of the confusion, in the beginning of the fight, 
was made with great energy and dispatch, and was just in 
time to prevent a serious disaster. 

Early on the morning of the 6th, the fighting was resumed, 
and a very heavy attack was m'ade on the front occupied by 
Pegram's brigade (now under the command of Colonel Hoff- 
man, of the 31st Virginia Regiment) ; but it was handsomely 
repulsed, as were several subsequent attacks at the same 
point. 

These attacks were so persistent, that iwo regiments of 
Johnson's division were moved to the rear of Pegram's bri- 
gade, for the purpose of supporting it ; and, when an offer 
was made to relieve it, under the apprehension that its am- 
munition might be exhausted, the men of that gallant brigade 
begged that they might be allowed to retain their position, 



18 



BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS . 



stating that they were getting along very well indeed, and 
wanted no help. 

During the morning, the fact was communicated to Gene- 
ral Ewell, by our cavalry scouts, that a column of the ene- 
my's infantry was moving between our left and the river,, 
with the apparent purpose of turning our left flank ; and in- 
formation was also received that Burnside's corps had crossed 
the river, and was in rear of the enemy's right. I received 
directions to watch this column, and take steps to prevent its 
getting to our rear ; and Johnston's brigade, of Rodes' divisi- 
on, which had just arrived from Hanover Junction, was sent 
to me for that purpose. This brigade, with some artillery, 
was put in position, some distance to my left, so as to 
command some bye-roads coming in from the river. In 
the meantime General Gordon had sent out a scouting 
party on foot, which discovered what was supposed to be 
the enemy's right flank resting in the woods, in front of 
my division ; and, during my absence while posting Johnston's 
brigade, he reported the fact to General Ewell, and suggested 
the propriety of attacking this flank of the enemy with his 
brigade, which was not engaged. On my return, the subject 
was mentioned to me by General Ewell, and I stated to him 
the danger and risk of making the attack under the circum- 
stances, as a column was threatening our left flank, and 
Burnside's corps was in rear of the enemy's flank on which 
the attack was suggested. General Ewell concurred with 
me in this opinion, and the impolicy of the attempt at that 
time was obvious, as we had no reserves, and> if it failed,, 
and the enemy showed any enterprise, a serious disaster 
would befall, not only our corps, but General Lee's whole army. 
In the afternoon, when the column threatening our left had 
been withdrawn, and it had been ascertained that Burnside 
had gone to Grant's left, on account of the heavy fighting on 
that flank, at my suggestion, General Ewell ordered the move* 
ment which Gordon had proposed. I determined to make it 
with Gordon's brigade supported by Johnston's, and to follow 
it up, if successful, with the rest of my division. Gordon's 



BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS. 



brigade was accordingly formed in line near the edge of 
the woods in which the enemy's right rested, and Johnston's 
in the rear, with orders to follow Gordon and obey his orders. 
I posted my Adjutant General, Major John W. Daniel, with a 
courier, in a position to be communicated with by Gordon, so 
as to inform me of the success attending the movement, and 
enable me to put in the other brigades at the right time. As 
soon as Gordon started, which was a very short time before 
sunset, I rode to my line and threw forward Pegram's brigade 
in a position to move when required. In the meantime Gor- 
don had become engaged, and, while Pegram's brigade was 
being formed in line, I saw some of Gordon's men coming 
back in confusion, and Colonel Evans, of the 31st Georgia 
Regiment, endeavoring to rally them. Colonel Evans informed 
me that his regiment, which was on Gordon's right, had 
struck the enemy's breastworks and had given way. I im- 
mediately ordered Pegram's brigade forward, and directed 
Colonel Evans to guide it. Its advance was through a dense 
thicket of underbrush, but it crossed the road running through 
Johnston's line, and struck the enemy's works, and one of the 
regiments, the 13th Virginia, under Colonel Terrill, got 
possession of part of the line, when Colonel Hoffman ordered 
the brigade to retire, as it was getting dark, and there was 
much confusion produced by the difficulties of the advance. 
Gordon had struck the enemy's right flank behind breastworks, 
and a part of his brigade was thrown into disorder. In going 
through the woods, Johnston had obliqued too much and 
passed to Gordon's left, getting in rear of the enemy. Major 
Daniel, not hearing from Gordon, had endeavored to get to 
him, when, finding the condition of things, he attempted to 
lead one of Pegram's regiments to his assistance, and was 
shot down while behaving with great gallantry, receiving a 
wound in the leg which has permanently disabled him. Not- 
withstanding the confusion in part of his brigade, Gordon 
succeeded in throwing the enemy's right flank into great con- 
fusion, capturing two brigadier generals (Seymour and Shaler), 
and several hundred prisoners, all of the 6th Corps, under 



2a 



BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS. 



Sedgwick. The advance of Pegram's brigade, and the de- 
monstration of Johnston's brigade in the rear, where it en- 
countered a part af the enemy's force and captured some 
prisoners, contributed materially to the result. It was fortunate,, 
however, that darkness came to close this affair, as the enemy,, 
if he had been able to discover the disorder on our side, might 
have brought up fresh troops and availed himself of our con- 
dition. As it was, doubtless, the lateness of the hour caused, 
him to be surprised,, and the approaching darkness increased 
the confusion in his ranks, as he could not see the 
strength of the attacking force, and probably imagined it to 
be much more formidable than it really was. All of the bri- 
gades engaged in the attack were drawn back, and formed 
on a new line in front of the old one, and obliquely to it. 

At light on the morning of the 7th, an advance was made,, 
which disclosed the fact that the enemy had given up his line 
of works in front of my whole line, and a good portion of 
Johnston's. Between the lines, a large number of his dead 
had been left, and, at his breastworks, a large number of 
muskets and knapsacks had been abandoned, and there was 
every indication of great confusion. It was not till then, that 
we ascertained the full extent of the success attending the 
movement of the evening before. The enemy had entirely 
abandoned the left side of the road, across which Johnson's- 
line extended, and my division and a part of his were thrown 
forward, occupying a part of the abandoned works on the 
right of the road, and leaving all those on the left in our rear. 
This rendered our line straight, the left having been pre- 
viously thrown back, making a curve. 

During this day there was some skirmishing, but no serious 
fighting in my front. The loss in my division during the 
fighting in the Wilderness was comparatively light. 

On the morning of the 8th, it was discovered that the enemy 
was leaving our front and moving towards Spottsylvania. 
Court House. General Lee's army was also put in motion ; 
E well's Corps moving along the line occupied by our troops 
on the day before, until it reached the Plank Road,, where it 



BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS. 



21 



struck across to Shady Grove, which is on the road from 
Orange Court House to Spottsylvania Court House. 

On reaching the Plank Road, I received through General 
A. P. Hill, who was sick and unable to remain on duty, an 
order from General Lee, transferring Hays' brigade from my 
division to Johnson's, in order that it might be consolidated 
with another Louisiana brigade in that division, whose Briga- 
dier-General had been killed at the Wilderness, and Johnston's 
brigade from Rodes' division to mine ; and assigning me to 
the temporary command of Hill's corps, which was still in 
position across the Plank Road, and was to bring up the rear. 
I accordingly turned over the command of my division to 
Gordon, the senior Brigadier left with it, and assumed com- 
mand of Hill's corps.* 



*In his official report, Grant says : " Early on the 5th. the advance corps, the 
5th, Major-General G. K. Warren commanding, met and engaged the enemy 
outside his entrenchments near Mine Run ; " and further on he says : " On the 
morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind 
his entrenched lines, with pickets to the front covering a part of the battle field. 
From this it was evident to my mind that the two days fighting had satisfied 
him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwith- 
standing his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind his 
works " In mentioning his movement towards Spottsylvania Court House, he 
says : " But the enemy having became aware of our movement, and having the 
shorter line, was enabled to reach there first." If these statements were true, the 
only legitimate inference is that General Lee had an entrenched line on, or near 
Mine Run, previously established; that the battle commenced immediately in 
front of the works on this line ; and that, after the two days fighting, he had 
fallen behind them to await an attack. Whereas the fact is, that the only 
entrenched line on, or near, Mine Run, was that made, on its west bank, when 
Meade crossed the river at the end of November 1803, and which was used for 
that occasion only. The fighting in the Wilderness began eight or ten miles east 
of that line, and at no time during that fighting was it usad for any purpose. 
The ' entrenched lines occupied by our army on the morning of the 7th, were 
slight temporary works thrown up, on, or in front of the battle field, though it 
is probable that, at some points, the line may not have been as far to the front 
as our troops had advanced; as, in taking it, regard was necessarily had to the 
conformation of the ground. On our left, as will be seen above, the line was 
advanced in front of Grant's own line of the previous day. 

Grant says General Lee had the advantage of position As the latter had to 
move from his lines on the Rapidan and attack Grant in the Wilderness, how 



BATTLES AROUND SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT 
HOUSE. 

OPERATIONS OF HELL'S CORPS. 

Hill's Corps was composed of Heth's, Wilcox's, and 
Mahone's (formerly Anderson's) divisions of infantry, and 
three battalions of artillery under Colonel Walker. When I 
took command of it, the infantry numbered about 13,000 
muskets for duty. 

General Lee's orders to me, were to move by Todd's 
tavern along the Brock Road to Spottsylvania Court House, as 
soon as our front was clear of the enemy. In order to get 
into that road, it was necessary to reopen an old one leading 
from Hill's right, by which I was enabled to take a cross road 
leading into the road from Shady Grove to Todd's tavern. 
The waggon trains and all the artillery, except one battalion, 
were sent around by Shady Grove. About a mile from the 
road from Shady Grove to Todd's tavern, the enemy's 
cavalry videttes were encountered, and Mahone's division 
was thrown forward to develope the enemy's force and 
position. Mahone encountered a force of infantry, which had 
moved up from Todd's tavern towards Shady Grove, and 
had quite a brisk engagement with it, causing it to fall back 
rapidly towards the former place. At the same time, General 
Hampton, who had communicated with me, after I left the 
Plank Road, moved with his cavalry on my right and struck 

happened it that he was enabled to get the advantage of position, after the 
two days fighting? He also says that General Lee was enabled to reach 
Spottsylvania Court House, first, because he had the shorter line. The fact is, 
that, as the two armies lay in their positions at the Wilderness, their lines were 
parallel to the road to Spottsylvania Court House. Grant had the possession of 
the direct road to that place, and he had the start. General Lee had to move 
on the circuitous route by Shady Grove, and he was enabled to arrive there first 
with part of his infantry, because his cavalry held Grant's advance in check for 
nearly an entire day. 



BATTLES OF SPOTTSYLV A NIA C. H. 



23 



the enemy on the flank and rear ; but on account of want of 
knowledge of the country on our part, and the approach of 
darkness, the enemy was enabled to make his escape. This 
affair developed the fact that the enemy was in possession of 
Todd's tavern and the Brock Road, and a continuation of my 
march would have led though his entire army. We bivouacked 
for the night, at the place from which Mahone had driven the 
enemy, and a force was thrown oat towards Todd's tavern, 
which was about a mile distant. 

Very early next morning, (the 9th,) I received an order from 
General Lee, through Hampton, to move on the Shady Grove 
road towards Spottsylvannia Court House, which I did, 
crossing a small river called the Po, twice. After reaching 
the rear of the position occupied by the other two corps, I was 
ordered to Spottsylvannia Court House, to take position on 
the right, and cover the road from that place to Fredericksburg. 
No enemy appeared in my front on this day, except at a dis- 
tance on the Fredericksburg Road. 

Early on the morning of the 10th, I was ordered to move 
one of my divisions back, to cover the crossing of the Po 
on the Shady Grove Road ; and to move with another divi- 
sion, to the rear and left, by the way of Spottsylvannia Old 
Court House, and drive back a column of the enemy which 
had crossed the Po and taken possession of the Shady Grove 
Road, thus threatening our rear and endangering our trains, 
which were on the road leading by the Old Court House to 
Louisa Court House. 

Our line was then north of the Po, with its left, Fields' 
division of Longstreet's corps, resting on that stream, just 
above the crossing of the Shady Grove Road. The whole of 
the enemy's force was also north of the Po, prior to this 
movement of his. Mahone's division was sent to occupy the 
banks of the Po on Field's left, while, with Heth's division 
and a battalion of artillery, I moved to the rear, crossing the 
Po on the Louisa Court House Road, and then following that 
road until we reached one coming in from Waite's Shop on 
the Shady Grove Road. After moving about a mile on this 



24 



BATTLES OF SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H. 



road, we met Hampton gradually falling back before the 
enemy, who had pushed out a column of infantry considerably 
to the rear of our line. This column was, in turn, forced 
back to the position on the Shady Grove Road, which was 
occupied by what was reported to be Hancock's corps. 
Following up and crossing a small stream just below a mill 
pond, we succeeded in reaching Waite's Shop, from whence 
an attack was made on the enemy, and the entire force 
which had crossed the Po was driven back with a loss of one 
piece of artillery, which fell into our hands, and a consid- 
erable number in killed and wounded. This relieved us 
from a very threatening danger, as the position the enemy 
had attained would have enabled him to completely enfilade 
Field's position, and get possession of the line of our com- 
munications to the rear, within a very short distance of which 
he was, when met by the force which drove him back. In 
this affair, Heth's division behaved very handsomely, all of 
the brigades, (Cook's, Davis', Kirkland's, and Walker's,) 
being engaged in the attack. General H. H. Walker had 
the misfortune to receive a severe wound in the foot, which 
rendered amputation necessary, but, otherwise, our loss was 
slight. As soon as the road was cleared, Mahone's division 
crossed' the Po, but it was not practicable to pursue the affair 
further, as the north bank of the stream at this point was 
covered by a heavily entrenched line, with a number of 
batteries, and night was approaching. 

On the morning of the 11th, Heth was moved back to 
Spottsyivania Court House, and Malone was left to occupy 
the position on the Shady Grove Road, from which the enemy 
had been driven.* 

My line on the right had been connected with Ewell's 

* It will be seen, that after this affair, I held, for a time, both of General 
Lee's flanks, which was rathe*r an anomaly, but it could not be avoided, as we 
bad no reserves, and the two other corps, being immediately in front of the enemy 
in line of battle, and almost constantly engaged, could not be moved without 
great risk. It was absolutely necessary to occupy the position held on the left 
by Malone, to avoid a renewal of the danger from which we had escaped. 



BATTLES OF SPOTTSY LYANIA C. H. 



25 



right, and covered the Fredericksburg Road, as also the road 
leading from Spottsyivannia Court House across the Ny into 
the road from Fredericksburg to Hanover Junction. Wilcox 
was on my left uniting with Ewell, and Heth joined him. 
The enemy had extended his lines across the Fredericksburg 
Road, but there was no fighting on this front on the 10th or 
1 1th, except some artillery firing. 

On the afternoon of the 11th, the enemy was demonstrating 
to our left, up the Po, as if to get possession of Shady Grove 
and the road from thence to Loaisa Court House. General 
Hampton reported a column of infantry moving up the Po, 
and I was ordered by General Lee to take possession of Shady 
Grove, by light next morning, and hold it against the enemy. 
To aid in that purpose, two brigades of Wilcox's division, 
(Thomas' and Scales') were moved from the right, and 
Mahone was ordered to move before light to Shady Grove ; 
but during the ni^ht it was discovered that the movement to 
our left was a feint, and that there was a real movement of 
the enemy towards our right. 

Before daybreak on the morning of the 12th, Wilcox's 
brigades were returned to him, and at dawn, Mahone's divi- 
sion was moved to the right, leaving Wright's brigade of that 
division to cover the crossing of the Po on Field's left. On 
this morning, the enemy made a very heavy attack on Ewell's 
front, and broke the line where it was occupied by Johnson's 
division. A portion of the attacking force swept along John- 
son's line to Wilcox's left, and was checked by a prompt 
movement, on the part of Brigadier General Lane, who was 
on that flank. As soon as the firing was heard, General 
Wilcox sent Thomas' and Scales' brigades to Lane's assist- 
ance, and they arrived just as Lane's brigade had repulsed 
this body of the enemy, and they pursued it for a short dis- 
tance. As soon as Mahone's division arrived from the left, 
Perrin's and Harris', brigades of that division, and subse- 
quently, McGowan's brigade of Wilcox's division were sent 
to General Ewell's assistance, and were carried into action 
under his orders. Brigadier General Perrin was killed, 



16 BATTLES OF SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H» 



and Brigadier General McGowan severely wounded, while 
gallantly leading their respective, brigades into action ; and 
ali the brigades sent to EwelPs assistance suffered severely. 

Subsequently, on the same day, under orders from General 
Lee, Lane's brigade of Wilcox's division, and Mahone's own 
brigade (under Colonel Weisiger), were thrown to the front, 
for the purpose of moving to the left, and attacking the flank 
of the column of the enemy which had broken Ewell's line, 
to relieve the pressure on him, and, if possible, recover the 
part of the line which had been lost. Lane's brigade com- 
menced the movement and had not proceeded far, when it 
encountered and attacked, in a piece of woods in front of my 
line, the 9th corps, under Burnside, moving up to attack a 
salient on my front. Lane captured over three hundred 
prisoners, and three battle flags, and his attack on the enemy's 
flank, taking him by surprise, no doubt, contributed materially 
to his repulse. Mahone's brigade did not become seriously 
engaged. The attacking column which Lane encountered, 
got up to within a very short distance of a salient defended 
by Walker's brigade of Heth's division, under Colonel Mayo, 
before it was discovered, as there was a pine thicket in front, 
under cover of which the advance was made. A heavy fire 
of musketry from Walker's brigade, and Thomas' which was 
on its left, and a fire of artillery from a considerable number 
of guns on Heth's line, were opened with tremendous effect 
upon the attacking column, and it was driven back with 
heavy loss, leaving its dead in front of our works. This affair 
look place under the eye of General Lee himself. In the 
afternoon, another aitempt was made to carry out the contem- 
plated flank movement, with Mahone's brigade, and Cook's 
brigade of Heth's division, to be followed up by the other 
troops under my command ; but it was discovered that the 
enemy had one or more entrenched lines in our front, to the 
fire from which our flanking column would have been ex- 
posed. Moreover, the ground between the lines was very 
rough, being full of rugged ravines and covered with thick 
pines and other growth ; and it was thought advisable to 



battles of spottsylvania c. m. 



desist from the attempt. The two brigades which were to 
have commenced the movement, were then thrown to the 
front on both sides of the Fredericksburg road 9 and, passing 
over two lines of breastworks, defended by a strong force of 
skirmishers, developed the existence of a third and much 
stronger line in rear, which would have afforded an almost 
insuperable obstacle to the proposed flank movement This 
closed the operations of the corps under my command oti the 
memorable 12th of May, 

Between that day and the 19th} there Was no serious attack 
on my front, but much manoeuvring by the enemy. General 
Mahone made two or three reconnoissances to the front, which 
disclosed the fact that the enemy was gradually moving to 
our right. In making one of them, he encountered a body of 
the enemy which had got possession of Gayle's house, on the left 
of the road leading from our right towards the Fredericksburg 
and Hanover Junction road, at which a portion of our cavalry, 
under Brigadier General Chambliss, had been previously 
posted, and drove it back across the Ny.* Another recon* 
noissance, handsomely made by Brigadier General Wright, 
who had been brought from the left, ascertained that a heavy 
force of the enemy was between the Ny and the Po, in front 
of my right, which was held by Mahone, and was along the 
road towards Hanover Junction. To meet this movement of 
the enemy, Fields' division was brought from the left and 
placed on my right. 

On the 19th, General Ewell made a movement against the 
enemy's right, and to create a diversion in his favour, Thomas' 
brigade was thrown forward, and drove the enemy into his 
works in front of the salient, against which Burnside's attack 
had been made on the 12th, while the whole corps was held 

• The Mattapony River, which, by its junction with the Pamunkey, forma 
York River, is formed by the confluence of four streams, called respectively, the 
" Mat," " Ta," " Po," and " Ny.''' The Ny is north and east of Spottsylvannia 
Court House, and behind it the enemy did most of his manoeuvring in my front. 
It unites with the Po, a few miles to the east and south of Spottsylvannia Court ' 
House, and both streams are difficult to cross, except where there are bridges. 



28 



BATTLES OF S POTTS YL VAN I A C. H. 



in readiness to co-operate with Ewell, should his attack prove 
successful ; but, as he was compelled to retire, Thomas was 
withdrawn. 

Subsequently, the enemy retired from Heth's and Wilcox's 
fronts; and, on the afternoon of the 21st, Wilcox was sent 
out on the road leading from Mahone's front across the Ny, 
with two of his brigades to feel the enemy, and found him 
still in force behind entrenched lines, and had a brisk engage- 
ment with that force. 

While Wilcox was absent, an order was received by me, 
from General Lee, to turn over to General Hill the command 
of his corps, as he had reported for duty. I did so at once, 
and thus terminated my connection with this corps, which I 
had commanded during all the trying scenes around Spott- 
sylvannia Court House. The officers and men of the corps 
had all behaved well, and contributed, in no little degree, to 
the result by which Grant was compelled to wait six days for 
reinforcements from Washington, before he could resume the 
offensive, or make another of his flank movements to get be- 
tween General Lee's army and Richmond. 



HANOVER JUNCTION. 

OPERATIONS OP EARLY'S DIVISION. 

The movement of the enemy to get between our army and 
Richmond had been discovered, and, on the afternoon of the 
21st, E well's corps was put in motion towards Hanover 
Junction. * After turning over to General Hill, the command 

* Hanover Junction is about 22 mile3 from Richmond, and is at the intersection 
of the Richmond Fredericksburg and Potomac railroad with the Central rail- 
road from Richmond west, via Gordonsville and Staunton, It is on the direct 
road both from Spottsylvannia Court House and Fredericksburg to Richmond. 
The North Anna River is north of the Junction about two miles, and the South 
" Anna about three miles south of it. These two streams unite south of east, and 
a few miles from the Junction, and form the Pamunkey River. 



OPERATIONS AT HANOVER JUNCTION. 



29 



of his corps, I rode in the direction taken by E well's corps, 
and overtook it, a short time before day on the morning of the 
22nd. Hoke's brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel Lewis, this 
day joined us from Petersburg, and an order was issued trans- 
ferring Gordon's brigade, now under the command of Brigadier 
General Evans, to Johnson's division, which was placed 
under the command of General Gordon, who had been made 
a Major General. This left me in command of three brigades, 
to wit : Pegram's, Hoke's, and Johnston's, all of which were 
very much reduced in strength. My Adjutant General, Major 
Daniel, had been disabled for life by a wound received at the 
Wilderness, and my Inspector General, Major Samuel Hale, 
had been mortally wounded at Spottsylvannia Court House, 
on the 12th, while serving with the division and acting with 
great gallantry during the disorder which ensued after Ewell's 
line was broken. Both were serioas losses to me. 

On this day, (the 22nd), we moved to Hanover Junction, and, 
next day my division was posted on the extreme right, cover- 
ing a ferry two or three miles below the railroad bridge across 
the North Anna. While at Hanover Junction my division 
was not engaged. At one time it was moved towards our 
left, for the purpose of supporting a part of the line on which 
an attack was expected, and moved back again without being 
required. It was, subsequently, placed temporarily on the 
left of the corps, relieving Rodes' division and a part of Fields' 
while the line was being remodelled, and then took position 
on the right again. 

During the night of the 26th, the enemy again withdrew 
from our front. # 



•At Hanover Junction General Lee was joined by Pickett's division of Long- 
street's corps, and Breckinridge with two small brigades of infantry, and a 
battalion of artillery. These, with Hoke's brigade, were the first and only rein- 
forcements received by General Lee since the opening of the campaign. Yet, 
Grant's immense army, notwithstanding the advantage gained by it on the 12th 
of May, had been so crippled, that it was compelled to wait six days at Spott- 
sylvannia Court House for reinforcements from Washington, before it could 
resume the offensive. Breckinridge's infantry numbered less than 3000 muskets ; 
yet, Grant put3 it at 15000, and he makes an absurd attempt to cast the whole 
D 



BATTLES OF COLD HARBOUR. 

OPERATIONS OF SWELL'S CORPS. 

On the 27th, the enemy having withdrawn to the north bank 
of the north Anna, and commenced another flank movement 
by moving down the north bank of the Pamunkey, E well's 
corps, now under my command, by reason of General E well's 
sickness, was moved across the South Anna over the bridge 
of the Central railroad, and by a place called " Merry Oaks,' 5 
leaving Ashland on the Richmond Fredericksburg and Poto- 
mac railroad to the right, and bivouacked for the night at 
Hughes' cross road, the intersection of the road from Ashland 
to Atlee's station on the Central railroad with the road from 
the Merry Oaks to Richmond. Next morning I moved by 
Atlee's station to Hundley's corner, at the intersection of the 
road from Hanover Town, (the point at which Grant crossed 
the Pamunkey,) by Pole Green Church, to Richmond, with 
the road from Atlee's station, by Old Church in Hanover 
County, to the White House, on the Pamunkey. This is the 
point from which General Jackson commenced his famous attack 
on McClellan's flank and rear, in 1862, and it was very im- 
portant that it should be occupied, as it intercepted Grant's 
direct march towards Richmond. All these movements were 
made under orders from General Lee. 

My troops were placed in position, covering the road by 
Pole Creen Church, and also the road to Old Church, with my 
right resting near Beaver Dam Creek, a small stream running 

blame for the failure of the campaign, so far, on Butler ; to immolate whom he 
makes a digression in his account of the operations at Hanover Junction, and 
says : £< The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed 
itself up at Bermuda Hundreds, the enemy was enabled to bring the most, if not 
all the reinforcements brought from the south by Beauregard against the Army 
of the Potomac." He therefore determined to try another flank movement, and 
to get more reinforcements from the army at Bermuda Hundreds. 



BATTLES OF COLD HARBOUR. 



31 



towards Mechanicsville and into the Chickahominy. Brig- 
adier General Ramseur of Rodes' division, was this day 
assigned to the command of my division. EwelPs corps, the 
2nd of the Army of Northern Virginia, now numbered less 
than 9,000 muskets for duty, its loss, on the 12th of May, hav- 
ing been very heavy. 

On the 29th, the enemy having crossed the Tottopotomoy, 
(a creek running just north of Pole Green church, and east- 
ward to the Pamunkey,) appeared in my front on both roads, 
and there was some skirmishing, but no heavy fighting. 

On the afternoon of the 30th, in accordance with orders 
from General Lee, I moved to the right across Beaver Dam, 
to the road from Old Church to Mechanicsville, and thence 
along that road towards Old Church, until we reached Bethesda 
Church. At this point the enemy was encountered, and his 
troops which occupied the road, were driven by Rodes' divi- 
sion towards the road from Hundley's corner, which unites 
with the road from Mechanicsville, east of Bethesda Church. 
Pegram's brigade, under the command of Colonel Edward 
Willis of the 12th Georgia regiment, was sent forward, with 
one of Rodes' brigades on its right, to feel the enemy, and 
ascertain his strength ; but, meeting with a heavy force behind 
breastworks, it was compelled to retire, with the loss of some 
valuable officers and men, and among them were Colonel 
Willis, mortally wounded, and Colonel Terrill of the 13th 
Virginia regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel Watkins of the 
52nd Virginia regiment, killed. This movement showed that 
the enemy was moving to our right flank, and at night, I with- 
drew a short distance on the Mechanicsville road, covering it 
with my force. When I made the movement from Hundley's 
corner, my position at that place was occupied by a part of 
Longstreet's corps, under Anderson. 

On the next morning, my troops were placed in position on 
the east side of Beaver Dam across the road to Mechanicsville, 
but Rodes was subsequently moved to the west side of the 
creek. 

Grant's movement to our right, towards Cold Harbour, was 



BATTLES OF COLD HARBOUR, 



continued on the 31st, and the 1st of June, and corresponding 
movements were made by General Lee to meet him, my com- 
mand retaining its position with a heavy force in its front. 

On the 2nd, all the troops on my left, except Heth's division 
of Hill's corps, had moved to the right, and, in the after- 
noon of that day, Rodes' division moved forward, along the 
road from Hundley's corner towards Old Church, and drove 
the enemy from his entrenchments, now occupied with heavy 
skirmish lines, and forced back his left towards Bethesda 
Church, where there was a heavy force. Gordon swung 
round so as to keep pace with Rodes, and Heth co-operated, 
following Rodes and taking position on his left flank. In this 
movement there was some heavy fighting and several hun- 
dred prisoners were taken by us. Brigadier-General Doles, 
a gallant officer of Rodes' division, was killed, but otherwise 
our loss was not severe. 

On the next day (the 3rd.), when Grant made an attack at 
Cold Harbour in which he suffered very heavily, there were 
repeated attacks on Rodes' and Heth's fronts, those on Cook's 
brigade, of Heth's division, being especially heavy, but all of 
them were repulsed. There was also heavy skirmishing on 
Gordon's front. During the day, Heth's left was threatened 
by the enemy's cavalry, bat it was kept ofTby Walker's brigade 
under Colonel Fry, which covered that flank, and also repulsed 
an effort of the enemy's infantry to get to our rear. As it was 
necessary that Heth's division should join its corps on the right, 
and my flank in this position was very much exposed, I with- 
drew at the close of the day to the line previously occupied, 
and next morning Heth moved to the right. 

My right now connected with the left of Longstreet's corps 
under General Anderson. The enemy subsequently evacu- 
ated his position at Bethesda Church and his lines in my front, 
and, having no opposing force to keep my troops in their lines, 
1 made two efforts to attack the enemy on his right flank and 
rear. The first was made on the 6th, when I crossed the 
Matadaquean (a small stream, running through wide swamps 
in the enemy's rear), and got in rear of his right flank, driving 



BATTLES OF COLD HARBOUR. 



33 



in his skirmishers until we came to a swamp, which could be 
crossed only on a narrow causeway defended by an entrenched 
line with artillery. General Anderson was to have co-operated 
with me, by moving down the other side of the Matadaquean, 
but the division sent for that purpose did not reach the position 
from which I started until near night, and I was therefore 
compelled to retire as my position was too much exposed. 

On the next day (the 7th.), a reconnoissance made in front of 
Anderson's line, showed that the greater part of it was uncov- 
ered, and, in accordance with instructions from General Lee, 
I moved in front of, and between it and the Matadaquean, until 
my progress was arrested by a ravine and swamp which pre- 
vented any further advance, but a number of pieces of artillery 
were opqned upon the enemy's position in flank and reverse, 
so as to favour a movement from Anderson's front, which had 
been ordered but was not made ; and at night I retired from 
this position to the rear of our lines. 

Since the fighting at the Wilderness, Grant had made it an 
invariable practice to cover his front, flank, and rear, with a 
perfect network of entrenchments, and all his movements were 
made under cover of such works. It was therefore very diffi- 
cult to get at him. 

On the 11th., my command was moved to the rear of Hill's 
line, near Gaines' Mill ; and, on the 12th , I received orders 
to move, with the 2nd. corps, to the Shenadoah Valley, to 
meet Hunter. This, therefore, closed my connection with the 
campaign from the Rapidan to James River. 

When I moved, on the morning of the 13th., Grant had al- 
ready put his army in motion to join Butler, on James River, 
a position which he could have reached, from his camps on 
the north of the Rapidan, by railroad and transports, without 
the loss of a man. In attempting to force his way by land, he 
had already lost, in killed and wounded, more men than were 
in General Lee's entire army ; and he was compelled to give 
up, in despair, the attempt to reach Richmond in that way.* 

* Grant, in describing his movement from Spottsylvania Court House to Han- 
dover Junction., says : u But the enemy again having the shorter line, and being in 



34 NOTE ON THE REPORTS OF GRANT AND STANTON. 



possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the North- Anna in advanee- 
of us, and took position behind it." And, when he speaks of his final determina- 
tion to join Butler, he says : " After the Battle of the Wilderness it was evident 
that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risk with the army 
he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or, feebly 
on the offensive, immediately in front of them r and where, in case of repulse,, 
he could retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of life than T was wil- 
ling to make, all could not be accomplished that I designed north of Rich- 
mond." 

Mr. Secretary Stanton, with a keenness of strategic acumen which is alto- 
gether unparalleled, says: "Forty three days of desperate fighting or march- 
ing, by day and night, forced back the rebel army from the Rapidan to their en- 
trenchments around Richmond, and carried the Army of the Potomac to the 
south side of James River. The strength of the enemy's force when the 
campaign opened, or the extent of his loss, is not known to this Department, 
Any inequality between Lee's army and the Army of the Potomac, was fully 
compensated by the advantage of position." 

We are left in the dark whether it was the desperate fighting or rfie desperate 
marching which did all this : but, however that may be, it was a wonderful 
achievement, especially when it is considered that the Army of the Potomac 
might have been carried to the south side of James River by transports, and 
Lee's army thereby forced back to the entrenchments around Richmond, with- 
out the " Forty-three days of desperate fighting or marching, by day and 
night," and without the loss of men sustained by Grant There are some who 
think Stanton is slyly making fun of Grant ; but, if he is not, and is in dead 
earnest, the question naturally arises, in the mind of one not as gifted as the 
Federal Secretary of War: How happened it that, if Lee was being constantly 
forced back, for forty-three days, over a distance of more than eighty miles, he 
always had the shorter line, and posses-ion of the main roads, and got the ad- 
vantage of position, and had time to fortify it? 

I happen to know that General Lee always had the greatest anxiety to strike 
at Grant, in the open field ; and I should like to know when it was that the 
latter operated on the defensive, or offensive either, except behind, or immedi- 
ately in front of, far better entrenchments than General Lee's army, with its- 
limited means, was able to make An inspection of the battle-fields, from the 
Rapidan to the James, will show that Grant's army did a vast deal more dig- 
ging than General Lee's. 

The truth is, that the one commander was a great captain, and perfect master 
of his art, while the other had none of the requisites of a great captain, but 
merely possessed the most ordinary brute courage, and had the control of un- 
limited numbers and means. Yet, it is claimed that Grant fights and writes 
better than Alexander, and Hannibal, and Csesar, and Napoleon, and all the 
rest ; and when, in the exercise of his great powers of composition, he turns 
the batteries of his rhetoric on Butler, I say, in his own classic language, " Go 
in ! " You can't hit him a lick amiss ! I cannot, however, but be amused at 
the effort to make Butler the scape-goat ; and cannot help thinking' that Grant 
ought to have known, beforehand, that he (Butler) was unfit to make war, ex.- 



s 



NOTE ON THE REPORTS OF GRANT AND STANTON. 35 

cept on defenceless women and children, and that the trophies valued by him 
were not those won at the cannon's mouth. ' 

Grant, in his report, has enunciated the leading principles of his strategy, 
and he is certainly entitled to the credit of having practised them, if not to the 
merit of originality. They were : " First, to use the greatest number of troops 
practicable against the armed force of the enemy ; " and, u Second, to hammer 
continuously against the armed force of the enemy, and his resources, until, by 
mere attrition, if by nothing else, there should be nothing left to him but an 
equal submission, with the loyal section of our common country, to the consti- 
tution and laws of the land." (Alas ! what has become of the constitution and 
laws?) This latter principle was more concisely and forcibly expressed by Mr. 
Lincoln, when he declared his purpose to "keep a-pegging." The plain Eng- 
lish of the whole idea was to continue raising troops, and to oppose them, in 
overwhelming numbers, to the Confederate Army, until the latter should wear 
itself out whipping them, when a newly-recruited army might u go in and 
win.'' And, this was actually what took place in regard to General Lee's 
army. 

Grant having established his fame as a writer, as well as fighter, I presume 
he will give the world the benefit of his ideas, and publish a work on strategy, 
which I would suggest ought to be called " The Lincoln-Grant or Pegging- 
Hammer Art of War " 

He has made some observations, in his report, about the advantages of inte- 
rior lines of communication, supposed to be possessed by the Confederate com- 
manders, which are more specious than sound. The Mississippi Eiver divided 
the Confederacy into two parts, and the immense naval power of the enemy 
enabled him to render communication across that river, after the loss of New 
Orleans and Memphis, always difficult, and finally to get entire possession of it. 
On the eastern side of it, the railroad communications were barely sufficient for 
the transportation of supplies, and the transportation of troops over them was 
always tedious and difficult. The Ohio River, in the West, and the Potomac, in 
the East, with the mountains of Western Virginia, rendered it impossible for an 
invading army to march into the enemy's country, except at one or two fords 
on the Potomac, just east of the Blue Ridge, and two or three fords above Har- 
per's Ferry, The possession of the seas, and the blockade of our ports, as well 
as the possession of the Mississippi, the Ohio, and Potomac Rivers, with the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the railroads through Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, and Tennessee, enabled the enemy to transport 
troops, from the most remote points, with more ease and rapidity than they 
could be transported over the railroads under the control of the Confederate 
Government, all of which were in bad condition. The enemy, therefore, in 
fact had all the advantages of interior lines ; that is, rapidity of communica- 
tion and concentration, with the advantage, also, of unrestricted communica- 
tion with all the world, which his naval power gave him. 



CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND 

AND 

THE VALLEY OF VIRGINIA. 



INTRODUCTION. 

The Valley of Virginia, in its largest sense, embraces all 
that country lying between the Blue Ridge and Alleghany 
Mountains, which unite at its south-western end. 

The Shenandoah Valley, which is a part of the Valley of 
Virginia, embraces the Counties of Augusta, Rockingham, 
Shenandoah, Page, Warren, Clarke, Frederick, Jefferson and 
Berkeley. This Valley is bounded on the north by the Potomac, 
on the south by the County of Rockbridge, on the east by the 
Blue Ridge, and on the west by the Great North Mountain 
and its ranges. 

The Shenandoah River is composed of two branches, called, 
respectively, the " North Fork " and the " South Fork," which 
unite near Front Royal in Warren County. The North Fork 
rises in the Great North Mountain, and runs eastwardly to 
within a short distance of New Market in Shenandoah County, 
and thence north-east by Mount Jackson to Strasburg, where 
it turns east to Front Royal. The South Fork is formed by 
the union of North River, Middle River, and South River. 
North River and Middle River, running from the west, unite 
near Mount Meridian in Augusta County. South River rises 
in the south-eastern part of Augusta, and runs by Waynesboro, 
along the western base of the Blue Ridge, to Port Republic in 
Rockingham, where it unites with the stream formed by the 



38 



INTRODUCTION. 



junction of the North and Middle Rivers, a few miles above. 
From Port Republic, the South Fork of the Shenandoah runs 
north-east, through the eastern border of Rockingham and the 
county of Page, to Front Royal in Warren County. 

The North Fork and South Fork are separated by the Mas- 
sanutten Mountain, which is connected with no other mount- 
ain, but terminates abruptly at both ends. Its northern end is 
washed at its base, just below Strasburg, by the North Fork. 
Its southern end terminates near the road between Harrison- 
burg and Conrad's Store on the South Fork, at which latter 
place the road through Swift Run Gap in the Blue Ridge 
crosses that stream. Two valleys are thus formed, the one 
on the North Fork being called " The Main Valley," and the 
other on the South Fork, and embracing the County of Page 
and part of the County of Warren, being usually known by 
the name of " The Luray Valley." The Luray Valley unites 
with the Main Valley at both ends of the mountain. There is 
a good road across Massanutten Mountain, from one valley 
to the other, through a gap near New-Market. South of this 
gap there is no road across the mountain, and north of it the 
roads are very rugged and not practicable for the march of a 
large army with its trains. At the northern or lower end of 
Massanutten Mountain, and between two branches of it, is a 
valley called " Powell's Fort Valley " or more commonly 
" The Fort." This valley is accessible only by the very rugged 
roads over the mountain which have been mentioned, and 
through a ravine at its lower end. From its isolated position, 
it was not the theatre of military operations of any consequence, 
but merely furnished a refuge for deserters, stragglers, and 
fugitives from the battle fields. 

From Front Royal, the Shenandoah River runs along the 
western base of the Blue Ridge to Harper's Ferry, where it 
unites with the Potomac, which here bursts through the 
mountains. The mountain in extension of the range of the 
Blue Ridge from this point through Maryland and Pennsyl- 
vania is called " South Mountain." 

Strictly speaking, the County of Berkeley and the greater 



INTRODUCTION. 



39 



part of Frederick are not in the Valley of the Shenandoah. 
The Opequon, rising south-west of Winchester, and crossing 
the Valley Pike four or five miles south of that place, turns to 
the north and empties into the Potomac some distance above 
its junction with the Shenandoah ; the greater part of Fred- 
erick and nearly the whole of Berkeley being on the western 
side of the Opequon. 

Little North Mountain, called in the lower valley " North 
Mountain," runs north-east, through the western portions of 
Shenandoah, Frederick and Berkeley Counties, to the Potomac. 
At its northern end, where it is called North Mountain, it 
separates the waters of the Opequon from those of Back Creek. 

Cedar Creek rises in Shenandoah County, west of Little 
North Mountain, and running north-east along its western base, 
passes through that mountain, four or five miles from Stras- 
burg, and, then making a circuit, empties into the North Fork 
of the Shenandoah, about two miles below Strasburg. 

The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad crosses the Potomac at 
Harper's Ferry, and, passing through Martinsburg in Berkeley 
County, crosses Back Creek near its mouth, runs up the 
Potomac, crossing the South Branch of that river near its 
mouth, and then the North Branch to Cumberland in Mary- 
land. From this place it runs into Virginia again and, passing 
through North Western Virginia, strikes the Ohio River by 
two stems terminating at Wheeling and Parkersburg respect- 
ively. 

There is a railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, 
called " The Winchester and Potomac Railroad," and also 
one from Manassas Junction on the Orange and Alexandria 
Railroad, through Manassas Gap in the Blue Ridge, by Front 
Royal and Strasburg, to Mount Jackson, called " The 
Manassas Gap Railroad ;" but both of these roads were torn up 
and rendered unserviceable in the year 1862, under the orders 
of General Jackson. 

From Staunton in Augusta County, there is a fine mac- 
adamized road called " The Valley Pike," running through 
Mount Sydney, Mount Crawford, Harrisonburg, New Market, 



40 



INTRODUCTION. 



Mount Jackson, Edinburg, Woodstock, Strasburg, Middle- 
town, Newtown, Bartonsville and Kearnstown to Winchester 
in Frederick County, and crossing Middle River seven miles 
from Staunton, North River at Mount Crawford eighteen miles 
from Staunton, the North Fork of the Shenandoah at Mount 
Jackson, Cedar Creek between Strasburg and Middletown, 
and the Opequon at Bartonsville, four or five miles from Win- 
chester. There is also another road west of the Valley Pike, 
connecting these several villages, called the u Back Road," 
and, in some places, another road between the Valley Pike 
and the Back Road, which is called the " Middle Road." 

From Winchester there is a macadamized road, via Martins- 
burg, to Williamsport on the Potomac in Maryland, and 
another, via Berryville in Clarke County, and Charlestown in 
Jefferson County, to Harper's Ferry. There is also a good 
pike from Winchester to Front Royal, which crosses both forks 
of the Shenandoah just above their junction ; and from Front 
Royal there are good roads up the Luray Valley, and by the 
way of Conrad's Store and Port Republic, to Harrisonburg and 
Staunton. 

From Staunton, south, there are good roads passing through 
Lexington, in Rockbridge County, and Buchanan, in Botte- 
tourte County, to several points on the Virginia and Tennessee 
Railroad ; and others direct from Staunton and Lexington to 
Lynchburg. 

The Central Railroad, from Richmond, passes through the 
Blue-Ridge, with a tunnel, at Rock-fish Gap, and runs 
through Waynesboro and Staunton, westwardly, to Jackson's 
River, which is one of the head-streams of James River. 

This description of the country is given in order to render 
the following narrative intelligible without too much repe- 
tition. 

In the spring of 1864, before the opening of the campaign, 
the lower Shenandoah Valley was held by the Federal 
troops, under Major-General Sigel, with his head-quarters at 
Winchester, while the upper Valley was held by Brigadier- 
General Imboden, of the Confederate Army, with one brigade 



INTRODUCTION. 



41 



of cavalry, or mounted infantry, and a battery of artillery, 
When the campaign opened, Sigel moved up the Valley, and 
Major-General Breckenridge moved from South-Western Vir- 
ginia, with two brigades of infantry and a battalion of artil- 
lery, to meet him. Breckenridge, having united his forces 
with Imboden's, met and defeated Sigel, at New Market, on 
the 1 5th day of May, driving him back towards Winchester. 
Breckenridge then crossed the Blue Ridge, and joined Gene- 
ral Lee, at Hanover Junction, with his two brigades of infan- 
try and the battalion of artillery. Subsequently, the Federal 
General Hunter organized another and larger force than 
SigePs, and moved up the Valley ; and, on the 5th day of 
June, defeated Brigadier-General William E. Jones, at Pied- 
mont, between PoTt Republic and S taunton — Jones' force 
being composed of a very small body of infantry, and a 
cavalry force which had been brought from South- Western 
Virginia, after Breckenridge's departure from the Valley. 
Jones was killed, and the remnant of his force, under Briga- 
dier-General Vaughan, fell back to Waynesboro. Hunter's 
force then united with another column which had moved 
from Lewisburg, in Western Virginia, under the Federal 
General Crook. As soon as information was received of 
Jones' defeat and death, Breckenridge was sent back to the 
Valley, with the force he had brought with h m. 



MARCH TO LYNCHBURG, AND PURSUIT OF 
HUNTER. 



On the 12th of June, while the 2nd Corps (Ewell's) of the 
Army of Northern Virginia was lying near Gaines' Mill, in 
rear of Hill's line at Cold Harbour, I received verbal orders 
from General Lee, to hold the corps, with two of the batta- 
lions of artillery attached to it, in readiness to move to the 
Shenandoah Valley. Nelson's and Braxton's battalions were 
selected, and Brigadier-General Long was ordered to accom- 
pany me as Chief of Artillery. After dark, on the same day, 
written instructions were given me by General Lee, by 
which I was directed to move, with the force designated, at 
3 o'clock next morning, for the Valley, by the way of Louisa 
C.H. and Charlottesville, and through Brown's or Swift Run 
Gap in the Blue Ridge, as I might find most advisable ; to 
strike Hunter's force in the rear, and, if possible, destroy it ; 
then to move down the valley, cross the Potomac near Lees- 
burg in Loudon County, or at or above Harper's Ferry, as I 
might find most practicable, and threaten Washington City. 
I was further directed to communicate with General Brecken- 
ridge, who would co-operate with me in the attack on Hun- 
ter, and the expedition into Maryland. 

At this time the railroad and telegraph lines between Char- 
lottesville and Lynchburg had been cut by a cavalry force 
from Hunter's army ; and those between Richmond and 
Charlottesville had been cut by Sheridan's cavalry, from 
Grant's army ; so that there was no communication with 
Breckenridge. Hunter was supposed to be at Staunton with 
his whole force, and Breckenridge was supposed to be at 
Waynesboro, or Rock-fish Gap. If such had been the case, 
the route designated by General Lee would have carried me 
into the Valley in Hunter's rear. 

The 2nd Corps now numbered a little over 8,000 muskets 



MARCH TO LYNCHBURG. 



43 



for duty. It had been on active and arduous service in the 
field for forty days, and had been engaged in all the great 
battles from the Wilderness to Cold Harbour, sustaining very 
heavy losses at Spottsylvania C.H., where it lost nearly an 
entire division, including its commander, Major-General 
Johnson, who was made prisoner. Of the Brigadier-Generals 
with it at the commencement of the campaign, only one re- 
mained in command of his brigade. Two (Gordon and 
Ramseur) had been made Major-Generals ; one (G. H. Steu- 
art) had been captured ; four (Pegram, Hays, J. A. Walker, 
and R. D. Johnston) had been severely wounded ; and four 
(Stafford, J. M. Jones, Daniel, and Doles) had been killed in 
action. Constant exposure to the weather, a limited supply 
of provisions, and two weeks' service in the swamps north of 
the Chickahominy had told on the health of the men. Divi- 
sions were not stronger than brigades ought to have been, nor 
brigades than regiments. 

On the morning of the 13th, at two o'clock, we commen- 
ced the march; and, on the 16th, arrived at the Rivanna 
River, near Charlottesville, having marched over eighty miles 
in four days.* 

From Louisa C.H. I had sent a dispatch to Gordonsviile, 
to be forwarded, by telegraph, to Breckenridge ; and, on my 
arrival at Charlottesville, on the 16th, to which place I rode 
in advance of the troops, I received a telegram from him, 



* On the 15th., we passed over the ground, near Trevillian's depot, on which 
Hampton and Sheridan had fought, on the 11th. and 12th. Hampton had de- 
feated Sheridan, and was then in pursuit of him. Grant claims, in his report, 
that, on the 11th., Sheridan drove our cavalry " from the field, in complete 
rout;" and says, when he advanced towards Gordonsviile, on the 12th., "he 
found the enemy reinforced by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, 
about five miles from the latter place, and too strong to successfully assault." 

This is as thoroughly a fancy sketch a3 can well be manufactured. There 
was not an infantry soldier in arms nearer the scene of action than with Gene- 
ral Lee s army, near Cold Harbour ; and, the " well-constructed rifle-pits " 
were nothing more than rails put up in the manner in which cavalry were ac- 
customed to arrange them to prevent a charge. Sheridan mistook some of 
Hampton's cavalry, dismounted and fighting on foot, for infantry; and the 
statement was made to cover his defeat. 



44 



MARCH TO LYNCHBURG. 



dated at Lynchburg, informing me that Hunter was then in 
Bedford County, about twenty miles from that place, and 

moving on it. 

The railroad and telegraph between Charlottesville and 
Lynchburg had been, fortunately, but slightly injured by the 
enemy's cavalry, and had been repaired. The distance be- 
tween the two places was sixty miles, and there were no 
trains at Charlottesville, except one which belonged to the 
Central road, and was about starting for Waynesboro. I or- 
dered this to be detained, and immediately directed, by tele- 
gram, all the trains of the two roads to be sent to me with all 
dispatch, for the purpose of transporting my troops to Lynch- 
burg. The trains were not in readiness to take the troops on 
board until sunrise on the morning of the 17th, and then only 
enough were furnished to transport about half of my infantry. 
Ramseur's division, one brigade of Gordon's division, and 
part of another were put on the trains, as soon as they were 
ready, and started for Lynchburg. Rodes' division, and 
the residue of Gordon's, were ordered to move along the 
railroad, to meet the trains on their return. The artillery 
and waggon-trains had been started on the ordinary roads, 
at daylight. 

I accompanied Ramseur's division, going on the front train, 
but the road and rolling stock were in such bad condition that 
I did not reach Lynchburg until about one o'clock in the after- 
noon, and the other trains were much later. I found General 
Breckinridge in bed, suffering from an injury received by the 
fall of a horse killed under him in action near Cold Harbour. 
He had moved from Rockfish Gap to Lynchburg by a forced 
march, as soon as Hunter's movement towards that place was 
discovered. When I showed him my instructions, he very 
readily and cordially offered to co-operate with me, and serve 
under my command. 

Hunter's advance fron Staunton had been impeded by a 
brigade of cavalry, under Brigadier General McCausland, 
which had been managed with great skill, and kept in his 
front all the way, and he was reported to be then advancing 



OPERATIONS AT LYNCHBURG. 



45 



on the old stone turnpike from Liberty in Bedford County by 
New London, and watched by Imboden with a small force of 
cavalry. 

As General Breckenridge was unable to go out, at his re- 
quest, General D. H. Hill, who happened to be in town, had 
made arrangements for the defence of the city, with such 
troops as were at hand. Brigadier General Hays, who was 
an invalid lrom a wound received at Spottsylvannia Court 
House, had tendered his services and also aided in making 
arrangements for the defence. I rode out with General Hill 
to examine the line selected by him, and make a reconnois- 
sance of the country in front. Slight works had been hastily 
thrown up on College Hill, covering the turnpike and Forest 
roads from Liberty, which were manned by Breckenridge 's 
infantry and the dismounted cavalry of the command which 
had been with Jones at Piedmont. The reserves, invalids 
from the hospitals, and the cadets from the Military Institute 
at Lexington, occupied other parts of the line. An inspection 
satisfied me that, while this arrangement was the best which 
could be made under the circumstances in which General 
Hill found himself, yet it would leave the town exposed to 
the fire of the enemy's artillery, should he advance to the 
attack, and I therefore determined to meet the enemy with my 
troops in front. 

We found Imboden about four miles out on the turnpike, 
near an old Quaker church, to which position he had been 
gradually forced back by the enemy's infantry. My troops, 
as they arrived, had been ordered in front of the works to 
bivouac, and I immediately sent orders for them to move out 
on this road, and two brigades of Ramseur's division arrived 
just in time to be thrown across the road, at a redoubt about 
two miles from the city, as Imboden's command was driven 
back by vastly superior numbers. These brigades, with 
two pieces of artillery in the redoubt, arrested ihe progress 
of the enemy, and Ramseur's other brigade, and the part 
of Gordon's division which had arrived, took position on 
the same line. The enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery 

£ 



46 



OPERATIONS AT LYNCHBURG. 



on us, but, as night soon came on, he went into camp 
in our front.* 

On my arrival at Lynchhurg, orders had been given for the 
immediate return of the trains for the rest of my infantry, and 
I expected it to arrive by the morning of the 18th, but it did 
not get to Lynchburg until late in the afternoon of that day. 
Hunter's force was considerably larger than mine would have 
been, had it all been up, and as it was of the utmost conse- 
quence to the army at Richmond that he should not get into 
Lynchburg, I did not feel justified in attacking him until I 
could do so with a fair prospect of success. I contented 
myself therefore with acting on the defensive on the 18th, 
throwing Breckenridge's infantry and a part of his artillery on 
the front line, while that adopted by General Hill was oc- 
cupied by the dismounted cavalry and the irregular troops. 
During the day, there was artillery firing and skirmishing 
along the line, and, in the afternoon, an attack was made on 
our line, to the right of the turnpike, which was handsomely 
repulsed with considerable loss to the enemy. A demonstra- 
tion of the enemy's cavalry on the Forest road, was checked 
by pait of Breckenridge's infantry under Wharton, and Mc- 
Causland's cavalry. 

On the arrival of the cars from Richmond this day, Major 
Generals Elzey and Ransom reported for duty, the former to 
command the infantry and dismounted cavalry of Brecken- 



* Hunter's delay in advancing from Staunton had been most remarkable, and 
can only be accounted for by the fact, that indulgence in petty acts of malignity 
and outrage upon private citizens was more congenial to his nature than bold 
operations in the field. He had defeated Jones' small force at Piedmont about 
ten miles from Staunton, on the 5th, and united with Crook on the 8th, yet he 
did not arrive in front of Lynchburg until near night on the 17tb. The route 
from Staunton to Lynchburg by which he moved, which was by Lexington, 
Buchanan, the Peaks of Otter, and Liberty, is about one hundred miles in dis- 
tance. It is true McCausland had delayed his progress by keeping constantly 
in his front, but an energetic advance would have brushed away McCausland's 
small force, and Lynchburg, with all its manufacturing establishments and 
stores, would have fallen before assistance arrived. A subsequent passage over 
the greater part of the same route showed how Hunter had been employed. 



PURSUIT OF HUNTER. 



47 



yidge's command, and the latter to command the cavalry. The 
mounted cavalry consisted of the remnants of several brigades 
divided into two commands, one under Imboden, and the other 
under McCausland. It was badly mounted and armed, and 
its efficiency much impaired by the defeat at Piedmont, and the 
arduous service it had recently gone through. 

As soon as the remainder of my infantry arrived by the 
railroad, though none of my artillery had gotten up, arrange- 
ments were made for attacking Hunter at daylight on the 
19th, but, sometime after midnight, it was discovered that he 
was moving, though it was not known whether he was 
retreating, or moving so as to attack Lynchburg on the south 
where it was vulnerable, or to attempt to join Grant on the 
south side of James River. Pursuit could not, therefore, be 
made at once, as a mistake, if either of the last two objects 
had been contemplated, would have been fatal. At light, how- 
ever, the pursuit commenced, the 2nd Corps moving along the 
turnpike, over which it was discovered Hunter was retreating, 
and Elzey's command on the right, along the Forest road, 
while Ransom was ordered to move on the right of Elzey, 
wilh McCausland's cavalry, and endeavour to strike the 
enemy at Liberty or the Peaks of Otter. Imboden, who was 
on the road from Lynchburg to Campbell Court House, to 
watch a body of the enemy's cavalry, which had moved in 
that direction the day before, was to have moved on the left 
towards Liberty, but orders did not reach him in time. The 
enemy's rear was overtaken at. Liberty, twenty-five miles from 
Lynchburg, just before night, and driven through that place, 
after a brisk skirmish, by Ramseur's division. The days march 
on the old turnpike, which was very rough, had been terrible. 
McCausland had taken the wrong road and did not reach Lib- 
erty until after the enemy had been driven through the town. 

It was here ascertained that Hunter had not retreated on 
the route by the Peaks of Otter, over which he had advanced, 
but had taken the road to Buford's depot, at the foot of the 
Blue Ridge, which would enable him to go either by Salem, 
Fincastle, or Buchanan. Ransom was, therefore, ordered to 



48 



PURSUIT OF HUNTER. 



take the route, next day, by the Peaks of Otter, and endeavour 
to intercept the enemy should he move by Buchanan or Fin- 
castle. The pursuit was resumed early on the morning of 
the 20th, and on our arrival in sight of Buford's, the enemy's 
rear guard was seen going into the mountain on the road 
towards Salem. As this left the road to Buchanan open, my 
aide, Lieutenaat Pitzer, was sent across the mountain to that 
place, with orders to Ransom to move for Salem. Lieutenant 
Pitzer was also instructed to ride all night and send directions, 
by courier from Fincastle, and telegraph from Salem, to have 
the road through the mountains to Lewisburg and South 
Western Virginia blockaded. The enemy was pursued into 
the mountains at Buford's Gap, but he had taken possession 
of the crest of the Blue Ridge, and put batteries in position 
commanding a gorge, through which the road passes, where 
it was impossible for a regiment to move in line. I had 
endeavoured to ascertain if there was not another way across the 
mountain by which I could get around the enemy, but all the 
men, except the old ones, had gotten out of the way, arid the 
latter, as well as the women and children, were in such a 
state of distress and alarm, that no reliable information could 
be obtained from them. We tried to throw forces up the 
sides of the mountains to get at the enemy, but they were so 
rugged that night came on before anything could be accom- 
plished, and we had to desist, though not until a very late 
hour in the night. 

By a mistake of the messenger, who was sent with orders 
to General Rodes, who was to be in the lead next morning, 
there was some delay in his movement on the 21st, but the 
pursuit was resumed very shortly atter sun rise. At the Big 
Lick, it was ascertained that the enemy had turned off from 
Salem towards Lewisburg, on a road which passes through 
the mountains at a narrow pass called the " Hanging Rock, 1 ' 
and my column was immediately turned towards that point, 
but on arriving there it was ascertained that the enemy's rear 
guard had passed through the gorge. McCausland had struck 
his column at this point and captured ten pieces of artillery, 




PURSUIT OF HUNTER. 



49 



some waggons, and a number of prisoners ; but, the enemy 
having brought up a heavy force, McCausland was compelled 
to fall back, carrying off, however, the prisoners, and a part 
of the artillery, and disabling the rest so that it could not be 
removed. As the enemy had got into the mountains, where 
nothing useful could be accomplished by pursuit, I did not 
deem it proper to continue it farther. A great part of my 
command had had nothing to eat for the last two days, except 
a little bacon which was obtained at Liberty. The cooking 
utensils were in the trains, and the effort to have bread baked 
at Lynchburg had failed. Neither the waggon trains, nor the 
artillery of the 2nd corps, were up, and I knew that the 
country, through which Hunter's route led for forty or fifty 
miles, was, for the most part, a desolate mountain region ; 
and that his troops were taking everything in the way of pro- 
visions and forage which they could lay their hands on. My 
field officers, except those of Breckenridge's command, were 
on foot, as their horses could not be transported on the trains 
from Charlottesville. I had seen our soldiers endure a great 
deal, but there was a limit to the endurance even of Confed- 
erate soldiers. A stern chase with infantry is a very difficult 
one, and Hunter's men were marching for their lives, his 
disabled being carried in his provision train which was now 
empty. My cavalry was not strong enough to accomplish 
anything of importance, and a further pursuit could only have 
resulted in disaster to my command from want of provisions 
and forage. 

I was glad to see Hunter take the route to Lewisburg, as I 
knew he could not stop short of the Kanawha River, and he 
was, therefore, disposed of for some time. Had he moved to 
South Western Virginia, he would have done us incalculable 
mischief, as there were no troops of any consequence in that 
quarter, but plenty of supplies at that time. I should, there- 
fore, have been compelled to follow him.* 



* Grant, in his report says: " General Hunter, owing to a want of ammuni- 
tion to give battle, retired from before the place " (Lynchburg). This is a little 



50 



PURSUIT OF HUNTER* 



My command had marched sixty miles, in the three days 
pursuit, over very rough roads, and that part of it from the 
Army of Northern Virginia had had no rest since leaving 
Gaines' Mill. I determined, therefore, to rest on the 22nd, so 
as to enable the waggons and artillery to get up, and prepare 
the men for the long march before them. Imboden had come 
up, following on the road through Salem after the enemy, and 
the cavalry was sent through Fincastle, to watch the enemy 
and annoy him as he passed through the mountains towards 
Lewisburg, and also ascertain whether he would endeavour 
to get into the valley towards Lexington or Staunton. 



remarkable, as it appears that this expedition had been long contemplated and 
was one of the prominent features of the campaign of 1864. . Sheridan, with his 
cavalry, was to have united with Hunter at Lynchburg, and the two together 
were to have destroyed General Lee's communications and depots of supplies, 
and then have joined Grant. Can it be believed that Hunter set out on so 
important an expedition with an insufficient supply of ammunition ? He had 
only fought the battle of Piedmont with a part of his force, and it was not a 
very severe one, as Jones' force was a small one and composed mostly of 
cavalry. Crooks column not being there was not engaged. Had Sheridan 
defeated Hampton at Trevillian's, he would have reached Lynchburg after 
destroying the railroad on the way, and I could not have reached there in time 
to do any good. But Hampton defeated Sheridan, aud the latter saw " infantry'* 
" too strong to successfully assault." Had Hunter moved on Lynchburg 
with energy, that place would have fallen before it was possible for me to get 
there. But he tarried on the way ' for purposes which will hereafter appear,, 
and when he reached there, bis* heart failed him and he was afraid to fight an. 
inferior force, and then there was discovered, " A want of ammunition to give 
battle." 



MARCH DOWN THE VALLEY, AND OPERATIONS 
IN THE LOWER VALLEY AND MARYLAND. 



At Lynchburg, I had received a telegram from General 
Lee, directing me, after disposing of Hunter, either to return 
to his army or carry out the original plan, as I might deem 
most expedient under the circumstances in which I found my- 
self. After the pursuit had ceased, I received another dispatch 
from him, submitting it to my judgment whether the condition 
of my troops would permit the expedition across the Potomac 
to be carried oat, and I determined to take the responsibility of 
continuing it. On the 23rd, the march was resumed and we 
reached Buchanan that night, where we struck again the route 
over which Hunter had advanced.* Ransom's cavalry moved 

* The scenes on Hunter's route from Lynchburg had been truly heart-rending. 
Houses had been burned, and helpless women and children left without shelter. 
The country had been stripped of provisions and many families left without a 
morsel to eat. Furniture and bedding had been cut to peices, and old men and 
women and children robbed of all the clothiug they had except that on their 
backs. Ladies trunks had been rifled and their dresses torn to peices in mere 
wantonness. Even the negro girls had lost their little finery. We now had 
renewed evidences of the outrages committed by Hunter's orders in burning and 
pluudering private houses. We saw the ruins of a number of houses to which 
the torch had been applied by his orders. At Lexington he had burned the 
Military Institute, with all of its contents, including its library and scientific 
apparatus; and Washington College had been plundered and the statue of 
Washington stolen. The residence of Ex-Governor Letcher at that place had 
been burned by orders, and but a few minutes given Mrs. Letcher and her family 
to leave the house. In the same county a most excellent christian gentleman, a 
Mr. Creigh, had been hung, because, on a former occasion, he had killed a strag- 
gling and marauding Federal soldier while in the act of insulting and outraging 
the ladies of his family. These are but some of the outarges committed by Hunter 
or his orders, and 1 will not insult the memory of the ancient barbarians of the North 
by calling them " acts of Vandalism." If those old barbarians were savage and 
cruel, they at least had the manliness and daring of rude soldiers, with occasional 
traits of magnanimity. Hunter's deeds were those of a malignant and cowardly 
fanatic, who was better qualified to make war upon helpless women and children 
than upon armed soldiers. The time consumed in the perpretration of those 
deeds, was the salvation of Lynchburg, with its stores, foundries, and factories } 
which were so necessary to our army at Richmond. 



52 



MARCH DOWN THE VALLEY. 



by Clifton Forge, through the western part of Rockbridge, to 
keep a lookout for Hunter and ascertain if he should attempt 
to get into the Valley again. 

On the 26th, I reached Staunton in advance of the troops, 
and the latter came up next day, which was spent in reducing 
transportation and getting provisions from Waynesboro, to 
which point they had been sent over the railroad. Some of 
the guns and a number of the horses belonging to the artillery 
were now unfit for service, and the best of each were selected, 
and about a battalion taken from Breckenridge's artillery, 
under Lt. Col. King, to accompany us, in addition to the two 
battalions brought with the 2nd Corps. The rest were left 
behind with a portion of the officers and men in charge of 
them. The dismounted cavalry had been permitted to send 
for their horses which had been recruiting, and Col. Bradley T. 
Johnson, who had joined me at this place with a battalion of 
Maryland Cavalry, was assigned to the command of Jones' 
brigade, with the temporary rank of Brigadier General, that 
brigade having been reorganized and the two Maryland bat- 
talions attached to it. General Breckenridge had accompanied 
us from Lynchburg, and, to give him a command commensu- 
rate with his proper one, and at the same time enable me to con- 
trol the cavalry more readily, Gordon's division of infantry 
was assigned to his command in addition to the one under 
Elzey, and Ransom, in charge of the cavalry, was ordered to 
report to me directly. Major General Elzey was relieved 
from duty at his own request, and the division under him 
was left under the temporary command of Brigadier General 
Vaughan. 

The official reports at this place showed about two thousand 
mounted men for duty in the cavalry, which w T as composed of 
four small brigades, to wit : Imboden's, McCausland's, Jack- 
son's, and Jones' (now Johnson's). Vaughan's had not been 
mounted but the horses had been sent for from South-western 
Virginia. The official reports of the infantry showed 10,000 
muskets for duty, including Vaughan's dismounted cavalry. 
Nearly, if not quite half of the company officers and men were 



MARCH DOWN THE VALLEY. 



53 



barefooted or nearly so, and a dispatch had been sent from 
Salem by courier, and Lynchburg by telegraph, to Richmond, 
requesting shoes to be sent to Staunton, but they had not arrived. 

Another telegram was received here from Gen. Lee, stating 
that the circumstances under which my original orders were 
given had changed, and again submitting it to my judgment, 
in the altered state of things, whether the movement down the 
Valley and across the Potomac should be made. The acces- 
sion to my command from Breckenridge's forces had not been 
as great as General Lee supposed it would be, on account of 
the disorganization consequent on Jones' defeat at Piedmont, 
and the subsequent rapid movement to Lynchburg from Rock- 
fish Gap, but I determined to carry out the original design at 
all hazards, and telegraphed to General Lee my purpose to 
continue the movement. 

The march was resumed on the 28th with five days rations 
in the waggons and two days in haversacks, empty waggons 
being left to bring the shoes when they arrived. Imboden was 
sent through Brock's Gap in the Great North Mountain to the 
Valley of the South Branch of the Potomac, with his brigade 
of cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, to destroy the rail- 
road bridge over that stream and all the bridges on the Balti- 
more and Ohio rail-road from that point to Martinsburg. The 
telegraph line was repaired to New-Market as we marched 
down the Valley, and communications kept up with that point 
by signal stations. On the 2nd of July we reached Winchester,* 



* On this day we passed through Newtown where several houses, including 
that of a Methodist minister, had been burned by Hunter's orders, because apart 
of Mosby's command had attacked a train of supplies for Sigel's force, at this 
place. The original order was to burn the whole town, but the officer sent to 
execute it had revolted at the cruel mandate of his superior, and another had 
been sent who but partially executed it, after having forced the people to take 
an oath of allegiance to the United States to save their houses. Mosby's battal- 
ion, though called '• guerillas'' by the enemy, was a regular organization in the 
Confederate Army, and was merely serving on detached duty under General 
Lee's orders. The attack on the train was an act of legitimate warfare, and the 
order to burn Newtown, and the burning of the houses mentioned were most 
wanton, cruel, unjustifiable, and cowardly. 



54 



OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 



and I here received a dispatch from General Lee, directing me to 
remain in the lower Valley until everything was in readiness to 
cross the Potomac, and to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio railroad 
and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal as far as possible. This 
was in accordance with my previous determination, and its 
policy was obvious. My provisions were nearly exhausted 
and it I had moved through Loudon, it would have been neces- 
sary for me to halt and thresh wheat and have it ground, as 
neither bread nor flour could be otherwise obtained ; which 
would have caused much greater delay than was required on 
the other route, where we could take provisions from the en- 
emy. Moreover unless the Baltimore and Ohio railroad was 
torn up, the enemy would have been able to move troops Irom 
the West over that road to Washington. 

On the night of the 2nd, McCausland was sent across 
North Mountain, to move down Back Creek, and burn the 
railroad bridge at its mouth, and then to move by North 
Mountain depot to Haynesville, on the road from Martinsburg 
to Williamsport ; and, early on the morning of the 3rd, Brad- 
ley Johnson was .sent by Smithfield and Leetown, to cross the 
railroad at Kearneysville, east of Martinsburg, and unite with 
McCausland, at Haynesville, so as to cut ofT the retreat of 
Sigel, who was at xMartinsburg with a considerable force. 
Breckenridge moved, on the same morning, direct for Mar- 
tinsburg, with his command preceded by Gilmor's battalion 
of cavalry, while I moved, with Rodes' and Ramseur's divi- 
sions, over the route taken by Johnson, to Leetown. On the 
approach of Breckenridge, Sigel, after very slight skirmish- 
ing, evacuated Martinsburg, leaving behind considerable 
stores, which fell into our hands. McCausland burned the 
bridge over Back Creek, captured the guard at North Moun- 
tain depot, and succeeded in reaching Haynesville ; but John- 
son encountered a force at Leetown, under Mulligan, which, 
after hard fighting, he drove across the railroad, when, Sigel 
haviug united with Mulligan, Johnson's command was forced 
back, just before night, on Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions, 
which had arrived at Leetown, after a march of twenty -four 



OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND. 



55 



miles. It was too late, and these divisions were too much 
exhausted, to go after the enemy ; and, during the night, Si- 
gel retreated across the Potomac, at Shepherdstown, to Mary- 
land Heights. 

On the 4th, Shepherdstown was occupied by a part of Ran- 
som's cavalry. Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions moved to 
Harper's Ferry, and the enemy was driven from Bolivar 
Heights, and the Village of Bolivar, to an inner line of 
works under the cover of the guns from Maryland Heights. 
Breckenridge, after burning the railroad bridges at Martins- 
burg, and across the Opequon, moved to Duffield's depot, five 
miles from Harper's Ferry, destroying the road as he moved. 
During the night of the 4th, the enemy evacuated Harper's 
Ferry, burning the railroad and pontoon bridges across the 
Potomac. 

It was not possible to occupy the town of Harper's Ferry, 
except with skirmishers, as it was thoroughly commanded by 
the heavy guns on Maryland Heights ; and the 5th was spent 
by Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions in demonstrating at that 
place. In the afternoon, Breckenridge's command crossed 
the river at Shepherdstown, and Gordon's division was ad- 
vanced over the Antietam, towards Maryland Heights. At 
night, considerable stores, which had been abandoned at 
Harper's Ferry, were secured ; and, before day, Rodes' and 
Ramseur's divisions moved to Shepherdstown, and crossed 
the Potomac early on the 6th, Lewis' brigade, of Ramseur's 
division, being left to occupy Harper's Ferry with skir- 
mishers. 

On this day (the 6th) Gordon's division advanced towards 
Maryland Heights, and drove the enemy into his works. 
Working parties were employed in destroying tne aqueduct 
of the canal over the Antietam, and the locks and canal- 
boats. 

On the 7th, Rodes moved through Rohersville, on the road 
to Crampton's Gap in South Mountain, and skirmished with 
a small force of the enemy, while Breckenridge demonstrated 
against Maryland Heights, with Gordon's division, supported 



56 



OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND. 



by his other division, now under Brigadier-General Echols, 
who had reported for duty. 

While these operations were going on, McCausland had 
occupied Hagerstown, and levied a contribution of $20,000, 
and Boonsboro had been occupied by Johnson's cavalry. On 
the 6th I received a letter from General Lee, by special 
courier, informing me that, on the 12th, an effort would be 
made to release the prisoners at Point Lookout, and directing 
me to take steps to unite them with my command, if the at- 
tempt was successful ; but I was not informed of the manner 
in which the attempt would be made — General Lee stating 
that he was not, himself, advised of the particulars. 

My desire had been to manoeuvre the enemy out of Mary- 
land Heights, so as to enable me to move directly from Har- 
per's Ferry for Washington ; but he had taken refuge in his 
strongly-fortified works, and, as they could not be approached 
without great difficulty, and an attempt to carry them by 
assault would have resulted in greater loss than the advan- 
tage to be gained would justify, I determined to move 
through the gaps of South Mountain to the north of the 
Heights. On the 7th, the greater portion of the cavalry was 
sent, across the mountain, in the direction of Frederick ; and, 
that night, the expected shoes having arrived and been dis- 
tributed, orders were given for a general move next morn- 
ing ; and an officer (Lieut.-Col. Goodwin, of a Louisiana 
Regiment) was ordered back to Winchester, with a small 
guard, to collect the stragglers at that place, and prevent 
them from following. 

Imboden had reached the railroad, at the South Branch of 
the Potomac, and partially destroyed the bridge, but had not 
succeeded in dislodging the guard from the b ock-house at 
that place. He had been taken sick, and very little had been 
accomplished by the expedition ; and his brigade, now under 
the command of Colonel George H. Smith, had returned. 

Early on the morning of the 8th, the whole force moved ; 
Rodes, through Crampton's Gap, to Jefferson ; Breckenridge, 
through Fox's Gap ; and Ramseur, with the trains, through 



BATTLE OF MONOCACY. 



57 



Boonsboro Gap, followed by Lewis' brigade, which had star- 
ted from Harper's Ferry the night before, after burning the 
trestle-work on the railroad, and the stores which had not 
been brought off. Breckenridge and Ramseur encamped 
near Middletown, and Rodes near Jefferson. Ransom had 
occupied Catoctan Mountain, oetween Middletown and Fre- 
derick, with his cavalry, and had skirmished heavily with a 
body of the enemy at the latter place. McCausland was or- 
dered to move to the right, in the afternoon, and the next day 
cut the telegraph and railroad between Maryland Heights 
and Washington and Baltimore — cross the Monocacy, and, if 
possible, occupy the railroad bridge over that stream, at the 
Junction near Frederick. 

Early on the 9th, Johnson, with his brigade of cavalry, 
and a battery of horse artillery, moved to the north of Frede- 
rick, with orders to strike the railroads from Baltimore to 
Harrisburg and Philadelphia, burn the bridges over the Gun- 
powder, also to cut the railroad between Washington and 
Baltimore, and threaten the latter place ; and then to move 
towards Point Lookout, far the purpose of releasing the priso- 
ners, if we should succeed in getting into Washinglon. The 
other troops also moved forward towards Monocacy Junction, 
and Ramseur's division passed through Frederick, driving a 
force of skirmishers before it. 



BATTLE OF MONOCACY. 

The enemy, in considerable force under General Lew 
Wallace, was found strongly posted on the eastern bank of the 
Monocacy near the Junction, with an earthwork and two block 
houses commanding both the railroad bridge and the bridge 
on the Georgetown pike. Ramseur's division was deployed 
in front of the enemy, after driving his skirmishers across the 
river, and several batteries were put in position, when a sharp 



58 



BATTLE OF MONOCACY. 



artillery fire opened from both sides. Rodes' division had 
come up from Jefferson and was placed on Ramseur's left, 
covering the roads from Baltimore and the crossings of the 
Monocacy above the Junction Breckenridge's command, 
with the trains, was in the rear between Frederick and the 
Junction, while the residue of the cavalry was watching a 
force of the enemy's cavalry which had followed from Mary- 
land Heights. The enemy's position was too strong, and the 
difficulties of crossing the Monocacy under fire too great, to 
attack in front without greater loss than I was willing to incur. 
I therefore made an examination in person to find a point at 
which the river could be crossed, so as to take the enemy in 
flank. While I was engaged in making this examination to 
my right, I discovered McCausland in the act of crossing the 
river with his brigade. As soon as he crossed, he dismounted 
his men, and advanced rapidly against the enemy's left flank, 
which he threw into confusion, and he came very near captur- 
ing a battery of artillery, but the enemy concentrated on him, 
and he was gradually forced back obstinately contesting the 
ground. McCausland's movement, which was very brilliant- 
ly executed, solved the problem for me, and, as soon as I 
discovered it, orders were sent to Breckenridge to move up 
rapidly with Gordon's division to McCausland's assistance, 
and to follow up his attack. This division crossed at the same 
place, and Gordon was ordered to move forward and strike 
the enemy on his left flank, and drive him from the position 
commanding the crossings in Ramseur's front, so as to enable 
the latter to cross. This movement was executed under the 
personal superintendence of General Breckenridge, and, while 
Ramseur skirmished with the enemy in front, the attack was 
made by Gordon in gallant style, and, with the aid of several 
pieces of King's artillery which had been crossed over, and 
Nelson's artillery from the opposite side, he threw the enemy 
into great confusion and forced him from his position. Ram- 
seur immediately crossed on the railroad bridge and pursued 
the enemy's flying forces, and Rodes crossed on the left and 
joined in the pursuit. Echol's division which had been left 



BATTLE OF MONOCACY. 



59 



to guard the trains, was ordered up during the engagement, but 
was not needed. The pursuit was soon discontinued, as 
Wallace's entire force had taken the road towards Baltimore, 
and I did not want prisoners. Wallace's force I estimated at 
8000 or 10,000 men, and it was ascertained that one division 
of the 6th corps (Rickett's) from Grant's army, was in the 
fight. Between 600 and 700 unwounded prisoners fell into 
our hands, and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was 
very heavy. Our loss in killed and wounded was about 700, 
and among them were brigadier General Evans wounded, and 
Colonel Lamar of the 61st Georgia regiment, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Tavener, of the 17th Virginia cavalry, and Lieutenant 
Hobson, of Nelson's artillery, killed. The action closed 
about sunset, and we had marched fourteen miles before it 
commenced. All the troops and trains were crossed over the 
Monocacy that night, so as to resume the march early next 
day. Such of our wounded as could not be moved in ambu- 
lances or otherwise, were sent to the hospitals at Frederick 
under charge of competent medical officers, and our dead 
were buried. During the operations at Monocacy, a contri- 
bution of $200,000 in money was levied on the city of Fred- 
erick, and some needed supplies were obtained. 



OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON, AND 
RECROSSING THE POTOMAC. 

On the 10th, the march was resumed at daylight, and we 
bivouacked four miles from Rockville, on the Georgetown 
pike, having marched twenty miles. Ramseur's division, 
which had remained behind for a short time to protect a 
working party engaged in destroying the railroad bridge, was 
detained for a time in driving off the party of cavalry which 
had been following from Maryland Heights, and did not get 



60 



OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON. 



up until one o'clock at night. McCausland, moving in front 
on this day, drove a body of the enemy's cavalry before him, 
and had quite a brisk engagement at Rockville, where he 
encamped after defeating and driving off the enemy. 

We moved at daylight on the 11th; McCausland moving 
on the Georgetown pike, while the infantry, preceeded by Im- 
boden's cavalry under Colonel Smith, turned to the left at 
Rockville, so as to reach the 7th street pike which runs by 
Silver Spring into Washington. Jackson's cavalry moved on 
the left flank, The previous day had been very warm, and 
the roads were exceedingly dusty, as there had been no rain 
for several weeks. The heat during the night had been very 
oppressive, and but, little rest had been obtained. This day 
was an exceedingly hot one, and there was no air stirring. 
W r hile marching, the men were enveloped in a suffocating 
cloud of dust, and many of them fell by the way from exhaus- 
tion. Our progress was therefore very much impeded, but I 
pushed on as rapidly as possible, hoping to get into the forti- 
fications around Washington before they could be manned. 
Smith drove a small body of cavalry before him into the works 
on the 7th street pike, and dismounted his men and deployed 
them as skirmishers. I rode ahead of the infantry, and arrived 
in sight of Fort Stevens on this road a short time after noon, 
when I discovered that the works were but feebly manned. 

Rodes, whose division was in front, was immediately order- 
ed to bring it into line as rapidly as possible, throw out skir- 
mishers, and move into the works if he could. My whole 
column was then moving by flank, which was the only practi- 
cable mode of marching on the road we were on, and before 
Rodes' division could be brought up, we saw a cloud of dust 
in the rear of the works towards Washington, and soon a 
column of the enemy filed into them on the right and left, and 
skirmishers were thrown out in front, while an artillery fire 
was opened on us from a number of batteries. This defeated 
our hopes of getting possession of the works by surprise, and 
it became necessary to reconnoitre. 

Rode's skirmishers were thrown to the front, driving those of 



OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON. 



61 



the enemy to the cover of the works, and we proceeded to 
examine the fortifications in order to ascertain if it was prac- 
ticable to carry them by assauit. They were found to be 
exceedingly strong, and consisted of what appeared to be 
enclosed forts for heavy artillery, with a tier of lower works 
in front of each pierced for an immense number of guns, the 
whole being connected by curtains with ditches in front, and 
strengthened by palisades and abattis. The timber had been 
felled within cannon range all around and left on the ground, 
making a formidable obstacle, and every possible approach 
was raked by artillery. On the right was Rock Creek, 
running through a deep ravine which had been rendered 
impassable by the felling of the timber on each side, and 
beyond were the works on the Georgetown pike which had 
been reported to be the strongest of all. On the left, as far as 
the eye could reach, the works appeared to be of the same 
impregnable character. The position was naturally strong 
for defence, and the examination shewed, what might have 
been expected, that every appliance of science and unlimited 
means had been used to render the fortifications around 
Washington as strong as possible. This reconnoissance con- 
sumed the balance of the day. 

The rapid marching, which had broken down a number of 
the men who were barefooted or weakened by previous expo- 
sure, and had been left in the Valley and directed to be 
collected at Winchester, and the losses in killed and wounded 
at Harper's Ferry, Maryland Heights, and Monocacy, had 
reduced my infantry to about 8,000 muskets. Of those 
remaining, a very large number were greatly exhausted by 
the last two days marching, some having fallen by sunstroke, 
and I was satisfied, when we arrived in front of the fortifi- 
cations, that not more than one third of my force could have 
been carried into action. I had about forty pieces of field 
artillery, of which the largest were 12 pounder Napoleons, 
besides a few pieces of horse artillery with the cavalry. 
McCausland reported the works on the Georgetown pike too 
strongly manned for him to assault. We could not move to 

F 



62 



OPERATIONS IN FEONT OF WASHINGTON, 



the right or the left without its being discovered from a signal 
station on the top of the " Soldiers' Home," which overlooked 
the country, and the enemy would have been enabled to 
move in his works to meet us. Under the circumstances, to 
have rushed my men blindly against the fortifications, with- 
out understanding the state of things, would have been worse 
than folly. If we had any friends in Washington, none of 
them came out to give us information, and this satisfied me 
that the place was not undefended. I knew that troops had 
arrived from Grant's army, for prisoners had been captured 
from Rickett's division of the 6th corps at Monocacy. From 
Sharpsburg I had sent a message to Mosby, by one of his 
men, requesting him to cross the Potomac below Harper's 
Ferry, cut the railroad and telegraph, and endeavour to find 
out the condition of things in Washington,, but he had not 
crossed the river and I had received no information from him. 
A northern paper, which was obtained, gave the information 
that Hunter, after moving up the Ohio River in steamboats y 
was passing over the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and I 
knew that he would be at Harper's Ferry soon, as Imboden 
had done very little damage to the road west of Martinsburg. 
After dark on the 11th, I held a consultation with Major 
Generals Breckenridge, Rodes, Gordon, and Ramseur, in which 
I stated to them the danger of remaining where we were, and 
the necessity of doing something immediately, as the proba- 
bility was that the passes of the South Mountain and the 
fords of the upper Potomac would soon be closed against us. 
After interchanging views with them, being very reluctant to 
abandon the project of capturing Washington, I determined to 
make an assault on the enemy's works at daylight next morn- 
ing, unless some imformation should be received before that 
time showing its impracticability,and so informed those officers. 
During the night a dispatch was received from Gen. Bradley 
Johnson from near Baltimore, informing me that he had receiv- 
ed information, from a reliable source, that two corps had ar- 
rived from Gen. Grant's army, and that his whole army was 
probably in motion. This caused me to delay the attack until 



OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON. 



63 



I could examine the works again, and, as soon as it was light 
enough to see, I rode to the front and found the parapets lined 
with troops. I had, therefore, reluctantly, to give up all hopes 
of capturing Washington, after I had arrived in sight of the 
dome of the Capitol, and given the Federal authorities a ter- 
rible fright. 

Grant in his report says, in regard to the condition of things 
when I moved towards Washington : " The garrisons of Balti- 
more and Washington were at this time made up of heavy 
artillery regiments, hundred days men, and detachments from 
the invalid corps." And, in regard to the force of Wallace at 
Monocacy, he says ; " ilis force was not sufficient to ensure 
success, but he fought, ihe enemy nevertheless, and although 
it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy 
and thereby served to enable Gen. Wright to reach Washington 
with two divisions of the 6th Corps, and the advance of the 
19th Corps, before him." Stanton says in his report : " Here 
(at Washington) they (we) were met by troops from the Army 
of the Potomac, consisting of the 6th Corps under General 
Wright, a part of the 8th Corps under General Gilmore, and a 
part of the 19th Corps, just arrived from New Orleans under 
General Emory." Taking Grant's statement of the troops 
which had arrived from his army as the most reliable, they 
were sufficient to hold the works against my troops, at least 
until others could arrive. But, in addition to those which 
had already arrived, there were the detachments from the in- 
valid corps, called, I believe, the " Veteran Reserves " (of 
which I was informed there were about 5,000), the heavy ar- 
tillery regiments, the hundred days' men, and, I suppose, the 
part of the 8th corps mentioned by Stanton. To all these 
may be added the local troops, or militia, and the government 
employees. Some of the northern papers stated that, be- 
tween Saturday and Monday, I could have entered the city ; 
but on Saturday I was fighting at Monocacy, thirty-five 
miles from Washington, a force which I could not leave in 
my rear ; and, after disposing of that force and moving as 
rapidly as it was possible for me to move, I did not arrive in? 



64 



OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON. 



front of the fortifications until after noon on Monday, and 
then my troops were exhausted, and it required time to bring 
them up into line. I had then made a march, over the circui- 
tous route by Charlottesville, Lynchburg, and Salem, down 
the Valley, and through the passes of the South Mountain, 
which, notwithstanding the delays in dealing with Hunter's, 
Sigel's, and Wallace's forces, is, for its length and rapidity, I 
believe, without a parallel in this or any other modern war — 
the unopposed marauding excursion of the freebooter Sher- 
man through Georgia, not excepted. My small force had 
been thrown up to the very walls of the Federal Capital, north 
of a river which could not be forded at any point within 40 
miles, and with a heavy force and the South Mountain in my 
rear — the passes through which mountain could be held by a 
small number of troops. A glance at the map, when it is re- 
collected that the Potomac is a wide river, and navigable to 
Washington for the largest vessels, will cause the intelligent 
reader to wonder, not why I failed to take Washington, but 
why I had the audacity to approach it as I did, with the 
small force under my command. It was supposed by some, 
who were not informed of the facts, that I delayed in the 
lower Valley longer than was necessary ; but, an examination 
of the foregoing narrative will show that not one moment 
was spent in idleness, but that every one was employed in 
making some arrangement, or removing some difficulty in my 
way, which it was necessary to make or remove, so as to en- 
able me to advance with a prospect of success. I could not 
move across the Potomac and through the passes of the South 
Mountain, with any safety, until Sigel was driven from, or 
safely housed in, the fortifications at Maryland Heights. 

After abandoning the idea of capturing Washington, I 
determined to remain in front of the fortifications during the 
12th, and retire at night, as I was satisfied that to remain 
longer would cause the loss of my entire force. 

Johnson had burned the bridges over the Gunpowder, on 
the Harrisburg and Philadelphia roads, threatened Baltimore, 
and started for Point Lookout, but I sent an order for him to 



RECROSSING THE POTOMAC. 



65 



return. The attempt to release the prisoners of which I was 
informed by General Lee, was not made, as the enemy had 
received notice of it in some way. Major Harry Gilmor, who 
burned the bridge over the Gunpowder on the Philadelphia 
road, captured Major General Franklin on a train at that point, 
but he was permitted to escape, either by the carelessness or 
exhaustion of the guard placed over him, before I was inform- 
ed of the capture. 

On the afternoon of the 12th, a heavy reconnoitring force was 
sent out by the enemy, which, after severe skirmishing, was 
driven back by Rodes' division with but slight loss to us. 
About dark we commenced retiring and did so without moles- 
tation.* Passing through Rockville and Poolsville, we crossed 
the Potomac at White's Ford, above Leesburg in Loudon 
County, on the morning of the 14th, bringing off the prisoners 
captured at Monocacy and everything else in safety. There 
was some skirmishing in the rear between our cavalry and 
that of the enemy which was following, and, on the afternoon 
of the 14th, there was some artillery firing by the enemy, across 
the river, at our cavalry which was watching the fords. 
Besides the money levied in Hagerstown and Frederick, 
which was subsequently very useful' in obtaining supplies, we 
brought off quite a large number of beef cattle, and the cavalry 
obtained a number of horses, some being also procured for the 
artillery, f 



* Grant says : "On the 12th, a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of 
Fort Stevens to ascertain the enemy's position and force. A severe skirmish 
ensued, in which we lost 280 in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss was 
probably greater. He commenced retiring during the night." In regard to the 
same affair, Stanton says ; " By these troops (Wright's, Gilmore's, and Emory's) 
the enemy was was driven back from Washington and retreated hastily to Vir- 
ginia, pursued by our forces under General Wright.*' Grant's statement is cor- 
rect, with the exception of the estimate he places on our loss. Comment on 
Stanton's is unaeccessary when it is compared with that of Grant. 

f On the night of the 12th, the house of Postmaster General Blair near Silver 
Spring was burned, and it was assumed by the enemy that it was burned by my 
orders. The fact is, that I had nothing to do with it, and do not yet know how 
the burning occurred. Though I believed that retaliation was fully justified by 
the previous acts of the enemy, yet 1 did not wish to incur the risk of any license 



RETURN TO THE VALLEY, AND OPERATIONS 
THERE. 

We rested, on the 14th. and 15th., near Leesburg; and, on 
the morning of the 16th., resumed the march to the Valley, 
through S inciter's Gap in the Blue Ridge. Hunter had arri- 
ved at Harper's Ferry, and united with Sigel, and the whole 
force had moved from that place, under Crook, to Hillsboro, 
in Loudon, and a body of cavalry from it made a dash on 
our train, as we were moving towards the Valley, and suc- 
ceeded in setting fire to a few waggons, but was soon driven 
off by troops from Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions, and one 
piece of artillery was captured from the enemy. 

On the morning of the 17th., we crossed the Shenandoah, 
at Snicker's or Castleman's Ferry, and took position near 
Berryville — Breckenridge covering the ford at the ferry, and 



on the part of my troops, and it was obviously impolitic to set the house on fire 
when we were retiring, as it amounted to notice of our movement. Some of my 
officers thought the burning was done by some person in the neighborhood, who 
took advantage of our presence to commit the act with impunity. It may have 
been occasioned by a shell from the enemy's guns, some of which went in that 
direction late in the day, or it may have been the act of some of my men ; and a 
number of them had abundant provocation for the act, in the sight of their own 
devastated homes as they marched down the Valley on Hunter's track. In retalia- 
tion for the burning of this house, two Federal gunboats with a body of soldiers 
on board were sent up the Rappahannock River, on which there was not a Con- 
federate soldier, to burn the house of the widow of the brother of the lion. J;.mea 
A. Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of War, and she and her little children 
were turned out of doors, and the house with all its contents consigned to the 
flames. A card was left, signed by Butler or his order, stating that the house 
was burned in retaliation for the burning of the Hon. Montgomery Blair's house. 
This retaliation upon a widowed lady and her orphan children, by a combined 
military and naval expedition, was worthy of the agent selected, and the cause 
in which he was engaged. But, though it was very congenial to his nature, I 
do not regard Butler as alone responsible for this act. The odium of it should 
attach to his superiors Lincoln and Grant, he being the favourite of the former, 
and the subordinate of the latter, and at that time, serving under hi& immediate 
orders. 



OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY. 



67 



the river above and below, and Rodes' and Ramseur's divi- 
sions the roads from Harper's Ferry. 

On the 18th, the enemy, having moved through Snicker's 
Gap, appeared on the banks of the Shenandoah, and there 
was some skirmishing. In the afternoon, a heavy column of 
his infantry made a dash at Parker's Ford, one mile below 
the ferry, and crossed over, after driving back the picket of 
one hundred men at that point. Breckenridge moved Gor- 
don's and Echol's divisions to the front, and held the enemy 
in check, while Rodes* division was brought up from the left, 
and attacked and drove him across the river, with heavy loss, 
and in great confusion. 

On the 19th, the enemy's main body still occupied the 
eastern bank of the Shenandoah, and smaller columns moved 
up and down the river, to effect a crossing, lmboden, with 
his own and McCausland's cavalry, resisted and repulsed 
one of these columns, which attempted to cross at Berry's 
Ferry, with considerable loss to the enemy. The horses of 
Vaughan's cavalry having been brought from South-western 
Virginia, his small force had been now mounted. On this 
day I received information that a column under Averill was 
moving from Martinsburg towards Winchester, and, as the po- 
sition I held near Berryville left my trains exposed to expedi- 
tions in the rear from Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, I de- 
termined to concentrate my force near Strasburg, so as to en- 
able me to put the trains in safely, and then move out and 
attack the enemy. This movement was commenced on the 
night of the 19th ; Ramseur's division, with a battery of ar- 
tillery, being sent to Winchester, to cover that place against 
Averill, while the stores, and the sick and wounded were 
being removed, and the other divisions moving through Mill- 
wood and White Post to the Valley Pike at Newtown and 
Middle town. 

Vaughan's and Jackson's cavalry had been watching Aver- 
ill, and, on the afternoon of the 20th., it was reported to Ge- 
neral Ramseur, by General Vaughan, that Averill was at Ste- 
phenson's depot, with an inferior force, which could be cap- 



68 



OPERATION'S IN THE VALLEY, 



tured, and Ramseur moved out from Winchester to attack 
him ; but, relying on the accuracy of the information he had 
received, General Ramseur did not take the proper precau- 
tions in advancing, and his division, while moving by the 
flank, was suddenly met by a larger force, under Averill, ad- 
vancing in line of battle, and the result was that Ramseur's 
force was thrown into confusion, and compelled to retire,, 
with the loss of four pieces of artillery, and a number in 
killled and wounded— Brigadier-Generals Lewis and Lilly 
being among the wounded, and Col. Board, of the 58th Vir- 
ginia Regiment, among the killed. Colonel Jackson made a 
vigorous charge with his cavalry, which enabled Ramseur to 
rally his men, restore order, and arrest the progress of Averill 
before he reached Winchester. The error committed, on this 
occasion, by this most gallant officer, was nobly retrieved in 
the subsequent part of the campaign. I received, at New- 
town, the news of Ramseur^s misfortune, and immediately 
moved to his assistance with Rodes' division ; but, on arri- 
ving at Winchester, I found that the enemy, after being 
checked, had fallen back a short distance ; and, as another 
and much larger column was moving through Berryville, i 
did not go after Averill, but moved the whole command to 
Newtown — the stores, and such of the wounded and sick as 
could be transported, having been gotten off. 

On the 21st., my whole inlantry force was concentrated 
near Middletown ; and, on the 22nd., it was moved across 
Cedar Creek, towards Strasbarg, and so posted as to cover 
all the roads from the direction of Winchester. 

A report having been sent to me, from Mt. Jackson, that a 
force of the enemy was moving from the Valley of the South 
Branch of the Potomac to that place, Imboden was sent to 
ascertain its truth, and it proved to be false. We rested on 
the 23rd., while waiting to ascertain the movements of the 
enemy, and daring the day a report was received from the 
cavalry in front, that a large portion of ihe force sent after us 
from Washington, was returning, and that Crook and Averill 
had united, and were at Kernstown, near Winchester. 



BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN. 



On the reception of the foregoing information, 1 determined 
to attack the enemy at once ; and, early on the morning of 
the 24th., my whole force was put in motion for Winchester. 
The enemy, under Crook, consisting of the " Army of West 
Virginia," and including Hunter's and SigePs forces, and 
Averill's cavalry, was found in position at Kernstown, on 
the same ground occupied by Shields, at the time of General 
Jackson's fight with him, on the 22nd of March, 1862. Ram- 
seur's division was sent to the left, at Bartonsville, lo get 
around the enemy's right flank, while the other divisions 
moved along the Valley Pike, and formed on each side of it. 
Ransom's cavalry was ordered to move in two columns ; one 
on the right, along the road from Front Royal to Winchester ; 
and the other on the left, and west of Winchester, so as to 
unite in rear of the latter place, and cut off the enemy's re- 
treat. After the enemy's skirmishers were driven in, it was 
discovered that his left flank, extending through Kernstown, 
was exposed, and General Breckenridge wa> ordered to 
move Echol's division, now under Brig.-Gen. Wharton, under 
cover of some ravines on our right, and attack that flank. 
This movement, which was made under Gen. Breckenridge's 
personal superintendence, was handsomely executed, and the 
attacking division struck the enemy's left flank in open 
ground, doubling it up and throwing his whole line into great 
confusion. The other divisions then advanced, and the rout 
of the enemy became complete. He was pursued, by the in- 
fantry and artillery, through and beyond Winchester ; and 
the pursuit was continued by Rodes' division to Stephrmson's 
depot, six miles from Winchester — this division then having 
marched twenty-seven miles from its position west ot Stras- 
burg. The cavalry had not been moved according to my 
orders ; and the enemy, having the advantage of an open 
country and a wide macadamized road, was enabled to make 



70 



BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN. 



his escape with his artillery and most of his waggons. Ge- 
neral Ransom had been in very bad health since he reported 
to me at Lynchburg, and unable to take the active command 
in the field ; and all my operations had been impeded for the 
want of an efficient and energetic cavalry commander. I 
think, if I had had one on this occasion, the greater part of 
the enemy's force would have been captured or destroyed, for 
the rout was thorough. Our loss, in this action, was very 
light. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was severe, 
and two or three hundred prisoners fell into our hands ; and, 
among them, Colonel Mulligan, in command of a division, 
mortally wounded. The infantry was too much exhausted to 
continue the pursuit on the 25th., and only moved to Bunker 
Hill, twelve miles from Winchester. The pursuit was con- 
tinued by our cavalry, and the enemy's rear-guard of cavalry 
was encountered at Martinsburg ; but, after slight skirmish- 
ing, it evacuated the place. The whole defeated force crossed 
the Potomac, and took refuge at Maryland Heights and Har- 
per's Ferry. The road from Winchester, via Martinsburg, to 
Williamsport, was strewed with debris of the rapid retreat — 
twelve caissons and seventy-two waggons having been aban- 
doned, and most of them burned * 



EXPEDITION INTO MARYLAND AND PENNSYL- 
VANIA—BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG. 

On the 26th we moved to Martinsburg, the cavalry going to 
the Potomac. The 27th and 28th were employed in destroyng 
the railroad, it having been repaired since we passed over it 

* Grant in his report entirely ignores this battle, in "which the enemy's forces 
were superior to mine, and merely says : — ■ " About the 25th, it became evident 
that the enemy was again advancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and 
the 6th corps which was at Washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of 
Harper's Ferry." 



EXPEDITION INTO MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA. 71 



at the beginning of the month. While at Martinsburg, it was 
ascertained, beyond all doubt, that Hunter had been again 
indulging in his favourite mode of warfare, and that, after his 
return to the Valley, while we were near Washington, among 
other outrages, the private residences of Mr. Andrew Hunter, 
a member of the Virginia Senate, Mr. Alexander R. Boteler, 
an ex-member of the Confederate Congress as well as of the 
United States Congress, and Edmund I. Lee, a distant relative 
cf General Lee, all in Jefferson County, with their contents, 
had been burned by his orders, only time enough being given 
for the ladies to get out of the houses. A number of towns 
in the South, as well as private country houses, had been 
burned by the Federal troops, and the accounts had been 
heralded forth in some of the Northern papers in terms of 
exultation, and gloated over by their readers, while they were 
received with apathy by others. I now came to the conclu- 
sion that we had stood this mode of warfare long enough, and 
that it was time to open the eyes of the people of the North to 
its enormity, by an example in the way of retaliation. I did 
not select the cases mentioned, as having more merit or greater 
claims for retaliation than others, but because they had occur- 
red within the limits of the country covered by my command, 
and were brought more immediately to my attention.* 

The town of Chambersburg in Pennsylvania was selected 



*Ihad often seen delicate ladies, who had been plundered, insulted, and 
rendered desolate by the acts of our most atrocious enemies, and while they did 
not call for it, yet, in the anguished expressions of their features while narrating 
their misfortunes, there was a mnte appeal to every manly sentiment of my 
bosom for retribution, which I could no longer withstand. On my passage 
through the lower Valley into Maryland, a lady had said to me, with tears in 
her eyes, " Our lot is a hard one and we see no peace, but there are a few green 
spots in our lives, and they are, when the Confederate soldiers come along and 
we can do something for them." May God defend and bless those noble women 
of the Valley, who so often ministered to the wounded, sick, and dying Con- 
federate soldiers, and gave their last morsel of bread to the hungry! They 
bore with heroic courage, the privations, sufferings, persecutions, and dangers, 
to which the war which was constantly waged in their midst exposed them, and 
upon no portion of the Southern people did the disasters which finally befell our 
army and country, fall with more crushing effect than upon them. 



72 EXPEDITION INTO MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA. 

as the one on which retaliation should be made, and McCaus- 
land was ordered to proceed, with his brigade and that of 
Johnson and a battery of artillery, to that place, and demand 
of the municipal authorities the sum of $100,000 in gold, or 
$500,000 in United States currency, as a compensation for the 
destruction of the houses named and their contents ; and, in 
default of payment, to lay the town in ashes, in retaliation for 
the burning of those houses and others in Virginia, as well as 
for the towns which had been burned in other Southern Slates. 
A written demand to that effect was sent to the municipal 
authorities, and they were informed what would be the result 
of a failure or refusal to comply with it. I desired to give the 
people of Chambersburg an opportunity of saving their town, 
by making compensation for part of the injury done, and hoped 
that the payment of such a sum would have the desired effect, 
and open the eyes of the people of other towns at the North, 
to the necessity of urging upon their government the adoption 
of a different policy. McCausland was also directed to pro- 
ceed from Chambersburg towards Cumberland in Maryland, 
and levy contributions in money upon that and other towns 
able to bear them, and if possible desiroy the machinery at the 
coal pits near Cumberland, and the machine shops, depots, and 
bridges on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad a? far as practicable. 

On the 29th, McCausland crossed the Potomac near Clear 
Spring, above Willi amsport, and I moved with Rodes' and 
Ramseur's divisions and Vaughan's cavalry to the latler place, 
while Imboden demonstrated with his and Jackson's cavalry 
towards Harper's Ferry, in order to withdraw attention from 
McCausland. Breckenridge remained at Martinsburg and 
continued the destruction of the railroad. Vaughan drove a 
force of cavalry from Williamsport, and went into Hagerstown, 
where he captured and destroyed a train of cars loaded with 
supplies. One of Rodes' brigades was crossed over at Williams- 
port and subsequently withdrawn. On the 30th, McCausland 
being well under way, I moved back to Martinsburg, and on 
the 31st the whole infantry force was moved to Bunker Hill, 
where we remained on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of August. 



EXPEDITION INTO MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA. 73 



On the 4th, in order to enable McCausland to retire from 
Pennsylvania and Maryland, and to keep Hunter, who had 
been reinforced by the 6th and 1 9th corps, and had been 
oscillating between Harper's Ferry and Monocacy Junction, 
in a state of uncertainty, I again moved to the Potomac with 
the infantry and Vaughan's and Jackson's cavalry, while Im- 
boden demonstrated towards Harper's Ferry. On the 5th Rodes' 
Ramseur's divisions crossed at Williamsport and took position 
near St. James' College, and Vaughan's cavalry went into 
Hagerstown. Breckenbridge, with his command, and Jack- 
son's cavalry, crossed at Shepherdstown, and took position at 
Sharpsburg. This position is in full view from Maryland 
Heights, and a cavalry force was sent out by the enemy to 
reconnoitre, which, after skirmishing with Jackson's cavalry, 
was driven off by the sharpshooters of Gordon's division. On 
the 6th, the whole force recrossed the Potomac at Williams- 
port, and moved towards Martinsburg ; and on the 7th we 
returned to Bunker Hill.* 



* While at Sharpsburg on this occasion, I rode over the ground on which the 
battle of Sharpsburg, or Antietam as it is called by the enemy, was fought, and I 
was surprised to see how few traces remained of that great battle. In. the woods 
at the famous Dunkard or Tunker Church, where, from persoual observation at 
the battle, I expected to find the trees terribly broken and battered, a stranger 
would find difficulty in identifying the marks of the bullets and shells. 

I will take occasion here to say that the public, North or South, has never 
known how small was the force with which General Lee fought that battle. 
McClellan's estimate is very wide of the mark. From personal observation and 
conversation with other officers engaged, including General Lee himself, I am 
satisfied that the latter was not able to carry 30,000 men into action. The ex- 
haustion of our men, in the battles around Richmond, the subsequent battles near 
Manassas, and on the march to Maryland, when they were for days without 
anything to eat except green corn, was so great that the straggling was fright- 
ful before we crossed the Potomac. As an instance of our weakness, and a re- 
miniscence worthy of being recorded, which was brought very forcibly to my 
mind while riding over the ground, I will state the following facts : In the 
early part of the day, all of General Jackson's troops on the field except my 
brigade (A. P. Hill had not then arrived from Harper's Ferry) were driven from 
the field in great disorder, and Hood had taken their place with his division. 
My brigade, which was on the extreme left supporting some artillery with which 
Stuart was operating, and had not been engaged, was sent for by Gen. Jackson 
and posted in the left of the woods at the Dunkard Church. Hood was also 



74 



BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG. 



On the 30th of July McCausland reached Chambersburg, 
and made the demand as directed, reading to such of the au- 
thorities as presented themselves the paper sent by me. The 
demand was not complied with, the people stating that they 
were not afraid of having their town burned, and that a Fed- 
eral force was approaching. The policy pursued by our army 
on former occasions had been so lenient, that they did not 
suppose the threat was in earnest this time, and they hoped 
for speedy relief. McCausland, however, proceeded to carry 
out his orders, and the greater part of the town was laid in 
ashes.* He then moved in the direction of Cumberland, but, 
on approaching that town, he found it defended by a force 
under Kelly too strong for him to attack, and he withdrew 
towards Hampshire County in Virginia, and crossed the Po- 
tomac near the mouth of the South Branch, capturing the 



forced back, and then the enemy advanced to this woods — Sumner's Corps, 
which was fresh, advancing on our left flank. My brigade then numbering 
about 1000 men for duty, with two or three hnnred men of Jackson's own divi- 
sion, who had been rallied by Colonels Grigsby and Stafford, and when there 
Was an interval of at least one half a mile between us and any other part of our 
line, held Sumner's Corps in check for some time, until Green's division of 
Mansfield's Corps penetrated into the interval in the woods between us and the 
rest of our line, when I was compelled to move by the flank and attack it. That 
division was driven out of the woods by my brigade, while Grigsby and Stafford 
skirmished with Sumner's advancing force, when we turned on it, and, with the 
aid of three brigades — to wit : Anderson's, Semmes', and Barksdale's — which had 
just arrived to our assistance, drove it from the woods in great confusion, and 
with heavy loss. So great was the disparity in the forces at this point that the 
wounded officers who were captured, were greatly mortified, and commenced 
making excuses by stating that the troops in their front were raw troops who 
stampeded and produced confusion in their ranks. McClellan, in his report, 
says that Sumner's Corps and Green's division encountered, in this woods, "over- 
whelming numbers behind breastworks," and he assigns the heavy losses and 
consequent demoralization in Sumners Corps, as one of the reasons for not re- 
newing the fight on the 18th. We had no breastworks or anything like them in 
that woods on the 1 7th, and, on our part, it was a stand up fight there altogether. 
The slight breastworks subsequently seen by McClellan were made on the 18th 
when we were expecting a renewal of the battle. 

* For this act, I, alone, am responsible, as the officers engaged in it were simply 
executing my orders, and had no discretion left them. Notwithstanding the 
lapse of time which has occurred, and the result of the war, I am perfectly satis- 
fied with my conduct on this occasion, and see no reason to regret it. 



DEFEAT OF m'cAUSLANB. 



75 



garrison at that place and partially destroying the railroad 
bridge. He then invested the post on the railroad at New 
Creek, but finding it too strongly fortified to take by assault, 
he moved to Moorefield in Hardy County, near which place 
he halted to rest and recruit his men and horses, as the com- 
mand was now considered safe from pursuit. Averill, however, 
had been pursuing from Chambersburg with a body of cavalry, 
and Johnson's brigade was surprised in camp, before day, on 
the morning of the 7th of August, and routed by AverilPs force. 
This resulted also in the rout of McCausland's brigade, and 
the loss of the artillery (4 pieces) and about 300 prisoners 
from the whole command. The balance of the command 
made its way to Mount Jackson in great disorder, and much 
weakened. This affair had a very damaging effect upon my 
cavalry for the rest of the campaign,* 



RETREAT TO FISHER'S HILL, AND SUBSEQUENT 
OPERATIONS, UNTIL THE BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 

On the 9th., Imboden reported that a large force had been 
concentrated at Harper's Ferry, consisting of the 6th., 19th., 
and Crook's corps, under a new commander, and that it was 
moving towards Berry vi lie, to our right. The new comman- 
der proved to be Major-General Sheridan, from Grant's army. 
On the 10th., we moved from Bunker Hill to the east of Win- 
chester, to cover the roads from Charlestown and Berryville 
to that place ; and Ramseur's division was moved to Win- 



* Grant says, in reference to this expedition under McCausland : " They were 
met and defeated by General Kelly ; and, with diminished numbers, escaped 
into the mountains of West Virginia ; " and. he makes no allusion whatever to 
AverUTs affair. There was no defeat by Kelly, but there was one by Averill, as 
I have stated. This show3 how loose Grant is as to his facts So far as we were 
concerned, the defeat by Averill was worse than it could have been by Kelly. 



76 



RETREAT TO FISHEr's HILL. 



Chester, to cover that place against a force reported to be ad- 
vancing from the west ; but, this report proving untrue, it 
was subsequently moved to the junction of the Millwood and 
Front Royal roads. On the morning of the 11th., it was dis- 
covered that the enemy was moving to our right, on the east 
of the Opequon, and my troops, which had been formed in 
line of battle covering Winchester, were moved to the right, 
towards Newtown, keeping between the enemy and the Val- 
ley Pike. Ramseur had a brisk skirmish with a body of the 
enemy's cavalry on the Millwood Road, and drove it back. 
Imboden's and Vaughan's brigades had a severe fight with 
another body of cavalry at the double toll-gate, at the inter- 
section of the Front Royal road with the road from White 
Post to Newtown ; and it was discovered that there had been 
a considerable accession to that arm from Grant's army. 
Just before night, Gordon had heavy skirmishing, near New- 
town, with a large force of cavalry, which advanced on the 
road from the double toll-gate, and drove it off. We en- 
camped near Newtown ; and, on the morning of the 12th., 
moved to Hupp's Hill, between Strasburg and Cedar Creek. 
Finding that the enemy was advancing in much heavier force 
than I had yet encountered, 1 determined to take position at 
Fisher's Hill, above Strasburg, and await his attack there. 
Imboden, with his brigade, was sent to the Luray Valley, to 
watch that route; and, in the afternoon, we moved to Fisher's 
Hill. I had received information a few days before, from 
General Lee, that General Anderson had moved with Ker- 
shaw's division of infantry and Fitz Lee's division of cavalry 
to Culpepper C.H. ; and I sent a dispatch to Anderson, in- 
forming him of the state of things, and requesting him to 
move to Front Royal, so as to guard the Luray Valley. 

Sheridan's advance appeared on the banks of Cedar Creek, 
on the 12th., and there was some skirmishing with it. My 
troops were posted at Fisher's Hill, with the right resting on 
the North Fork of the Shenandoah, and the left extending to- 
wards Little North Mountain ; and we awaited the advance 
of the enemy. General Anderson moved to Front Royal, in 



OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 



77 



compliance with my request, and took position to prevent an 
advance of the enemy on that route. Shortly after I took 
position at Fisher's Hill, Major-General Lomax reported to 
me to relieve Ransom, in command of the cavalry, and Mc- 
Cansland and Johnson joined us with the remnants of their 
brigades. Sheridan demonstrated at Hupp's Hill, within our 
view, for several days, and some severe skirmishing ensued. 

Upon taking position at Fisher's Hill, I had established a 
signal-station on the end of Three Top Mountain, a branch of 
Massanutten Mountain, near Strasburg, which overlooked 
both camps and enabled me to communicate readily with 
General Anderson, in the Luray Valley. A small force from 
Sheridan's army ascended the mountain and drove off our 
signal-men, and possession was taken of the station by the 
enemy, who was in turn driven away ; when several small 
but severe fights ensued over the station, possession of it 
being finally gained and held by a force of one hundred men 
under Captain Keller of Gordon's division. 

On the morning of the 17th., it was discovered that the 
enemy was falling back, and I immediately moved forward 
in pursuit, requesting General Anderson, by signal, to cross 
the river at Front Royal, and move towards Winchester, 
Just before night, the enemy's cavalry and a body of infantry, 
reported to be a division, was encountered between Kerns- 
town and Winchester, and driven through the latter place, 
after a sharp engagement, in which Wharton's division 
moved to the left and attacked the enemy's infantry, and 
drove it from a strong position on Bower's Hill, south of Win- 
chester, while Ramseur engaged it in front, and Gordon ad- 
vanced against the cavalry on the right.* 



* When Hunter was relieved I had hoped that an end was put to his mode of 
warfare, but I had now to learn how the new commander proposed to carry on 
ihe war in behalf of "the best government the world ever saw," (so called). 
Sheridan had commenced burning barns, mills, and stacks of small grain and 
hay, and the whole country was smoking. Among many others, the barn of a 
respectable farmer near Newtown, whose name was Chrisman, had been burned 
within a few steps of his house, and the latter saved with great difficulty, not- 
G 



78 



OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 



On the 1 8th we took position to cover Winchester, and Gen, 
Anderson came up with Kershaw's division of infantry, Cui~ 
shaw's battalion of Artillery, and two brigades of cavalry under 
Fitz Lee. General Anderson ranked me, but he declined to 
take command, and offered to co-operate in any movement I 
might suggest. We had now discovered that Torbert's and 
Wilson's divisions of cavalry from Grant's army had joined 
Sheridan's force, and that the latter was very large. 

On the 19th, my main force moved to Bunker Hill and 
Lomax's cavalry made reconnoissances to Martinsburg and 
Shepherdstown, while Anderson^ whole force remained near 
Winchester. 

On the 28th, our cavalry had some skirmishing with the 
enemy's on the Opequon, and on the 21st, by concert, there was 
a general movement towards Harper's Ferry — my command 
moving through Smithfield towards Charlestown, and An- 
derson's on the direct road by Summit Point. A body of the 
enemy's cavalry was driven from the Opequon, and was pur- 
sued by part of our cavalry towards Summit Point. I encoun- 
tered Sheridan's main force near Cameron's depot, about three 



withstanding the fact that Mr. Chrisman had received from General Torhert, in 
command of the Federal cavalry, a written protection stating that for some 
weeks he had taken care of, and showed great kindness to, a badly-wounded 
Federal soldier. In passing through Middletown, I was informed that one of 
my soldiers had been tried and hung as a spy. The grave at the foot of the 
gallows was opened, and the body was recognized by his brother and the offi- 
cers of his company as a private of the 54th North Carolina Regiment. This 
man had been found by the enemy, in Middletown, in attendance on a Confede* 
rate soldier whose leg was amputated, and he had claimed to be a citizen, but a 
paper was found on his person showing that he had been formerly detailed as a 
nurse in the hospital. On this state of facts, he was hung ag a spy. He was 
not employed in any such capacity, and he was so illiterate, not being able to 
read or write, that his appearance and evident want of intelligence precluded 
the idea of his being so employed. I would have retaliated at once by hanging 
a commissioned officer, but the enquiry which I made furnished some reason for 
believing that the man had remained behind, and endeavoured to pass for a citi- 
zen to avoid service in our army ; and I did not therefore wish to risk the lives 
of my officers and men who were in the enemy's hands, by making his a case for 
retaliation. His execution by the enemy, however, was none the leg* waatou 
and barbarous. 



OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 



79 



miles frcm Charlestown, in a position which he commenced 
fortifying at once. Rodes' and Ramseur's (divisions were ad- 
vanced to the front, and very heavy skirmishing ensued and 
was continued unlil night, but I waited for General Anderson 
to arrive before making a general attack. He encountered 
Wilson's division of cavalry at Summit Point, and, after driv- 
ing it off, went into camp at that place. At light next morning, 
it was discovered that the enemy had retired during the night, 
and his rear guard of cavalry was driven through Charlestown 
towards Hall-town, where Sheridan had taken a strong position 
under the protection of the heavy guns on Maryland Heights. 
I demonstrated on the enemy's front on the 22nd, 23rd, and 
24th, and there was some skirmishing. General Anderson 
then consented to take my position in front of Charlestown and 
amuse the enemy with Kershaw's division of infantry, support- 
ed by McCausland's brigade of cavalry on the left and a regi- 
ment of Fitz Lee's cavalry on the right, while I moved with 
my infantry and artillery to Shepherdstown, and Fitz Lee with 
the rest of the cavalry to Williamsport, as if to cross into 
Maryland, in order to keep up the fear of an invasion of Mary- 
land and Pennsylvania. 

On the 25th Fitz Lee started by the way of Leetown and 
Martinsburg to Williamsport, and I moved through Leetown 
and crossed the railroad at Kearneysville to Shepherdstown. 
After Fitz Lee had passed on, I encountered a very large force 
of the enemy's cavalry between Leetown and Kearneysville, 
which was moving out with several days forage and rations 
for a raid in our rear. After a sharp engagement with small 
arms and artillery, this force was driven back through Shep- 
herdstown, where we came very near surrounding and capturing 
a considerable portion of it, but it succeded in making its escape 
across the Potomac. Gordon's division, which was moved 
around to intercept the enemy, became heavily engaged, and 
cut off the retreat of part of his force by one road, but it made 
its way down the river to the ford by another and thus escaped. 
In this affair, a valuable officer, Colonel Monaghan of the 6th. 
Louisiana Regiment, was killed. Fitz Lee reached Williams- 



80 



OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 



port, and had some skirmishing across the river at that place 9 
and then moved to Shepherdstown. 

On the 26th I moved to Leetown, and on the 27th I moved 
back to Bunker Hill ; while Anderson, who had confronted 
Sheridan, during the two days of my absence, with but a di- 
vision of infantry and a brigade and a regiment of cavalry, 
moved to Stephenson's Depot. 

On the 28th, our cavalry, which had been left holding a line 
from Charlestown to Shepherdstown, was compelled to retire 
across the Opequon, after having had a brisk engagement with 
the enemy's cavalry at Smithfleld. On the 29th, the enemy's 
cavalry crossed the Opequon near Smithfleld, driving in our 
cavalry pickets, when I advanced to the front with a part of my 
infantry, and drove the enemy across the stream again, and ? 
after a very sharp artillery duel, a portion of my command was 
crossed over and pursued the enemy through Smithfleld to- 
wards Charlestown. We then retired, leaving a command of 
cavalry at Smithfleld, but it was compelled to recross the 
Opequon, on the advance of a heavy force from the direction 
of Charlestown. 

Quiet prevailed on the 30th, but on the 3 1st there were some 
demonstrations of cavalry by the enemy on the Opepuon. 
which were met by ours. On this day, (31st), Anderson moved 
to Winchester, and Rodes with his division went to Martins- 
burg on a reconnoissance, drove a force of the enemy's cav- 
alry from that place, interrupted the preparations for repairing 
the railroad, and then returned. 

There was quiet on the 1st, but y on the 2nd, I broke up my 
camp at Bunker Hill, and moved with three divisions of in- 
fantry and part of McCausland's cavalry under Col. Ferguson,, 
across the country towards Summit Point, on a reconnoissance, 
while the trains under the protection of Rodes' division were 
moved to Stephenson's depot. After I had crossed the Ope- 
quon and was moving towards Summit Point, Averill's cav- 
alry attacked and drove back in some confusion, first Vau- 
ghan's, and then Johnson's cavalry, which were on the Mar- 
tinson rg road, and the Opequon, but Rodes returned towards- 



OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 



81 



Bunker Hill and drove the enemy back in turn. This affair 
arrested my march and I recrossed the Opequon and moved to 
Stephenson's depot, where I established my camp. 

On the 3rd, Rodes moved to Bunker Hill in support of Lo- 
max's cavalry, and drove the enemy's cavalry from and beyond 
that place. 

A letter had been received from General Lee, requesting 
that Kershaw's division should be returned to him, as he was 
very much in need of troops, and, after consultation with me, 
Gen. Anderson determined to recross the Blue Ridge with that 
division and Fitz Lee's cavalry. On the 3rd, he moved to- 
wards Berryville for the purpose of crossing the mountain at 
Ash by 's Gap, and I was to have moved towards Charlestown 
next day, to occupy the enemy's attention during Anderson's 
movement. Sheridan, however, had started two divisions of 
cavalry through Berryville and White Post, on a raid to our 
rear, and his main force had moved towards Berryville. An- 
derson encountered Crook's corps at the latter place, and after 
a sharp engagement drove it back on the main body. Re- 
ceiving information of this affair, I moved at daylight next 
morning, with three divisions, to Anderson's assistance, Gor- 
don's division being left to cover Winchester. I found Ker- 
shaw's division extended out in a strong skirmish line con- 
fronting Sheridan's main force, which had taken position in 
rear of Berryville, across the road from Charlestown to that 
place, and was busily fortifying, while the cavalry force which 
had started on the raid was returning and passing between 
Berryville and the river to Sheridan's rear. As may be sup- 
posed, Anderson's position was one of great peril, if the enemy 
had possessed any enterprise, and it presented the appearance 
of the most extreme audacity for him thus to confront a force 
so vastly superior to his own, while, too, his trains were at 
the mercy of the enemy's cavalry, had the latter known it. 
Placing one of my divisions in line on Kershaw's left, I moved 
with the other two along the enemy's front towards his right, 
for the purpose of reconnoitring and attacking that flank, if 
a suitable opportunity offered. After moving in this way for 



82 



OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 



two miles, I reached an elevated position from which the en- 
emy's line was visible, and within artillery range, of it. I at 
first thought that I had reached his right flank, and was about 
making arrangements to attack it, when casting my eye to my 
left, I discovered, as far as the eye could reach with the aid of 
field glasses, a line extending towards Summit Point. The 
position the enemy occupied was a strong one, and he was 
busily engaged fortifying it, having already made considerable 
progress. It was not until I had had this view that 1 re- 
alized the size of the enemy's force, and as I discovered that 
his line was too long for me to get around his flank, and the 
position was too strong to attack in front, I returned and in- 
formed General Anderson of the condition of things. After 
consultation with him, we thought it not advisable to attack 
the enemy in his entrenched lines, and we determined to move 
our forces back to the west side of the Opequon, and see if he 
would not move out of his works. The waggon trains were 
sent back early next morning (the 5th) towards Winchester, 
and, about an hour by sun, Kershaw's division, whose place 
had been taken by one of my divisions, moved towards the 
same point. About two o'clock in the afternoon my troops 
were withdrawn, and moved back to Stephenson's depot. 
This withdrawal was made while the skirmishers were in 
close proximity and firing at each other; yet there was no 
effort on the part of the enemy to molest us. Just as my front 
division (Rodes') reached Stephenson's depot, it met, and drove 
back, and pursued for some distance, Averill's cavalry, which 
was forcing, towards Winchester, that part of our cavalry 
which had been watching the Martin sburg road. 

It was quiet on the 6th, but on the 7th the enemy's cavalry 
made demonstrations on the Martinsburg Road, and the Ope- 
quon at several points and was repulsed. 

On the 8th it was quiet again, but on the 9th a detachment 
of the enemy's cavalry came to the Opequon below Brucetown, 
burned some mills, and retreated before a division of infantry 
sent out to meet it. 

On the 10th , my infantry moved by Bunker Hill to Darkes; 



OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER VALLEY. 



83 



ville and encountered a considerable force of the enemy's cav- 
alry, which was driven off, and then pursued by Lomax through 
Martinsburg across the Opequon. We then returned to Bunk- 
er Hill and the next day to Stephenson's depot, and there was 
quiet on the 12th. 

On the 13th, a large force of the enemy's cavalry, reported 
to be supported by infantry, advanced on the road from Sum- 
mit Point and drove in our pickets from the Opequon, when 
two divisions of infantry were advanced to the front, driving 
the enemy across the Opequon again. A very sharp artillery 
duel across the creek then took place, and some of my in- 
fantry crossed over, when the enemy retired. 

On the 14th, General Anderson again started, with Kershaw's 
division and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery, to cross the Blue 
Ridge by the way of Front Royal, and was not molested. 
Fitz Lee's cavalry was left with me, and Ramseur's division 
was moved to Winchester to ocoupy Kershaw's position. 

There was an affair between one of Kershaw's brigades and 
a division of the enemy's cavalry, while I was at Fisher's 
Hill and Anderson at Front Royal, in which some prisoners 
were lost ; and two affairs in which the outposts from Ker- 
shaw's command were attacked and captured by the enemy's 
cavalry, one in front of Winchester and the other in front of 
Charlestown ; which I have not undertaken to detail, as they 
occurred when General Anderson was controlling the opera- 
tions of that division, but it is proper to refer to them here as 
part of the operations in the Valley. 

On the 15th and 16th my troops remained in camp undis- 
turbed. 

The positions of the opposing forces were now as follows : 
Ramseur's division and Nelson's battalion of artillery were on 
the road from Berryville to Winchester, one mile from the 
latter place. Rodes', Gordon's, and Wharton's divisions, (the 
last two being under Breckenridge,) and Braxton's and King's 
battalions of artillery were at Stephenson's depot on the Win- 
chester and Potomac railroad, which is six miles from Win- 
chester. Lomax's cavalry picketed in my front on the Ope- 



84 



POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES. 



quon, and on my left from that stream to North Mountain,, 
while Fitz Lee's cavalry watched the right, having small 
pickets across to the ShenaDdoah. Four principal roads, from 
positions held by the enemy, centered at Stephenson's depot, to 
wit : the Martinsburg road, the road from Charlestown via 
Smithfield, the road from the same place via Summit Pointy 
and the road from Berryville via Jordan's Springs. Sheridan's 
main force was near Berryville, at the entrenched position 
which has been mentioned, while Averill was at Martinsburg 
with a division of cavalry. Berryville is ten miles from Win- 
chester, nearly east, and Martinsburg twenty two miles nearly 
north. The crossing of the Opequon on the Berryville road 
is four or five miles from Winchester. From Berryville 
there are two good roads to Front Royal, via Millwood and 
W T hite Post, and from Millwood there is a macadamized road to 
Winchester, and also good roads via White Post to the Valley 
Pike at Newtown and Middletown, the last two roads running 
east of the Opequon. The whole country is very open, being 
a limestone country which is thickly settled and well cleared, 
and affords great facilities for the movement of troops and the 
operations of cavalry. From the enemy's fortifications on 
Maryland Heights, the country north and east of Winchester, 
and the main roads through it, are exposed to view. 

The relative positions which we occupied rendered my 
communications to the rear very much exposed, but I could 
not avoid it without giving up the lower Valley. The object 
of my presence there was to keep up a threatening attitude 
towards Maryland and Pennsylvania, and prevent the use of 
the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and the Chesapeake and 
Ohio canal, as well as to keep as large a force as possible 
from Grant's army to defend the Federal Capital. Had Sheri- 
dan, by a prompt movement, thrown his whole force on the 
line of my communications, I would have been compelled to 
attempt to cut my way through, as there was no escape for 
me to the right or left, and my force was too weak to cross 
the Potomac while he was in my rear. I knew my danger, 
but I could occupy no other position that would have enabled 



POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES. 85 



me to accomplish the desired object. If I had moved up the 
Valley at all, I could not have stopped short of New Market, 
for between that place and the country in which I was there 
was no forage for my horses ; and this would have enabled 
the enemy to resume the use of the railroad and canal, and 
return all the troops from Grant's army to him. Being com- 
pelled to occupy the position where I was, and being aware 
of its danger as well as apprized of the fact that very great 
odds were opposed to me, my only resource was to use my 
forces so as to display them at different points with great 
rapidity, and thereby keep up the impression that they were 
much larger than they really were. The events of the last 
month had satisfied me that the commander opposed to me 
w r as without enterprise, and possessed an excessive caution 
which amounted to timidity. If it was his policy to produce 
the impression that his force was too weak to fight me, he did 
not succeed, but if it was to convince me that he was not an 
able or energetic commander, his strategy was a complete 
success, and subsequent events have not changed my opinion. 

My infantry force at this time consisted of the three divi- 
sions of the 2nd Corps of the Army ol Northern Virginia, and 
Wharton's division of Breckenridge's command. The 2nd 
Corps numbered a little over 8000 muskets when it was 
detached in pursuit, of Hunter, and it had now been reduced 
to about 7000 muskets, by long and rapid marches and the 
various engagements and skirmishes in which it had partici- 
pated. Wharton's division had been reduced to about 1700 
muskets by the same causes. Making a small allowance for 
details and those unfit for duty, I had about 8,500 muskets for 
duty. When I returned from Maryland, my cavalry con- 
sisted of the remnants of five small brigades, to wit : Im- 
boden's, McCausland's, Johnson's, Jackson's, and Vaughan's. 
Vaughan's had now been ordered to South Western Virginia, 
most of the men having left without permission. The surprise 
and rout of McCausland's and Johnson's brigades by Averill 
at Moorefield, had resulted in the loss of a considerable 
number of horses and men, and such had been the loss in all 



86 POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES. 



the brigades, in the various fights and skirmishes in which 
they had been engaged, that the who'e of this cavalry, now 
under Lomax, numbered only about 1700 mounted men. 
Fitz Lee had brought with him two brigades, to wit : Wick- 
ham's, and Lomax's old brigade (now under Colonel Payne), 
numbering about 1200 mounted men. I had the three battal- 
ions of artillery which had been with me near Washington, 
and Fitz Lee had brought a few pieces of horse artillery. 
When I speak of divisions and brigades of my troops, it must 
be understood that they were mere skeletons of those organi- 
zations. 

Since my return from Maryland, my supplies had been 
obtained principally from the lower Valley and the counties 
west of it, and the money which was obtained by contribu- 
tions in Maryland was used for that purpose. Nearly the 
whole of our bread was obtained by threshing the wheat and 
then having it ground, by details from my command, and it 
sometimes happened that while my troops were fighting, the 
very flour which was to furnish them with bread for their next 
meal was being ground under the protection of their guns. 
Latterly our flour had been obtained from the upper Valley, 
but also by details sent for that purpose. The horses and 
mules, including the cavalry horses, were sustained almost 
entirely by grazing. 

I have no means of stating with accuracy Sheridan's force, 
and can only form an estimate from such data as I have been 
abie to procure. Citizens who had seen bis force, stated that 
it was the largest which they had ever seen in the Valley on 
either side, and some estimated it as high as 60,000 or 70,000, 
but of course I made allowance for the usual exaggeration of 
inexperienced men. My estimate is from the following data : 
In Grant's letter to Hunter, dated at Monocacy, August 5th, 
1864, and contained in the report of the former, is the follow- 
ing statement : " In detailing such a force, the brigade of 
cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockville, may be 
taken into account. There are now on their way to join you 
three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least 



POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES. 



87 



5,000 men and horses." Sheridan relieved Hunter on the 
6th, and Grant says in his report, " On the 7th of August, the 
Middle Department and the Departments of West Virginia, 
Washington, and the Susquehanna were constituted into the 
Middle Military division, and Major General Sheridan was 
assigned to the temporary command of the same. Two 
divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and 
Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. 
The first reached him at Harper's Ferry on the 11th of August." 
Before this cavalry was sent to the Valley, there was already 
a division there commanded by Averill, besides some detach- 
ments which belonged to the department of West Virginia. 
A book containing the official reports of the chief surgeon of 
the cavalry corps of Sheridan's army, which was subsequently 
captured at Cedar Creek on the 19th of October, showed that 
there were present for duty in that corps, during the first week 
in September, over 11,000 men, and present for duty during 
the week ending the 17th day of September, 10,100 men 
The extracts from Grant's report go to confirm this statement, 
as, if three brigades numbered at least 5,000 men and horses, 
the two divisions, when the whole of them arrived, with 
Averill's cavalry, must have numbered over 10,000. I think, 
therefore, that I can safely estimate Sheridan's cavalry at the 
battle of Winchester, on the 19th of September, at 10,000. 
His infantry consisted of the 6th, 19th, and Crook's corps, the 
latter being composed of the " Army of West Virginia," and 
one division of the 8th corps. The report of Secretary Stanton 
shows that there was in the department of which the u Middle 
Military division " was composed, the following " available 
force present for duty May 1st, 1864," to wit : 

" Department of Washington 42,124." 

" Department of West Virginia 30,782." 

" Department of the Susquehanna 2,970." 

" Middle Department 5,627." 

making an aggregate of 81,503 ; but, as the Federal Secretary 
of War in the same report says, " In order to repair the losses 
of the Army of the Potomac, the chief part of the force 



88 



POSITIONS AND STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES. 



designed to guard the Middle Department and the Depart- 
ment of Washington was called forward to the front," we 
may assume that 40,000 men were used for that purpose, 
which would leave 41,503, minus the losses in battle before 
Sheridan relieved Hunter, in the Middle Military division, 
exclusive of the 6th and 19th corps, and the cavalry from 
Grant's army. The infantry of the Army of the Potomac was 
composed of the 2nd, 5th, and 6th corps, on the 1st of May 
1864, and Stanton says the " available force present for duty " 
in that army on that day, was 120,386 men. Allowing 30,000 
for the artillery and cavalry of that army, which would be a 
very liberal allowance, and there would still be left 90,385 
infantry ; and it is fair to assume that the 6th corps numbered 
one third of the infantry, that is, 30,000 men on the 1st of 
May 1864. If the losses of the Army of the Potomac had been 
such as to reduce the 6th corps to less than 10,000 men, not- 
withstanding the reinforcements and recruits received, the 
carnage in Grant's army must have been frightful indeed. 
The 19th corps was just from the Department of the Gulf and 
had not gone through a bloody campaign. A communication 
which was among the papers captured at Cedar Creek, in 
noticing some statement of a newspaper correspondent in 
regard to the conduct of that corps at Winchester, designated 
it as " a vile slander on 12,000 of the best soldiers in the 
Union army." In view of the foregoing data, without count- 
ing the troops in the Middle Department and the Departments 
of Washington and the Susquehanna, and making liberal 
allowances for losses in battle, and for troops detained on post 
and garrison duty in the Department of West Virginia, I 
think that I may assume that Sheridan had at least 35,000 
infantry against me. The troops of the 6th corps and of the 
Department of West Virginia, alone, without counting the 
19th corps, numbered on the 1st of May 1864, 60,782. If 
with the 19th corps, Sheridan did not have 35,000 infantry 
remaining from this force, what had become of the balance? 
Sheridan's artillery very greatly outnumbered mine, both in 
men and guns. 



EXPEDITION TO MARTINSBURG. 



89 



Having been informed that a force was at work on the rail- 
road at Martinsburg, I moved on the afternoon of the 17th of 
September, with Rodes' and Gordon's division, and Braxton's 
artillery, to Bunker Hill, and, on the morning of the 18th, with 
Gordon's division and a part of the artillery to Martinsburg, 
preceded by a part of Lomax'e cavalry. Averill's division of 
cavalry was driven from the town across the Opequon in the 
direction of Charlestown, and we then returned to Banker 
Hill. Gordon was left at Bunker Hill, with orders to move 
to Stephenson's depot by sunrise next morning, and Rodes' 
division moved to the latter place that night, to which I also 
returned. At Martinsburg, where the enemy had a telegraph 
office, I learned that Grant was with Sheridan that day, and I 
expected an early move. 



BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 

At light on the morning of the 19th, our cavalry pickets at 
the crossing of the Opequon on the Berryville road were driven 
in, and information having been sent me of that fact, I imme- 
diately ordered all the troops at Stephenson's depot to be in 
readiness to move, directions being given for Gordon, who had 
arrived from Bunker Hill, to move at once, but, by some mis- 
take on the part of my staff officer, the latter order was not 
delivered to General Breckenridge or Gordon. I rode at once 
to Ramseur's position, and found his troops in line across the 
Berryville road skirmishing with the enemy. Before reaching 
this point, I had ascertained that Gordon was not moving, and 
sent back for him, and now discovering that the enemy's advance 
was a real one and in heavy force, I sent orders for Brecken- 
ridge and Rodes to move up as rapidly as possible. The 
position occupied by Ramseur, was about one mile and a half 
out from Winchester, on an elevated plateau between Abra- 
ham's Creek and Red Bud Run. Abraham's creek crosses the 



90 



BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 



Valley Pike one mile south of Winchester, and then crosses 
the Front Royal road about the same distance south-east of the 
town, and, running eastwardly, on the southern side of the 
Berry vi lie road, crosses that road a short distance before it 
empties into the Opequon. Red Bud Run crosses the Mar- 
tinsburg road about a mile and a half north of Winchester, and 
runs eastwardly, on the northern side of the Berryville road, to 
the Opequon. Ramseur was therefore in the obtuse angle 
formed by the Martinsburg and Front Royal roads. In front 
of and to the right of him, for some distance, the country was 
open. Abraham's Creek runs through a deep valley, and be- 
yond it, on the right, is high open ground, at. the intersection 
of the Front Royal and Millwood roads. To Ramseur's left, 
the country sloped off to the Red Bud, and there were some 
patches of woods which afforded cover for troops. To the 
north of the Red Bud, the country is very open, affording fa- 
cilities for the movement of any kind of troops. Towards the 
Opequon, on the front, the Berryville road runs through a ravine 
with hills and woods on each side, which enabled the enemy 
to move his troops under cover, and mask them out of range of 
artillery. Nelson's artillery was posted on Ramseur's line, 
covering the approaches as far as practicable, and Lomax with 
Jackson's cavalry and part of Johnson's was on the right, 
watching the valley of Abraham's Creek and the Front Royal 
road beyond, while Fitz Lee was on the left, across the Red 
Bud, with his cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, and a 
detachment of Johnson's cavalry watched the interval between 
Ramseur's left and the Red Bud. These troops held the 
enemy's main force in check until Gordon's and Rodes' di- 
visions arrived from Stephenson's depot. Gordon's division 
arrived first, a little after ten o'clock, A.M., and was placed 
under cover in rear of a piece of woods behind the interval be- 
tween Ramseur's line and the Red Bud, the detachment of 
Johnson's cavalry having been removed to the right. Knowing 
that it would not do for us to await the shock of the enemy's 
attack, Gordon was directed to examine the ground on the left, 
with a view to attacking a force of the enemy which had taken 



BATTLE OF WINCHESTER, 



91 



position in a piece of wood in front of him, and while he was 
so engaged, Rodes arrived with three of his brigades, and was 
directed to form on Gordon's right in rear of another piece of 
woods. While this movement was being executed, we dis- 
covered very heavy columns of the enemy, which had been 
massed under cover between the Red Bud and the Berryville 
road, moving to attack Ramseur on his left flank, while an- 
other force pressed him in front.. It was a moment of imminent 
and thrilling danger, as it was impossible for Ramseur's di- 
vision, which numbered only about 1,700 muskets, to with- 
stand the immense force advancing against it. The only 
chance for us was to hurl Rodes and Gordon upon the flank of 
the advancing columns, and they were ordered forward at 
once to the attack. They advanced in most gallant style 
through the woods into the open ground, and attacked with 
great vigour, while Nelson's artillery on the right, and Brax- 
ton's on the left, opened a destructive fire. But Evans' Brigade 
of Gordon's division, which was on the extreme left of our 
infantry, received a check from a column of the enemy, and 
was forced back through the woods from behind which it had 
advanced, the enemy following to the very rear of the woods, 
and to within musket range of seven pieces of Braxton's ar- 
tillery which were without support. This caused a pause in 
our advance and the position was most critical, for it was ap- 
parent that unless this force was driven back the day was lost. 
Braxton's guns, in which now was our only hope, resolutely 
stood their ground, and, under the personal superintendence of 
Lieutenant Colonel Braxton and Colonel T. H. Carter, my 
then Chief of Artillery $ opened with canister on the enemy. 
This fire was so rapid and well directed that the enemy stag- 
gered, halted, and commenced falling back, leaving a battle flag 
on the ground, whose bearer was cut down by a canister shot* 
Just then, Battle's brigade of Rodes' division, wnich had ar- 
rived and been formed in line for the purpose of advancing to 
the support of the rest of the division, moved forward and swept 
through the woods, driving the enemy before it, while Evans' 
brigade was rallied and brought back to the charge. Our ad- 



BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 



vance, which had been suspended for a moment, was resumed, 
and the enemy's attacking columns were thrown into great 
confusion and driven from the field. This attacking force of 
the enemy proved to be the 6th and 19th corps, and it was a 
grand sight to see this immense body hurled back in utter dis- 
order before my two divisions, numbering a very little over 
5,000 muskets. Ramseur's division had received the shock of 
the enemy's attack, and been forced back a little, but soon re- 
covered itself. Lomax, on the right, had held the enemy's 
cavalry in check, and, with a part of his force, had made a 
gallant charge against a body of infantry, when Ramseur's line 
was being forced back, thus aiding the latter in recovering 
from the momentary disorder. Fitz Lee on the left, from across 
the Red Bud, had poured a galling fire into ihe enemy's col- 
umns with his sharpshooters and horse artillery, while Nelson's 
and Braxton's battalions had performed wonders. This affair 
occurred about 11, A.M., and a splendid victory had been 
gained. The ground in front was strewn with the enemy's 
dead and wounded, and some prisoners had been taken. But 
on our side, Major General Rodes had been killed, in the very 
moment of triumph, while conducting the attack of his di- 
vision with great gallantry and skill, and this was a heavy 
blow to me. Brigadier General Godwin of Ramseur's division 
had been killed, and Brigadier General York of Gordon's di- 
vision had lost an arm. Other brave men and officers had fal- 
len, and we could illy bear the loss of any of them. Had I 
then had a body of fresh troops to push our victory, the day 
would have been ours, but in this action, in the early part of 
the day, I had present only about 7,000 muskets, about 2,000 
cavalry, and two battalions of artillery with about 30 guns ; 
and they had all been engaged. Wharton's division and 
King's artillery had not arrived, and Imboden's cavalry under 
Colonel Smith, and McCausland's under Colonel Ferguson, 
were watching the enemy's cavalry on the left, on the Mar- 
tinsburg road and the Opequon. The enemy had a fresh corps 
which had not been engaged, and there remained his heavy 
force of cavalry. Our lines were now formed across from 



BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 



93 



Abraham's Creek to Red Bud and were very attenuated. The 
enemy was still to be seen in front in formidable force, and, 
away to our right, across Abraham's creek, at the junction of 
the Front Royal and Millwood roads, he had massed a di- 
vision of cavalry with some artillery, overlapping us at least a 
mile, while the country was open between this force and the 
Valley Pike, and the Cedar Creek Pike back of the latter ; 
which roads furnished my only means of retreat in the event 
of disaster. My line did not reach the Front Royal road on 
the right, or the Martinsbuig road on the left. 

When the order was sent for the troops to move from Ste- 
phenson's depot, General Breckenridge had moved to the front, 
with Wharton's division and King's artillery, to meet a cavalry 
force which had driven our pickets from the Opequon on the 
Charlestown road, and that division had become heavily en- 
gaged with the enemy, and sustained and repulsed several de- 
termined charges of his cavalry, while its own flanks were in 
great danger from the enemy's main force on the right, and a 
column of his cavalry moving up the Martinsburg road on the 
left. After much difficulty and some hard fighting, Gen. Breck- 
enridge succeeded in extricating his force, and moving up the 
Martinsburg road to join me, but he did not reach the field 
until about two o'clock in the afternoon. 

In the meantime there had been heavy skirmishing along 
the line, and the reports from the front were that the enemy 
was massing for another attack, but it was impossible to tell 
where it would fall. As the danger from the enemy's cavalry 
on the right was very great and Lomax's force very weak ? 
Wickham's brigade of Fitz Lee's cavalry had been sent from 
the left to Lomax's assistance. When Wharton's division 
arrived, Patton's brigade of that division was left to aid Fitz 
Lee in guarding the Martinsburg road, against the force of cav- 
alry which was advancing on that road watched by Lomax's 
two small brigades ; and the rest of the division was formed in 
rear of Rodes' division in the centre, in order to be moved to 
any point that might be attacked. Late in the afternoon, two 
divisions of the enemy's cavalry drove in the small force which 

H 



94 



BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 



had been watching it on the Martinsburg road, and Crooks 
corps, which had not been engaged, advanced at the same time 
on that flank, on the north side of Red Bud, and, before this 
overwhelming force, Patton's brigade of infantry and Payne's 
brigade of cavalry under Fitz Lee were forced back. A con- 
siderable force of the enemy's cavalry then swept along the 
Martinsburg road to the very skirts of Winchester, thus getting 
in the rear of our left flank. Wharton's two other brigades 
were moved in double quick time to the left and rear, and, 
making a gallant charge on the enemy's cavalry, with the aid 
of King's artillery, and some of Braxton's guns which were 
turned to ihe rear, succeeded in driving it back. The division 
was then thrown into line by General Breckenridge, in rear 
of our left and at right angles with the Martinsburg road, and 
another charge of the enemy's cavalry was handsomely repul- 
sed. But many of the men on our front line, hearing the fire 
in the rear, and thinking they were flanked and about to be 
cut off, commenced falling back, thus producing great confu- 
sion. At the same time, Cruok advanced against our left, and 
Gordon threw Evans' brigade into line to meet him, but the 
disorder in the front line became so great, that, after an obstin- 
ate resistance, that brigade was compelled to retire also. The 
whole front line had now given way, but a large portion of 
the men were rallied and formed behind an indifferent line of 
breastworks, which had been made just outside of Winchester 
during the first year of the war, and, with the aid of the ar- 
tillery which was brought back to this position, the progress 
of the enemy's infantry was arrested. Wharton's division 
maintained its organization on the left, and Ramseur fell back 
in good order on the right. Wickham's brigade of cavalry had 
been brought from the right, and was in position on Fort Hill 
just outside of Winchester on the west. Just after the advance 
of the enemy's infantry was checked by our artillery, it was 
reported to me that the enemy had got around our right flank, 
and as I knew this was perfectly practicable and was expect- 
ing such a movement from the cavalry on the Front. Royal 
road, I gave the order to retire, but instantly discovering that 



BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 



95 



the supposed force of the enemy was Ramseur's division, 
which had merely moved back to keep in line with the other 
troops, I gave the order for the latter to return to the works 
before they had moved twenty paces. This order was 
obeyed by Wharton's division, but not so well by the others. 
The enemy's cavalry force however was too large for us, and 
having the advantage of open ground, it again succeeded in 
getting around our left, producing great confusion, for which 
there was no remedy. Nothing was now left for us but to 
retire through Winchester, and Ramseur's division, which 
maintained its organization, was moved on the east of the 
town to the south side of it, and put in position forming the 
basis for a new line, while the other troops moved back through 
the town. Wickham's brigade, with some pieces of horse 
artillery on Fort Hill, covered this movement and checked the 
pursuit of the enemy's cavalry. When the new line was form- 
ed, the enemy's advance was checked until night-fall, and we 
then retired to Newtown without serious molestation. Lomax 
had held tire enemy's cavalry on the Front Royal road in 
check, and a feeble attempt at pursuit was repulsed by Ram- 
seur near Kernstown. 

As soon as our reverse began, orders had been sent for the 
removal of the trains, stores, and sick and wounded in the 
hospitals, to Fisher's Hi l, over the Cedar Creek Pike and the- 
Back Road. This was done with safety, and all the wounded, 
except such as were not in a condition to be moved, and those 
which had not been brought from the field, were carried to 
the rear. 

This battle, beginning with the skirmishing in Ramseur's 
front, had lasted from daylight until dark, and, at the close of 
it, we had been forced back two miles, after having repulsed 
the enemy's first attack with great slaughter to him, and sub- 
sequently contested every inch of ground with unsurpassed 
obstinacy. We deserved the victory, and would have had it, 
but for the enemy's immense superiority in cavalry, which h 
alone gave it to him. 

Three pieces of King's artillery, from which the horses were- 




96 BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 

shot, and which therefore could not be brought off, were lost, 
but the enemy claimed five, and, if he captured that number, 
two were lost by the cavalry and not reported to me. My loss 
in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was severe for the size of 
my force, but it was only a fraction of that claimed by the 
enemy. Owing to its obedience to orders in returning to the 
works, the heaviest loss of prisoners was in Wharton's division. 
Among the killed, were Major General Kodes and Brigadier 
General Godwin. Colonel G. W. Patton, commanding a bri- 
gade, was mortally wounded and fell into the hands of the 
enemy. Major General Fitz Lee was severely wounded, and 
Brigadier General York lost an arm. In Major General Rodes, 
I had to regret the loss, not only of a most accomplished, skil- 
ful, and gallant officer, upon whom I placed great reliance, 
but also of a personal friend, whose counsels had been of great 
service to me in the trying circumstances with which I had 
found myself surrounded. He fell at his post, doing a soldier's 
and patriot's duty to his country, and his memory will long be 
cherished by his comrades. General Godwin and Colonel 
Patton were both most gallant and efficient officers, and their 
loss was deeply felt, as was that of all the brave officers and 
men who fell in this battle. The enemy's loss in killed and 
wounded was very heavy, and some prisoners fell into our 
hands. 

A skilful and energetic commander of the enemy's force? 
would have crushed Ramseur before any assistance could have 
reached him, and thus ensured the destruction of my whole 
force ; and, later in the day, when the battle had turned against 
us, with the immense superiority in cavalry which Sheridan 
had, and the advantage of the open country, would have de- 
stroyed my whole force and captured everything I had. As 
it was, considering the immense disparity in numbers and 
equipment, the enemy had very little to boast of I had lost 
a few pieces of artillery and some very valuable officers and 
men, but the main part of my force, and all my trains had 
been saved, and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was 
far greater than mine. When I look back to this battle, I can 



BATTLE OF WINCHESTER. 



97 



but attribute my escape from utter annihilation to the inca- 
pacity of my opponent.* 

* The enemy has called this battle, " The Battle of the Opequon," but I know 
ho claim it has to that title, unless it be in the fact that, after his repulse in the 
fore part of the day, some of his troops ran back across that srream. I have 
always thought that instead of being promoted, Sheridan ought to have been 
cashiered for this battle. He seems to be a sort of pet of Grant's, and I give 
the following extracts from the report of the latter, to show the strange incon- 
sistency of which he is guilty to magnify Sheridan's services. In hi-* Monocacy 
letter to Hunter, Grant says : " Prom Harper's Ferry if it is found that the 
enemy has mov^ d north of the Potomac in large force, push north following 
him and attacking him wherever found ; follow him if driven south of the Poto- 
mac as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a 
small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force, detach- 
ing under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the raiders 
and drive them to their homes." And further on in the same letter, he says : 
"Bear in mind the object is to drive the enemy south, and to do this, you want 
to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he takes." 
When Sheridan relieved Hunter, this letter of instructions was ordered to be 
turned over to him, and two divisions of cavalry subsequently joined him ; yet 
Grant says in regard to Sheridan's operations: "His operations during the 
month of August and the fore part of September, were both of an offensive and 
defensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the 
cavalry, in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement 
took place. The two armies lay in such a position, the enemy on the west bank 
of the Opequon Creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berryville 
— that either could bring on a battle at any time. Defeat to us would open to 
the enemy the states of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances before 
another army could be interposed to check him. Under these circumstances, I 
hesitated about, allowing the initiative to be taken. Finally the use of the 
Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which were 
both obstructed by the enemy, became so mdispensablly necessary to us, and 
the importance of relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threat- 
ened invasion so great, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing 
to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did of Gen. 
Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, I left City Point 
on the 15th of September to visit him at his head-quarters, to decide after con- 
ference with him what should be done. I met him at Charlestown, and he 
pointed out so directly how each array lay, what he would do the moment he was 
authorized., and expressed such confidence of success that I saw there were but 
two words of instruction necessary — go in." In the Iteter to Hunter there is no 
hesitation about the initiative, and yet, notwithstanding this letter was turned 
over to Sheridan for his guidance, aud two divisions of cavalry sub equently 
gent to him, and the further fact that he had been operating both on the offensive 
and defensive, during August and the fore part of September, the impression is 
sought to be made, that his ardour was restrained by some sort of orders, of 
which no mention is made in Grant's report. Really this is very curious, and 



AFFAIR AT FISHER'S HILL. 



At light on the morning of the 20th, my troops moved to 
Fisher's Hill without molestation from the enemy, and again 
took position at that point on the old line - Wharton's division 
being on the right, then Gordon's, Ramseur's and Rodes', in 
the order in which they are mentioned. Fitz Lee's cavalry, 
now under Brigadier-General Wiekham, was sent up the 
Luray Valley to a narrow pass at Millford, to try and hold that 
valley against the enemy's cavalry. General Ramseur was 
transferred to the command of Rodes' division, and Brigadier- 
General Pegram, who had reported for duty about the 1st of 
August, and been in command of his brigade since that time, 
was left in command of the division previously commanded 
by Ramseur. My infantry was not able to occupy the whole 
line at Fisher's Hill, notwithstanding it was extended out in 
an attenuated line, wiih considerable intervals. The greater 
part of Lomax's cavalry was therefore dismounted, and placed 
on Ramseur's left, near Little North Mountain, but the line 
could not then be fully occupied. 

This was the only position in the whole Valley where a de- 
fensive line could be taken against an enemy moving up the 
Valley, and it had several weak points. To have retired be- 
yond this point, WDuld have rendered it necessary for me to 
fall back to some of the gaps of the Blue Ridge, at the upper 
part of the Valley, and I determined therefore to make a show 



Grant's admission of his hesitation in allowing the initiative to be taken, and the 
statement that the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio 
Canal were so obstructed, and the invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland so 
constantly threatened, as to compel him to throw off that hesitation, convey a 
great compliment to the efficiency of my small force. The railroad is twenty- 
two miles from Winchester at the nearest point, and the canal over thirty and 
north of the Potomac, whi^e Sheridan was much nearer to both. That Grant 
did find it necessnry to say to Sheridan : "go in 1 " I can well believe, but that 
the latter was panting for the utterance of that classic phrase, I must be allowed 
to regard as apocryphal. 



AFFAIR AT FISHEr's HILL. 



99 



of a stand here, with the hope that the enemy would be deterred 
from attacking me in this position, as had been the case in 
August. 

On the second day after our arrival at this place, General 
Breckenridge received orders from Richmond, by telegraph, 
to return to South Western Virginia, and I lost the benefit of 
his services. He had ably co-operated with me, and our per- 
sonal relations had been of the most pleasant character. 

In the afternoon of the 20th, Sheridan's forces appeared on 
the banks of Cedar Creek, about four miles from Fisher's Hill, 
and the 21st, and the greater part of the 22nd, were consumed 
by him in reconnoitring and gradually moving his forces to 
my front under cover of breast works. After some sharp skir- 
mishing, he attained a strong position immediately in my front 
and fortified it, and I began to think he was satisfied with the 
advantage he had gained and would not probably press it fur- 
ther ; but on the afternoon of the 22nd, I discovered that an- 
other attack was contemplated, and orders were given for my 
troops to retire, after dark, as I knew my force was not strong 
enough to resist a determined assault. Just before sunset, 
tiowever, Crook's corps, which had moved to our left on the 
side of Little North Mountain, and under cover of the woods, 
forced back Lomax's dismounted cavalry, and advanced against 
Ramseur's left. Ramseur made an attempt to meet this move- 
ment by throwing his brigades successively into line to the 
left, and Wharton's division was sent for from the right but it 
did not arrive. Pegram's brigades were also thrown into line 
in the same manner as Ramseur's, but the movement produced 
some disorder in both divisions, and as soon as il was observed 
by the enemy, he advanced along his whole line, and the mis- 
chief could not be remedied. After a very brief contest, my 
whole force retired in considerable confusion, but the men and 
officers of the artillery behaved with great coolness, fighting 
to the very last, and I had to ride to some of the officers and 
order them to withdraw their guns, before they would move. 
In some cases, they had held out so long, and the roads lead- 
ing from their positions into the Pike were so rugged, that 



100 



AFFAIR AT FISHER'S HILL, 



eleven guns fell into the hands of the enemy. Vigorous pur- 
suit was not made, and my force fell back through Woodstock 
to a place called the Narrow Passage, all the trains being car- 
ried off in safety. 

Our loss in killed and wounded in this affair was slight, 
but some prisoners were taken by the enemy, the most of 
whom were captured while attempting to make their way 
across the North Fork to Massannutten Mountain, under the 
impression that the enemy had possession of the Valley Pike 
in our rear. I had the misfortune to lose my Adjutant Gen- 
eral, Lieutenant Colonel A. S. Pendleton, a gallant and effi- 
cient young officer, who had served on General Jackson's staff 
during his Valley campaign, and subsequently to the time of 
the latter ? s death. Colonel Pendleton fell mortally wounded 
about dark, while posting a force across the Pike, a little in 
rear of Fisher's Hill, to check the enemy. He was acting with 
his accustomed gallantry, and his loss was deeply felt and 
regretted.* 



RETREAT UP THE VALLEY, AND OPERATIONS 
UNTIL THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 

On the morning of the 23rd, I moved back to Mount Jackson, 
where I halted to enable the sick and wounded, and the hos- 
pital stores at that place to be carried off. In the afternoon 
Averill's division of cavalry came up in pursuit, and after 



* In his account of the battle of Winchester, Grant says : " The enemy rallied 
and made a stand in a stFong position at Fisher's Hill, where he was attacked 
and again defeated with heavy loss on the 20th." This makes Sheridan pnrsue 
and attack with great promptness and energy, if it were true, but it will be seen 
that the attack was not made until late on the afternoon of the 3rd day after the 
battle at Winchester, and that the movement on my left flank was again made 
by Crook. If Sheridan had not had subordinates of more ability and energy 
than himself, I should probably have had to write a different history of my Val- 
ley campaign. 



KETREAT UP THE VALLEY. 



101 



some heavy skirmishing was driven back. I then moved to 
Rude's Hill between Mount Jackson and Newmarket. 

On the morning of the 24th, a body of the enemy's cavalry 
crossed the North Fork below Mount Jackson, and attempted 
to get around my right flank, but was heid in check, The 
enemy's infantry soon appeared at Mount Jackson, and com- 
menced moving around my left flank, on the opposite side of 
the river from that on which my left rested. As the country 
was entirely open, and Rude's Hill an elevated position, I 
could see the whole movement of the enemy, and as soon as 
it was fully developed, I commenced retiring in line of battle, 
and in that manner retired through New Market to a point at 
which the road to Port Republic leaves the Valley Pike, nine 
miles from Rude's Hill. This movement was made through 
an entirely open country, and at every mile or two a halt was 
made, and artillery opened on the enemy, who was pursuing 
which compelled him to commence deploying into line, when 
the retreat would be resumed. In this retreat, under fire in 
line, which is so trying to a retiring force, and tests the best 
qualities of the soldier, the conduct of my troops was most 
admirable, and they preserved perfect order and their line 
intact, notwithstanding their diminished numbers, and the 
fact that the enemy was pursuing in full force, and, every 
now and then, dashing up with horse artillery under the 
support of cavalry, and opening on the retiring lines. At 
the last halt, which was at a place called u Tenth Legion," 
near where the Port Republic road leaves the Pike, and was a 
little before sunset, I determined to resist any further advance, 
so as to enable my trains to get on the Port Republic road ; 
and skirmishers were sent out and artillery opened on the advan- 
cing enemy, but, after some skirmishing, he went into camp in 
our view, and beyond the reach of our guns. At this point, a 
gallant officer of artillery, Captain Massie, was killed by a shell. 
As soon as it was dark, we retired five miles on the Port Re- 
public road and bivouacked In the morning Lomax's cavalry 
had been posted to our left, on the Middle and Back roads 
from Mount Jackson to Harrisonburg, but it was forced back 



102 



RETREAT UP THE VALLEY. 



by a superior force of the enemy's cavalry, and retired to the 
latter place in considerable disorder. Wickham's brigade had 
been sent for from the Luray Valley to j in me through the 
New-Market Gap but it arrived at that gap just as we were 
retiring through New-Market, and orders were sent for it to 
return lo the Luray Valley, and join me at Port Republic. In 
the meantime, Payne's small brigade had been driven from 
Millloid by two divisions of cavalry under Torbert, which had 
moved up the Luray Valley and subsequently joined Sher- 
idan through the New-Market Gap. This cavalry had been 
detained by Wickham with his and Payne's brigades, at Mill- 
ford, a sufficient time to enable us to pass New-Market in safe- 
ty. If, however, it had moved up the Luray Valley by Con- 
rad's store, we would have been in a critical condition. 

On the morning of the 25th, we moved towards Port Repub- 
lic, which is in the fork of the South Fork and South River, 
and where the road through Brown's Gap in the Blue Ridge 
crosses those rivers, in order to unite with Kershaw's division 
which had been ordered to join me from Culpepper C. H. 
We crossed the River below the junction, and took position be- 
tween Port Republic and Brown's Ga,). Fitz Lee's and Lo- 
max's cavalry joined us here, and on the 26th, Kershaw's di- 
vision with Culshaw's battalion of artillery came up, after 
having crossed through Swift Run Gap, and encountered and 
repulsed, below Port Republic, a body of the enemy's cavalry. 
There was likewise heavy skirmishing on my front on the 26th 
with the enemy's cavalry, which made two efforts to advance 
towards Brown's Gap, both of which were repulsed after brisk 
fighting in which artillery was used 

Having ascertained that the enemy's infantry had halted at 
Harrisonburg, on the morning of the 27th I moved out and 
drove a division of his cavalry from Port Republic, and then 
encamped in the fork of the rivers. I here learned that two 
divisions of cavalry under Torbert had been sent through 
Staunton to Waynesboro, and were engaged in destroying the 
railroad bridge at the latter place, and the tunnel through the 
Blue Ridge at Rockfish Gap, and, on the 28lh, I moved for 



OPERATIONS IN THE UPPER VALLEY. 



103 



those points. In making this movement I had the whole of 
the enemy's infantry on my right, while one division of cav- 
alry was in my rear and two in my front, and on the left was 
the Blue Ridge. 1 had therefore to move with great circum- 
spection. — Wickham's brigade of cavalry was sent up South 
River, near the mountain, to get between the enemy and Rock- 
fish Gap, while the infantry moved in two columns, one up 
South River with the trains guarded in front by Pegram's 
and Wharton's divisions, and in rear by Ramseur's division, 
and the other, composed of Kershaw's and Gordon's divisions 
with the artillery, on ihe right through Mount Meridian, Pied- 
mont, and New Hope. McCausland's cavalry, under Col- 
onel Ferguson, was left to blockade and hold Brown's Gap, 
■while Lomax, with the rest of his cavairy and Payne's bri- 
gade, watched the right flank and rear. Wickham's brigade, 
having got between Rock fish Gap and Waynesboro, drove the 
enemy's w T orking parties from the latter place, and took posi- 
tion on a ridge in front of it, when a sharp artillery fight 
ensued. Pegram's division, d living a small body of cavalry 
before it, arrived just at night and advanced upon the enemy, 
when he retired in great haste, taking the roads through Staun- 
ton and west of the Valley Pike, back 1o the main body. A 
company of reserves, composed of boys under 18 years of age, 
which had been employed on special duty at Staunton, had 
moved to Rockfi>h Gap, and another company of reserves 
from Charlottesville, wiih two pieces of artillery, had moved 
to the same point, and when the enemy advanced towards the 
tunnel and before he got in range of the guns, they were 
opened, and he retired to Waynesboro. 

On the 29th and 30th, we rested at Waynesboro, and an 
engineer party was put to work repairing the bridge which 
had been but partially destroyed. 

On the 1st of October, I moved my whole force across the 
country to Mount Sidney on the Valley Pike, and took posi- 
tion between that place and North River, the enemy's forces 
having been concentrated around Harrisonburg, and on the 
north bank of the river. In this position we remained until 



104 



OPERATIONS IN THE UPPER VALLEY. 



the 6th, awaiting the arrival of Rosser's brigade of cavalry 
which was on its way from General Lee's army. In the 
meantime there was some skirmishing with the enemy's cav- 
alry on the North River, at the bridge near Mount Crawford 
and at Bridgewater above.* 

On the 5th, Rosser's brigade arrived and was temporarily 
attached to Fitz Lee's division, of which Rosser was given 
the command, as Brigadier-General Wickham had resigned. 
The horses of Rosser's brigade had been so much reduced by 
previous hard service and the long march from Richmond, that 
the brigade did not exceed six hundred mounted men for duty 
when it joined me Kershaw's division numbered 2700 mus- 
kets for duty, and he had brought with him Cutshaw's bat- 
talion of artillery. These reinforcements about, made up my 
losses at Winchester and Fisher's Hill, and I determined to 
attack the enemy in his position at Harrisonburg, and for that 
purpose made a reconno ssance on the 5th, but on the morning 
of the 6th, it was discovered that he had retired during the 
night down the Valley, f 



* Grant says that, after the fight at Fisher's Hill, " Sheridan pursued him with 
great euergy through Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge." 
With how much energy the pursuit was made, and how much truth there is in 
the statement that I was driven through "Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the 
gaps of the Blue Ridge,' ! will be seen from the foregoing account. A portion of 
my cavalry passed through Harrisonburg, but none of my other troops, and none 
of them through Staunton, and \ did not leave the Valley at all. Had Sheridan 
moved his infantry to Port Republic, I would have been compelled to retire 
through Brown's Gap to get provisions and forage, and it would have been im- 
possible for me to return to the Valley until he evacuated the upper part of it. 

f While Sheridau's forces were near Harrisonburg and mine were watching 
them, three of our cavalry scouts, in their uniforms and with arm3, got around 
his lines near a little town called Dayton and encountered Lieutenant Meigs, a 
Federal Engineer officer, with two soldiers. These parties came upon each other 
suddenly, and Lieutenant Meigs was ordered to surrender by one of our scouts ; 
to which he replied by shooting and wounding the scout, who in his turn fired 
and killed the Lieutenant. One of the men with Lieutenant Meigs was cnptured 
and the other escaped. For this act Sheridan ordered the town of Dayton to 
be burned, but for some reason that order was counteimanded, and another 
substituted for burning a lar<_ r e number of private houses in the neighborhood, 
which was executed, thus inflicting on non-combatants and women and chil- 
dren a most wanton and cruel punishment for a justifiable act of war. 



MOVEMENT DOWN THE VALLEY. 



105 



When it was discovered that the enemy was retiring, I 
moved forward at once and arrived at Mew Market with my 
infantry on the 7th. Rosser pushed forward on the Back and 
Middle roads in pursuit of the enemy's cavalry, which was 
engaged in burning houses, mills, barns, and stacks of wheat 
and hay, and had several skirmishes with it, while Lomax 
also moved forward on the Valley Pike and the roads east 
of it. I halted at New Market with the infantry, but Rosser 
and Lomax moved down the Valley in pursuit, and skirmished 
successfully with the enemy's cavalry on the 8th ; but on the 
9th they encountered his whole cavalry force at Tom's Brook, 
in rear of Fisher's Hill, and both of their commands were 
driven back in considerable confusion, with a loss of some 
pieces of artillery, — nine were reported to me as the number 
lost, but Grant claims eleven. Rosser rallied his command 
on the Back Road, at Columbia furnace opposite Edinburg, 
but a part of the enemy's cavalry swept along the Pike to 
Mount Jackson, and then retired on the approach of a part of 
my infantry. On the 10th, Rosser established his line of 
pickets across the Valley from Columbia furnace to Edinburg, 
and on the 11th Lomax was sent to the Luray Valley to 
take position at Millford. 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK OR BELLE GROVE. 

Having heard that Sheridan was preparing to send part of 
his troops to Grant, I moved down the Valley again on the 
12th. On the morning of the 13th we reached Fisher's Hill, 
and I moved with part of my command to Hupp's Hill, 
between Strasburg and Cedar Creek, for the purpose of 
reconnoitring. The enemy was found posted on the North 
bank of Cedar Creek in strong force, and, while we were 
observing him, without displaying any of my force except a 
small body of cavalry, a division of his infantry was moved 



106 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 



out to his left and stacked arms in an open field, when a 
battery of artillery was run out suddenly and opened on this 
division, scaltering it in great confasion. The enemy then 
displayed a large force, and sent a division across the creek 
to capture the guns which had opened on him, but, when it 
had advanced near enough, Conner's brigade of Kershaw's 
division was sent forward to meet this division, and, after a 
sharp contest, drove it back in considerable confusion and 
with severe loss. Conner's brigade behaved very handsomely 
indeed, but unfortunately, after the enemy had oeen entirely 
repulsed, Brigadier-General Conner, a most accomplished 
and gallant officer, lost his leg by a shell from the opposite 
side of the creek. Some prisoners were taken from the enemy 
in this affair, and Colonel Wells, the division commander, 
fell into our hands mortally wounded. The object of the 
reconnoissance having been accomplished, I moved back to 
Fisher's Hill, and I subsequently learned that the 6th corps 
had started for Grant's army but was brought back after this 
affair. 

I remained at Fisher's Hill until the 16th observing the 
enemy, with the hope that he would move back from his very 
strong position on the north of Cedar Creek, and that we 
would be able to get at him in a different position, but he did 
not give any indications of an intention to move, nor did he 
evince any purpose of attacking us, though the two positions 
were in sight of each other. In the meantime there was some 
skirmishing at Hupp's Hill, and some with the cavalry at 
Cedar Creek on the Back Road. On the 16th Rosser's scouts 
reported a brigade of the enemy's cavalry encamped on the 
Back Road, and detached from the rest of his force, and Rosser 
was permitted to go that night, with a brigade of infantry 
mounted behind the same number of cavalry, to attempt the 
surprise and capture of the camp. He succeeded in surround- 
ing and surprising the camp, but it proved to be that of only 
a strong picket, the whole of which was captured — the brigade 
having moved its location. 

At light on the morning of the 17th, the whole of my troops 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 



107 



Were moved out in front of our lines, for the purpose of cover- 
ing Rosser's return in case of difficulty, and, after he had 
returned, General Gordon was sent with a brigade of his 
division to Hupp's Hill, for the purpose of ascertaining by 
close inspection whether the enemy's position was fortified, 
and he returned with the information that it was. I was now 
compelled to move back for want of provisions and forage, or 
attack the enemy in his position with the hope of driving him 
from it, and I determined to attack. As I was not strong 
enough to attack the fortified position in front, 1 determined 
to get around one of the enemy's flanks and attack him by 
surprise if I could. After General Gordon's return from 
Hupp's Hill, he and Captain Hotchkiss, my topographical 
engineer, were sent to the signal Nation on the end of Mass- 
anutten Mountain, which had been re-established, for the 
purpose of examining the enemy's position from that point, 
and General Pegram was ordered to go as near as he could 
to Cedar Creek on the enemy's right flank, and see whether 
it was practicable to surprise him on that flank. Captain 
Hotchkiss returned to my headquarters after dark, and reported 
the result of his and General Gordon's examination, and he 
gave me a sketch of the enemy's position and camps. He 
informed me that the enemy's left flank, which rested near 
Cedar Creek, a short distance above its mouth, was lightly 
picketed, and that there was but a small cavalry picket on 
the North Fork of the Shenandoah, below the mouth of the 
creek, and he stated that, from information he had received, 
he thought it was practicable to move a column of infantry 
between the base of the mountain and the river, to a ford 
below the mouth of the creek. He also informed me that the 
main body of the enemy's cavalry was on his right flank on 
the Back Road to Winchester. The sketch made by Captain 
Hotchkiss, which proved to be correct, designated the roads 
in the enemy's rear, and the house of a Mr. Cooley at a 
favourable point for forming an attacking column, after it 
crossed the river, in order to move against the enemy and 
strike him on the Valley Pike in rear of his works. Upon 



108 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 



this information, I determined to attack the enemy by mov 
ing over the ground designated by Captain Hotchkiss, if 
it should prove practicable to move a column between the 
base of the mountain and the river. Next morning, General 
Gordon confirmed the report of Captain Hotchkiss, expressing 
confidence that the attack could be successfully made on the 
enemy's left, and rear, and General Pegram reported that a 
movement on the enemy's right flank would be attended with 
great difficulty, as the banks of Cedar Creek on that flank 
were high and precipitous and were well guarded. General 
Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss were then sent to examine 
and ascertain the practicability of the route at the base of the 
mountain, and General Pegram, at his request, was permitted 
to go to the signal station on the mountain to examine the 
enemy's position himself from that point. Directions were 
given, in the meantime, for everything to be in readiness to 
move that night (the 18th), and the division commanders were 
requested to be at my quarters at two o'clock in the afternoon, 
to receive their final instructions. 

The river makes a circuit to the left in front of the right of 
the position at Fisher's Hill and around by Strasburg, leaving 
a considerable body of land between it and the mountain, on 
which are several farms. Whenever Fisher's Hill had been 
occupied by us, this bend of the river had been occupied by a 
portion of our cavalry, to prevent the enemy from turning the 
right of the position, and it was now occupied by Colonel 
Payne with his cavalry numbering about 300. In order to 
make the contemplated movement, it was necessary to cross 
the river into this bend, and then pass between the foot of the 
mountain and the river below Strasburg, where the passage 
was very narrow, and cross the river again below the mouth of 
Cedar Creek. The enemy's camps and position were visible 
from a signal station on Round Hill in rear of Fisher's Hill, 
and had been examined by me from that point, but the dis- 
tance was too great to see with distinctness. From the station 
on the mountain, which immediately overlooked the enemy's 
left, the view was very distinct, but I could not go to that 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 



109 



point myself, as the ascent was very rugged, and it. required 
several hours to go and come, and I could not leave my com- 
mand for that time. I had therefore, necessarily, to rely on 
the reports of my officers. 

General Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss, on their return, re- 
ported the route between the mountain and river, which was 
a blind path, to be practicable for infantry but not for artillery, 
and a temporary bridge was constructed under Captain Hotch- 
kiss's superintendence, at the first crossing of the river on our 
right. The plan of attack on which I determined, was to send 
the three divisions of the 2nd Corps, to wit : Gordon's, Ram- 
seur's, and Pegram's, under General Gordon, over the route 
which has been specified to the enemy's rear, to make the 
attack at five o'clock in the morning, which would be a little 
before day-break — to move myself, with Kershaw's and Whar- 
ton's divisions, and all the artillery, along the Pike through 
Strasburg, and attack the enemy on the front and left flank 
as soon as Gordon should become engaged, and for Rosser to 
move with his own and Wickham's brigade, on the Back Road 
across Cedar Creek, and attack the enemy's cavalry simul- 
taneously with Gordon's attack, while Lomax should move by 
Front Royal, cross the river, and come to the Valley Pike, so 
as to strike the enemy wherever he might be, of which he was 
to judge by the sound of the firing. 

At two o'clock P.M., all the division commanders, except 
Pegram, who had not returned from the mountain, came to 
my head-quarters, and I gave them their instructions. Gordon 
was directed to cross over into the bend of the river imme- 
diately after dark, and move to the foot of the mountain, where 
he would rest his troops, and move from there in time to cross 
the river again and get in position at Cooley's house in the 
enemy's rear, so as to make the attack at the designated hour, 
and he was instructed, in advancing to the attack, to move for 
a house on the west side of the Valley Pike called the " Belle 
<jrove House," at which it was known that Sheridan's head- 
quarters were located. — A guide who knew the country and 
the roads, was ordered to be sent to General Gordon, and Col- 
i 



no 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 



onel Payne was ordered to accompany him with his force of 
cavalry, and endeavour to capture Sheridan himself. — Rosser 
was ordered to move before day, in time to attack at five 
o'clock next morning, and to endeavour to surprise the en- 
emy's cavalry in camp. Kershaw and Wharton were ordered 
to move, at one o'clock in the morning, towards Strasburg 
under my personal superintendence, and the artillery was 
ordered to concentrate where the Pike passed through the 
lines at Fisher's Hill, and, at the hour appointed for the attack, 
to move at a gallop to Hupp's Hill — the movement of the ar- 
tillery being thus delayed for fear of attracting the attention of 
the enemy by the rumbling of the wheels over the macadamized 
road. Swords and canteens were directed to be left in camp, 
so as to make as little noise as possible. The division com- 
manders were particularly admonished as to the necessity for 
promptness and energy in all their movements, and they were 
instructed to press the enemy with vigour after he was encount* 
ered, and to allow him no time to form, but to continue the 
pursuit until his forces should be completely routed. They 
were also admonished of the danger to be apprehended from a 
disposition to plunder the enemy's camps by their men, and 
they were enjoined to take every possible precaution against it. 

Gordon moved at the appointed time, and, after he had 
started, General Pegram reported to me that he had discovered, 
from the signal station on the mountain, what he supposed to 
be an entrenchment thrown up across the road over which 
Gordon would have to advance after crossing the river the 
second time, and that the signal operators had informed him 
that it had been thrown up since Gordon and Hotchkiss made 
their examination ; and he suggested the propriety of attacking 
the enemy's left flank at the same time Gordon made his at- 
tack, as he would probably have more difficulty than had 
been anticipated, f adopted this suggestion, and determined 
to cross Kershaw's division over Cedar Creek, at Bowman^ 
Mill, a little above its mouth, and strike the enemy's left flank 
simultaneously with the other attacks, of which purpose notice 
was sent to General Gordon by General Pegram. — At one 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 



Ill 



o'clock on the morning of the 19th, Kershaw and Wharton 
moved, and I accompanied them. At Strasburg Kershaw 
moved to the right on the road to Bowman's Mill, and Whar- 
ton moved along the Pike to Hupp's Hill, with instructions not 
to display his forces but avoid the enemy's notice until the at- 
tack began, when he was to move forward, support the artil- 
lery when it came up, and send a force to get posession of the 
bridge on the Pike over the creek. I accompanied Kershaw's 
division, and we got in sight of the enemy's fires at half past 
three o'clock. The moon was now shining and we could see 
the camps. The division was halted under cover to await the 
arrival of the proper time, and I pointed out to Kershaw, and 
the commander of his leading brigade, the enemy's position 
and described the nature of the ground, and directed them how 
the attack was to be made and followed up. Kershaw was 
directed to cross his division over the creek as quietly as pos- 
sible, and to form it into column of brigades as he did so, and 
advance in that manner against the enemy's left breastwork, 
extending to the right or left as might be necessary. At half 
past four he was ordered forward, and, a very short time after 
he started, the firing from Rosser on our left, and the picket 
firing at the ford at which Gordon was crossing were heard. 
Kershaw crossed the creek without molestation and formed 
his division as directed, aud precisely at five o'clock his leading 
brigade, with little opposition, swept over the enemy's left work 
capturing seven guns, which were at once turned on the enemy. 
As soon as this attack was made, I rode as rapidly as possible 
to the position on Hupp's Hill to which Wharton and the ar- 
tillery had been ordered. I found the artillery just arriving, 
and a very heavy fire of musketry was now heard in the en- 
emy's rear from Gordon's column. Wharton had advanced 
his skirmishers to the creek capturing some prisoners, but the 
enemy still held the works on our left of the Pike, command- 
ing that road and the bridge, and opened with his artillery 
on us. Our artillery was immediately brought into action and 
opened on the enemy, but he soon evacuated his works, and 
our men from the other columns rushed into them. Just then* 



112 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 



the sun rose, and Wharton's division and the artillery were 
immediately ordered forward. I rode in advance of them 
across the creek, and met General Gordon on the opposite hill. 
Kershaw's division had swept along the enemy's works on the 
right of the Pike, which were occupied by Crook's corps, and 
he and Gordon had united at the Pike, and their divisions had 
pushed across it in pursuit of the enemy. The rear division 
of Gordon's column (Pegram's) was crossing the river at the 
time Kershaw's attack was made, and General Gordon moved 
rapidly to Cooley's house, formed his troops and advanced 
against the enemy with his own division on the left, under 
Brigadier-General Evans, and Ramseur's on the right, with 
Pegram's in the rear supporting them. There had been a de- 
lay of an hour at the river before crossing it, either from a 
miscalculation of time in the dark, or because the cavalry 
which was to precede his column had not gotten up, and the 
delay thus caused, for which no blame is to be attached to 
General Gordon, enabled the enemy partially to form his lines 
after the alarm produced by Kershaw's attack, and Gordon's 
attack, which was after light, was therefore met with greater 
obstinacy by the enemy than it would otherwise have encoun- 
tered, and the fighting had been severe. Gordon, however, 
pushed his attack with great energy, and the 19th and Crook's 
corps were in complete route, and their camps, with a number 
of pieces of artillery and a considerable quantity of small arms, 
abandoned. The 6th corps, which was on the enemy's right, 
and some distance from the point attacked, had had time to 
get under arms and take position so as to arrest our progress. 
General Gordon briefly informed me of the condition of things 
and stated that Pegram's division, which had not been pre- 
viously engaged, had been ordered in. He then rode to take 
command of his division, and I rode forward on the Pike to as- 
certain the position of the enemy, in order to continue the attack. 
There was now a heavy fog, and that, with the smoke from the 
artillery and small arms, so obscured objects that the enemy's po- 
sition could not be seen ; but I soon came to Generals Ramseur 
and Pegram, who informed me that Pegram's division had en- 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 



113 



countered a division of the 6th corps on the left of the Valley 
Pike, and, after a sharp engagement, had driven it back on the 
main body of that corps, which was in their front in a strong 
position. They further informed me that their divisions were 
in line confronting the 6th corps, but that there was a vacancy 
in the line on their right which ought to be filled. I ordered 
Wharton's division forward at once, and directed Generals 
Ramseur and Pegram to put it where it was required. In a 
very short time, and while I was endeavouring to discover the 
enemy's line through the obscurity, Wharton's division came 
back in some confusion, and General Wharton informed me 
that, in advancing to the position pointed out to bim by 
Generals Ramseur and Pegram, his division had been driven 
back by the 6th corps, which, he said, was advancing. He 
pointed out the direction from which he said the enemy was 
advancing, and some pieces of artillery, which had come up, 
were brought into action. The fog soon rose sufficiently for 
us to see the enemy's position on a ridge to the west of 
Middletown, and it was discovered to be a strong one. After 
driving back Wharton's division he had not advanced, but 
opened on us with artillery, and orders were given for con- 
centrating all our guns on him. In the meantime, a force of 
cavalry was advancing along the Pike, and through the fields 
to the right of Middletown, thus placing our right and rear in 
great danger, and Wharton was ordered to form his division 
at once, and take position to hold the enemy's cavalry in 
check. WofTord's brigade of Kershaw's division, which had 
become separated from the other brigades, was ordered up 
for the same purpose. Discovering that the 6th corps could 
not be attacked with advantage on its left flank, because the 
approach in that direction was through an open flat and across 
a boggy stream with deep banks, I directed Captain Powell, 
serving on General Gordon's staff, who rode up to me while 
the artillery was being placed in position, to tell the General 
to advance against the enemy's right flank, and attack it in 
conjunction with Kershaw, while a heavy fire of artillery was 
opened from our right; but as Captain Powell said he did not 



114 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 



know where General Gordon was, and expressed some doubt 
about finding him, immediately after he started, I sent Lieu- 
tenant Page, of my own staff, with orders for both Generals 
Gordon and Kershaw to make the attack. In a short time 
Colonel Carter concentrated 18 or 20 guns on the enemy, and 
he was soon in retreat. Ramseur and Pegram advanced at 
once to the position from which the enemy was driven, and 
just then his cavalry commenced pressing heavily on the right, 
and Pegram's division was ordered to move to the north oi 
Middletown, and take position across the Pike against the cav- 
alry. Lieutenant Page had returned and informed me that he 
delivered my order to General Kershaw, but the latter informed 
him that his division was not in a condition to make the at- 
tack, as it was very much scattered, and there was a cavalry 
force threatening him in front. Lieutenant Page also stated 
that he had seen Gordon's division in Kershaw's rear reform- 
ing, and that it was also much scattered, and that he had not 
delivered the order to General Gordon, because he saw that 
neither his division nor Kershaw's was in a condition to ex- 
ecute it. As soon as Pegram moved, Kershaw was ordered 
from the left to supply his place. I then rode to Middletown 
to make provision against the enemy's cavalry, and discovered 
a large body of it seriously threatening that flank, which was 
very much exposed. Wharton's division and Wofford's brig- 
ade were put in position on Pegram's right, and several charges 
of the enemy's cavalry were repulsed. I had no cavalry on 
that flank except Payne's very small brigade, which had ac- 
companied Gordon, and made some captures of prisoners and 
waggons. Lomax had not arrived, but I received a message 
from him, informing me that he had crossed the river after 
some delay from a cavalry force guarding it, and I sent a mes- 
sage to him requiring him to move to Middletown as quick as 
possible, but, as I subsequently ascertained, he did not receive 
thai, message. Rosser had attacked the enemy promptly at 
the appointed time, but he had not been able to surprise him, 
as he was found on the alert on that flank, doubtless owing to 
the attempt at a surprise on the night of the 16th. There was 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 



115 



now one division of cavalry threatening my right Hank, and 
two were on the left, near the Back Road, held in check by 
Rosser. The force of the latter was too weak to make any 
impression on the enemy's cavalry, and all he could do was to 
watch it. As I passed across Cedar Creek after the enemy 
was driven from it, I had discovered a number of men in the 
enemy's camps plundering, and one of Wharton's battalions 
was ordered to clear the camps, and drive the men to their 
commands. It was reported to me, subsequently, that a great 
number were at the same work, and I sent all my staff officers 
who could be spared, to stop it if possible, and orders were 
sent to the division commanders to send for their men. 

After he was driven from his second position, the enemy had 
taken a new position about two miles north of Middletown, 
and, as soon as I had regulated matters on the right so as to pre- 
vent his cavalry from getting in rear of that flank, I rode to the 
left, for the purpose of ordering an advance. I found Ram- 
seur and Kershaw in line with Pegram, but Gordon had not 
come up. In a short time, however, I found him coming up 
from the rear, and I ordered him to take position on Kershaw's 
left, and advance for the purpose of driving the enemy from his 
new position — Kershaw and Ramsenr being ordered to ad- 
vance at the same time. As the enemy's cavalry on our left 
was very strong, and had the benefit of an open country to the 
rear of that flank, a repulse at this time would have been disas- 
trous, and I therefore directed General Gordon, if he found the 
enemy's line too strong to attack with success, not to make the 
assault. The advance was made for some distance, when Gor- 
don's skirmishers came back reporting a line of battle in front 
behind breast works, and General Gordon did not make the at- 
tack. It was now apparent that it would not do to press my 
troops further. They had been up all night and -were much 
jaded. In passing over rough ground to attack the enemy in 
the early morning, their own ranks had been much disordered, 
and the men scattered, and it had required time to reform them. 
Their ranks, moreover, were mucn thinned by the absence of 
the men engaged in plundering the enemy's camps. The de- 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 



lay which had unavoidably occurred, had enabled the enemy 
to rally a portion of his routed troops, and his immense force 
of cavalry, which remained intact, was threatening both of our 
flanks in an open country, which of itself rendered an advance 
extremely hazardous. I determined, therefore, to try and hold 
what had been gained, and orders were given for carrying off 
the captured and abandoned artillery, small arms, and wag- 
gons. A number of bold attempts were made during the sub- 
sequent part of the day, by the enemy's cavalry, to break our 
line on the right, but they were invariably repulsed. Late in 
the afternoon, the enemy's infantry advanced against Ram- 
seur's, Kershaw's and Gordon's lines, and the attack on Ram- 
sear's and Kershaw's fronts was handsomely repulsed in my 
view, and I hoped that the day was finally ours, but a portion 
of the enemy had penetrated an interval which was between 
Evans' brigade, on the extreme left,, and the rest of the line, 
when that brigade gave way, and Gordon's other brigades 
soon followed. General Gordon made every possible effort to 
rally his men, and lead them back against the enemy, but 
without avail. The information of this affair, with exagge- 
rations, passed rapidly along Kershaw's and Ramseur's lines, 
and their men, under the apprehension of being flanked, com- 
menced falling back in disorder, though no enemy was press- 
ing them, and this gave me the first intimation of Gordon's 
condition. At the same time the enemy's cavalry, observing 
the disorder in our ranks, made another charge on our right, 
but was again repulsed. Every effort was made to stop and 
rally Kershaw's and Ramseur's men, but the mass of them 
resisted all appeals, and continued to go to the rear without 
waiting for any effort to retrieve the partial disorder. Ram- 
seur, however, succeeded in retaining with him two or three 
hundred men of his division, and Major Goggin of Kershaw's 
staff, who was in command of Conner's brigade, about the 
same number from that brigade ; and these men, with six pieces 
of artillery of Cutshaw's battalion, held the enemy's whole 
force on our left in check for one hour and a half, until Ram- 
seur was shot down mortally wounded, and the ammunition; 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 



IIT 



of those pieces of artillery was exhausted. While the latter 
were being replaced by other guns, the force that had remained 
with Ramseur and Goggin gave way also. Pegram's and 
Wharton's divisions, and Wofford's brigade had remained 
steadfast on the right, and resisted all efforts of the enemy's 
cavalry, but no portion of this force could be moved to the left 
without leaving the Pike open to the cavalry, which would 
have destroyed all hope at once. Every effort to rally the men 
in the rear having failed, I had now nothing left for me but to 
order these troops to retire also. When they commenced to 
move, the disorder soon extended to them, but General Pe- 
gram succeeded in bringing back a portion of his command 
across Cedar Creek in an organized condition, holding the 
enemy in check, but this small force soon dissolved. A part 
of Evans' brigade had been rallied in the rear, and held a ford 
above the bridge for a short time, but it followed the example 
of the rest. I tried to rally the men immediately after cross- 
ing Cedar Creek, and at Happ's Hill, but without success. 
Could 500 men have been rallied, at either of these places, who 
would have stood by me, I am satisfied that all my artillery 
and waggons and the greater part of the captured artillery 
could have been saved, as the enemy's pursuit was very feeble. 
As it was, a bridge broke down on a very narrow part of the 
road between Strasburg and Fisher's Hill, just above Stras- 
burg, where there was no other passway, thereby blocking up 
all the artillery, ordnance and medical waggons, and ambu- 
lances which had not passed that point ; and, as there was no 
force to defend them, they were lost, a very small body of the 
enemy's cavalry capturing them. 

The greater part of the infantry was halted at Fisher's Hill, 
and Rosser, whose command had retired in good order on the 
Back Road, was ordered to that point with his cavalry. The 
infantry moved back towards New Market at three o'clock 
next morning, and Rosser was left at Fisher's Hill to cover 
the retreat of the troops, and hold that position until they were 
beyond pursuit. He remained at Fisher's Hill until after ten 
o'clock on the 20th, and the enemy did not advance to that 



118 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 



place while he was there. He then fell back without moles- 
tation to his former position, and established his line on Stony- 
Creek, across from Columbia Furnace to Edinburg, seven 
miles below Mount Jackson. My other troops were halted at 
New Market, about seven miles from Mount Jackson, and 
there was an entirely open country between the two places, 
they being very nearly in sight of each other.* 

Lomax had moved, on the day of the battle, on the Front 
Royal road towards Winchester, under the impression that the 
enemy was being forced back towards that place, and he did not 
reach me. When he ascertained the reverse which had taken 
place in the latter part of the day, he retired up the Luray 
Valley to his former position at Millford, without molestation. 

My loss in the battle of Cedar Creek was twenty-three 
pieces of artillery, some ordnance and medical waggons and 
ambulances, which had been carried to the front for the use 
of the troops on the field, about 1860 in killed and wounded? 
and something over 1,000 prisoners. Major General Ramseur 
fell into the hands of the enemy mortally wounded, and in him, 
not only my command, but the country sustained a heavy loss. 
He was a most gallant and energetic officer whom no disaster 
appalled, but his courage and energy seemed to gain new 



* Grant says in his account of the battle of Cedar Creek : " The enemy was 
defeated with great slaughter, and the loss of the most of his artillery and trains, 
and the trophies he had captured in the morning. The wreck of his army 
escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Staunton and Lynchburg. 
Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson." Stanton, who seems to think it his 
duty to improve on all Grant's statements, says : " The routed forces of the enemy 
were pursued to Mount Jackson, where he arrived without an organized regiment 
of his army. All of his artillery, and thousands of prisoners fell into Sheridan's 
hands. These successes closed military operations in the Shenandoah Valley, 
and a rebel force appeared there no more during the war." The recklessnes of 
these statements, of both Grant and Stanton, will appear trom the above narra- 
tive, as well as from my subsequent operations in the Shenandoah Valley- 
Would it be believed that this wreck of my army, which fled in such wild dismay 
before its pursuers, carried from the battle field 15 ( )0 prisoners, who were sent 
to Richmond — subsequently confronted Sheridan's whole force north of Cedar 
Creek, for two days, without his attacking it, and sent out expeditions which 
captured two important posts, with over 1000 prisoners and several pieces of 
artillery, in the limits of Sheridan's command ? Yet such was the case. 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 



119 



strength in the midst of confusion and disorder. He fell at 
his post fighting like a lion at bay, and his native state has 
reason to be proud of his memory. Brigadier General Battle 
was wounded at the beginning of the fight, and other valuable 
officers were lost. Fifteen hundred prisoners were captured 
from the enemy and brought off, and his loss in killed and 
wounded in this action was very heavy. 

This was the case of a glorious victory given up by my own 
troops after they had won it, and it is to be accounted for, on 
the ground of the partial demoralization caused by the plunder 
of the enemy's camps, and from the fact that the men under- 
took to judge for themselves when it was proper to retire. 
Had they but waited, the mischief on the left would have been 
remedied. I have never been able to satisfy myself that the 
enemy's attack, in the afternoon, was not a demonstration to 
cover his retreat during the night. It certainly was not a 
vigorous one, as is shown by the fact (hat the very small 
force with Ramseur and Goggin held him in check so long ; 
and the loss in killed and wounded in the division which first 
gave way, was not heavy, and was the least in numbers of 
all but one, though it was the third in strength, and its relative 
loss was the least of all the divisions. I read a sharp lecture 
to my troops, in an address published to them a few days after 
the battle, but I have never attributed the result to a want of 
courage on their part, for I had seen them perform too many 
prodigies of valour to doubt that. There was an individuality 
about the Confederate soldier, which caused him to act often 
in battle according to his own opinions, and thereby impair 
his own efficiency ; and the tempting bait offered by the rich 
plunder of the camps of the enemy's well fed, and well clothed 
troaps, was frequently too great for our destitute soldiers, and 
caused them to pause in the career of victory. 

Had my cavalry been sufficient to contend with that of the 

enemy, the rout in the morning would have been complete ; 

as it was, I had only about 1200 cavalry on the field under 

Rosser, and Lomax's force, which numbered less than 1700, 

did not get up. My infantry and artillery was about the same 
I 



120 



BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK. 



strength as at Winchester. The reports of the Ordnance offi- 
cers showed in the hands my troops about 8,800 muskets, in 
round numbers as follows : in Kershaw's division 2,700, Ram- 
seur's 2,100, Gordon's 1,700, Pegram's 1,200, and Wharton's 
1,100. Making a moderate allowance for the men left to guard 
the c imps and the signal station on the mountain, as well as 
for a few sick and wounded, I went into this battle with about 
8,500 muskets and a little over forty pieces of artillery. 

The book containing the reports of the Chief Surgeon of 
Sheridan's cavalry corps, which has been mentioned as cap- 
tured at this battle, showed that Sheridan's cavalry numbered 
about 8,700 men for duty a few days previous, and from infor- 
mation which I had received of reinforcements sent him, in 
the way of recruits and returned convalescents, I am satisfied 
that his infantry force was fully as large as at Winchester. 
Sheridan was absent in the morning at the beginning of the 
fight, and had returned in the afternoon before the change in 
the fortunes of the day. Nevertheless, I saw no reason to 
change the estimate I had formed of him * 

It may be asked, why with my small force I made the 
attack ? I can only say we had been fighting large odds 
during the whole war, and I knew there was no chance of 
lessening them. It was of the utmost consequence that Sheri- 
dan should be prevented from sending troops to Grant, and 
General Lee, in a letter received a day or two before, had 
expressed an earnest desire that a victory should be gained 
in the Valley if possible, and it could not be gained without 
fighting for it. 1 did hope to gain one by surprising the enemy 
in his camp, and then thought and still think I would have had 
it, if my directions had been strictly complied with, and my 
troops had awaited my orders to retire, f 



*The retreat of the main body of his armj had been arrested, and a new line 
formed behind breastworks of rails, before Sheridan arrived on the field ; and he 
still had immense odds against me when he made the attack in the afternoon. 

f A silly story was circulated and even published in the papers, that this bat- 
tle was planned and conducted by one of my subordinates up to a certain point, 
when my arrival on the field stopped the pursuit and arrested the victory. !No 



CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 



After the return from Cedar Creek, the main body of my 
troops remained in their camp for the rest of the month with- 
out disturbance, but on the 26th of October the enemy's cavalry 
attacked Lomax at Millford and, after sharp fighting, was re- 
pulsed. Having heard that Sheridan was preparing to send 
troops to Grant, and that the Manassas Gap railroad was being 
repaired, I moved down the Valley again on the 10th of 
November. I had received no reinforcements except about 
350 cavalry under General Cosby from Breckenridge's depart- 
ment in South Western Virginia, some returned convalescents, 
and several hundred conscripts who had been on details which 
had been revoked. On the 11th, on our approach to Cedar 
Creek, it was found that the enemy had fallen back towards 
Winchester, after having fortified and occupied a position on 
Hupp's Hill subsequently to the battle of Cedar Creek. Col. 
Payne drove a small body of cavalry through Middletown to 
Newtown, and I followed him and took position south of the 
latter place and in view of it. Sheridan's main force was 
found posted north of Newtown in a position which he was 
engaged in fortifying. I remained in front of him during the 
11th aud 12th, Rosser being on my left flank on the Back 



officer or soldier on that day received an order from me to halt, unless he was 
going to the rear. My orders were to press the enemy from the beginning and 
give him no time to form, and when I found that my troops had halted, I endea- 
voured to advance again, but I discovered it would not do to press them further. 
Those who have known me from my youth, as well as those who came in contact 
with me during the war, know that I was not likely to permit any other to plan 
a battle for me, or assume my duties in any particular. Yet I was always will- 
ing to receive and adopt valuable suggestions from any of my officers. 

Th«re was another false report, as to my personal habits during the Yalley 
Campaign, which obtained some circulation and credenee, but which I would 
not notice, except for the fact that it was referred to on the floor of the Confed- 
erate Senate by two members of that body. The utter falsehood of this report 
was well known to all my staff and General officers, as well as to all others who 
associated with me. 



122 



CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN* 



Road, and Lomax on my right between the Valley Pike and 
the Front Royal road, with one brigade (McCausland's) at 
Cedarville on the latter road. Rosser had some skirmishing 
with the enemy's cavalry on the 11th, and on the 12th two 
divisions advanced against him, and after a heavy fight the 
enemy was repulsed and some prisoners captured. Colonel 
Payne, who was operating immediately in my front, likewise 
had a sharp engagement with a portion of the enemy's cavalry 
and defeated it. When Rosser was heavily engaged, Lomax 
was ordered to his assistance with a part of his command, and, 
during his absence, late in the afternoon, Powell's division of 
the enemy's cavalry attacked McCausland at Cedarville, and, 
after a severe fight, drove him back across the river with the 
loss of two pieces of artillery. At the time of this affair, a 
blustering wind was blowing and the firing could not be heard ; 
and nothing was known of McCauslands misfortune until after 
we commenced retiring that night. In these cavalry fights, 
three valuable officers were killed, namely : Lt.-Col. Marshall 
of Rosser's brigade, Col. Radford of McCausland's brigade, 
and Capt. Harvie of McCausland's staff. 

Discovering that the enemy continued to fortify his position, 
and showed no disposition to come out of his lines with his 
infantry, and not being willing to attack him in his entrench- 
ments, after the reverses I had met with, I determined to retire, 
as we were beyond the reach of supplies. After dark on the 
12th, we moved to Fisher's Hill, and next day returned in the 
direction of New-Market, where we arrived on the 14th, no 
effort at pursuit being made. I discovered by this movement 
that no troops had been sent to Grant, and that the project of 
repairing the Manassas Gap rail-road had been abandoned.* 

Shortly after our return to New-Market, Kershaw's division 
was returned to General Lee, and Cosby 's cavalry to Rreck- 



* From Grant's account of the battle of Cedar Creek, it would be supposed 
that the 6th corps was returned to the army of the Potomac immediately after 
that battle, but the truth is that no troops were sent from Sheridan's army until 
in December, when the cold weather had put an end to all operations in the field 
by infantry. 



CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 123 

$ 

enridge. On the 22nd of November two divisions of the en- 
emy's cavalry advanced to Mount Jackson, after having driven 
in our cavalry pickets. Apart of it crossed over the river into 
Meem's bottom at the foot of Rude's Hill, but was driven back 
by a portion of my infantry, and the whole retreated, being 
pursued by Wickham's brigade, under Colonel Munford, to 
Woodstock. 

On the 27th, Rosser crossed Great North Mountain into Har- 
dy County, with his own and Payne's brigade, and, about the 
29th, surprised and captured the fortified post at New Creek, 
on the Baltimore and Ohio rail-road. At this place, two regi- 
ments of cavalry with their arms and colours were captured, 
and eight pieces of artillery and a very large amount of ord- 
nance, quarter master, and commissary stores fell into our 
hands. The prisoners, numbering 800, four pieces of artillery, 
and some waggons and horses, were brought off, the other 
guns, which were heavy siege pieces, being spiked, and their 
carriages and a greater part of the stores destroyed. Rosser 
also brought off several hundred cattle and a large number of 
sheep from Hampshire and Hardy counties. 

This expedition closed the material operations of the cam- 
paign of 1864 in the Shenandoah Valley, and, at that time, the 
enemy held precisely the same portion of that valley, which 
he held before the opening of the campaign in the spring, and 
no more, and the headquarters of his troops were at the same 
place, to wit : Winchester. There was this difference how- 
ever : at the beginning of the campaign, he held it with com- 
paratively a small force, and at the close, he was compelled 
to employ three corps of infantry and one of cavalry, for that 
purpose, and to guard the approaches to Washington, Mary- 
land, and Pennsylvania. When I was detached from General 
Lee's army, Hunter was advancing on Lynchburg, 170 miles 
south of Winchester, with a very considerable force, and 
threatening all of General Lee's communications with a very 
sprious danger. By a rapid movement, my force had been 
thrown to Lynchburg, just in time to arrest Hunter's march 
into that place, and he had been driven back and forced to es- 



124 



CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 



cape into the mountains of Western Virginia, with a loss of 
ten pieces of artillery, and subsequent terrible suffering to his 
troops. Maryland and Penny slvania had been invaded, Wash- 
ington threatened and thrown into a state of frantic alarm, and 
Grant had been compelled to detach two corps of infantry and 
two divisions of cavalry from his army. Five or six thousand 
prisoners had beer^ captured from the enemy and sent to Rich- 
mond, and, according to a published statement by Sheridan, 
his army had lost 13,831, in killed and wounded, after he 
took command of it. Heavy losses had been inflicted on that 
army by my command, before Sheridan went to the Valley, 
and the whole loss could not have been far from double my 
entire force. The enemy moreover had been deprived of the 
use of the Baltimore and Ohio rail-road, and the Chesapeake 
and Ohio canal, for three months. It is true that I had lost 
many valuable officers and men, and about 60 pieces of artil- 
lery, counting those lost, by Ramseur and McCausland, and 
not deducting the 19 pieces captured from the enemy; but I 
think I may safely state that the fall of Lynchburg with its 
foundries and factories, and the consequent destruction of 
General Lee's communications, would have rendered necessary 
the evacuation of Richmond, and that, therefore, the fall of the 
latter place had been prevented ; and, by my subsequent ope- 
rations, Grant's operations against General Lee's army had 
been materially impeded, and for some time substantially 
suspended. 

My loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, at Winchester and 
Fisher's Hill, had been less than 4,000, and, at Cedar Creek, 
about 3,000, but the enemy has attempted to magnify it to a 
much larger figure, claiming as prisoners several thousand 
more than my entire loss. How he makes out his estimate is 
not for me to explain. He was never scrupulous as to the 
kinds of persons of whom he made prisoners, and the state- 
ments of the Federal officers were not always confined to the 
truth, as the world has probably learned. I know that a num- 
ber of prisoners fell into the enemy's hands, who did not belong 
to my command : such as cavalry men on details to get fresh 



CLOSE OF THE T ALLEY CAMPAIGN. 



125 



horses, soldiers on leave of absence, conscripts on special de- 
tails, citizens not in the service, men employed in getting sup- 
plies for the departments, and stragglers and deserters from 
other commands. 

My army during the entire campaign had been self sustain- 
ing, so far as provisions and forage were concerned, and a con- 
siderable number of beef cattle had been sent to General Lee's 
army ; and when the difficulties under which I laboured are 
considered, I think I may confidently assert that I had done as 
well as it was possible for me to do,* 



* Some attempts have been made to compare my campaign in the Valley with 
that of General Jackson in the same district, in order to cast censure on me, but 
such comparison is not necessary for the vindication of the fame of that great 
leader, and it is mo3t unjust to me, as the circumstances under which we ope- 
rated were so entirely dissimilar. It was my fortune to serve under General 
Jackson, after his Valley campaign until his death, and I have the satisfaction of 
knowing that I enjoyed his confidence, which was signally shown in bis last of- 
ficial act towards me ; and no one admires his character and reveres his memory 
more than I do. It is not therefore with any view to detract from his merits, 
that I mention the following facts, but to show how improper it is to compare 
our campaigns, with a view of contrasting their merits. 1st. General Jackson 
did not have the odds opposed to him which I had, and his troop3 were com- 
posed entirely of the very best material which entered into the composition of 
our armies, that is, the men who came out voluntarily in the beginning of the 
war ; while my command, though comprising all the principal organizations 
which were with him, did not contain 1,500 of the men who had participated in 
the first Valley campaign, and there was a like falling off in the other organi- 
zations with me, which had not been with General Jackson in that campaign. 
This was owing to the losses in killed and disabled, and prisoners who were not 
exchanged. Besides the old soldiers whose numbers were so reduced, my com- 
mand was composed of recruits and conscripts. 2nd. General Jackson's cav- 
alry was not outnumbered by the enemy's, and it was far superior in efficiency — 
A3hby being a host in himself ; while my cavalry was more than trebled in 
numbers, and far excelled in arms, equipments, and horses, by that of the enemy. 
3rd. The Valley, at the time of his campaign, was teeming with provisions and 
forage from one end to the other ; while my command had very great difficulty 
in obtaining provisions for the men, and had to rely almost entirely on the grass 
in the open fields for forage. 4th. When General Jackson was pressed and had 
to retire, as well when he fell back before Banks in the spring of 1862, as, later, 
when he retired before Fremont to prevent Shields from getting in his rear, the 
condition of the water courses was such as to enable him to stop the advance of 
one column, by burning the bridges, and then fall upon and defeat another col- 
umn ; and, when hard pressed, place his troops in a position of security, until a 
favorable opportunity offered for attacking the enemy; while all the water 
K 



126 



CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN". 



Shortly after Rosser's return from the New Creek expedition^ 
Colonel Munford was sent with Wickham's brigade to the 
counties of Hardy and Pendleton, to procure forage for his 
horses, and, cold weather having now set in so as to prevent 
material operations in the field, the three divisions of the 2nd 
Corps were sent, in succession, to general Lee* — Wharton's 
division, the cavalry, and most of the artillery being retained 
with me. 

On the 16th of December, I broke up the camp at New-Mar- 
ket, and moved back towards Staunton, for the purpose of es- 
tablishing my troops on or near the Central rail-road — Lomax's 
cavalry, except one brigade left to watch the Luray Valley, 
having previously moved across the Blue Ridge, so as to be 
able to procure forage. Cavalry pickets were left in front of 
New-Market, and telegraphic communications kept up with 
that place, from which there was communication with the 
lower Valley, by means of signal stations on the northern end 
of Massanutten Mountain, and at Ashby's Gap in the Blue 
Ridge, which overlooked the enemy's camps and the surround- 
ing country. 

The troops had barely arrived at their new camps, when 
information was received that the enemy's cavalry was in 
motion. On the 19th, Custer's division moved from Win- 
chester towards Staunton, and, at the same time, two other 
divisions of cavalry, under Torbert or Merrit, moved across by 
Front Royal and Chester Gap towards Gordonsville. This 
information having been sent me by signal and telegraphy 
Wharton's division was moved, on the 20th, through a hail- 
storm, towards Harrisonburg, and Rosser ordered to the front 
with all the cavalry he could collect. Custer's division reach- 
ed Lacy's Spring, nine miles north of Harrisonburg, on the 
evening of the 30th, and, next morning before day, Rosser, 



courses were low and fordable, and the whole country was open in my front, on 
my flanks, and in my rear, during my entire campaign. These facts do not de- 
tract from the merits of General Jackson's campaign in the slightest degree, and 
far be it from me to attempt to obscure his well earned and richly deserved fame. 
They only show that I ought not to be condemned for not doing what he did. 



CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN, 



127 



with about 600 men of his own and Payne's brigades, attacked 
it in camp, and drove it back down the Valley in some con- 
fusion. Lomax had been advised of the movement towards 
Gordonsville, and, as soon as Custer was disposed of, Whar- 
ton's division was moved back, and on the 23rd a portion of 
it was run on the railroad to Charlottesville — Munford, who 
had now returned from across the great North Mountain, being 
ordered to the same place. On my arrival at Charlottesville 
on the 23rd, I found that the enemy's two divisions of cavalry, 
which had crossed the Blue Ridge, had been held in check 
near Gordonsville by Lomax, until the arrival of a brigade of 
infantry from Richmond, when they retired precipitately. I 
returned to the Valley and established my head quarters at 
Staunton — Wharton's division and the artillery being encamp- 
ed east of that place, and Rosser's cavalay west of it * and 
thus closed the operations of 1S64 with me.* 



* At the close of the year 1864, Grant's plans for the campaign in Virginia 
had been baffled, and he had merely attained a position on James Hirer, which 
he might have occupied at the beginning of the campaign without opposition. 
So far as the two armies, with which the campaign was opened, were concerned, 
he had sustained a defeat, and, if the contest had been between those two armies 
alone, his would have been destroyed. But, unfortunately, he had the means of 
reinforcing and recruiting his army to an almost unlimited extent, and there 
were no means of recruiting General Lee's. Four years of an unexampled strug- 
gle had destroyed the finances of the Confederate Government, and exhausted 
the material out of which an army could be raised. General Lee had performed 
his task as a military commander, but the Government was unable to furnish 
him the means of properly continuing the war ; and he had therefore to begin 
the campaign of 1865 with the remnant of his army of the previous year, while 
a new draft, and heavy reinforcements from other quarters, had furnished his 
opponent with a new army and largely increased numbers. The few detailed 
men sent to General Lee, after the revocation of their details, added nothing to 
the strength of his army, but were a positive injury to it. The mass of them 
had desired to keep out of the service, because they had no stomach for the 
fight, and when forced into it, they but served to disseminate dissatisfaction in 
the ranks of the army. Some writers who never exposed their own precious 
persons to the bullets of the enemy, have written very glibly about the desertions 
from the army. Now God forbid that I should say one word in justification of 
desertion under any circumstances. I had no toleration for it during the war, 
and never failed to sanction and order the execution of sentences for the extreme 
penalty for that offence, when submitted to me ; but some palliation was to be 
found for the conduct of many of those who did desert, in the fact that they did. 



128 



CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 



so to go to the aid of their families, who they knew were suffering for the neces- 
saries of life, while many able bodied young men remained at home, in peace 
and plenty, under exemptions and details. The duty to defend one's country 
exists independently of any law, and the latter is made to enforce, not create, 
the obligation. By the law, or the unwise administration of it, a man may be 
exempted from enforced service, but he cannot be released from the sacred duty 
of defending his country against invasion. Those able bodied men who flocked 
abroad to avoid service, and were so blatant in their patriotism when beyond 
the reach of danger, as I have had occassion to learn in my wanderings, as well 
as those who sought exemptions and details under the law, with a view to avoid 
the dangers and hardships of the war, were to all intents and purposes deserters, 
and morally more criminal than the poor soldier, who, in the agony of his dis- 
tress for the sufferings of his wife and little ones at home, yielded to the temp- 
tation to abandon his colours. There were some cases of exemptions and de- 
tails, where the persons obtaining them could be more useful at home than in 
the field, and those who sought them honestly on that account are not subject 
to the above strictures, but there were many cases where the motives were very 
different. The men whose names form the roll of honour for the armies of the 
Confederate States, are those who voluntarily entered the service in the begin- 
ning of the war, or as soon as they were able to bear arms, and served faithfully 
to the end, or until killed or disabled ; and I would advise the unmarried among 
my fair countrywomen to choose their husbands from among the survivors of this 
class, and not from among the skulkers. By following this advice, they may 
not obtain as much pelf, but they may rest assured that they will not be the 
mothers of cowards, and their posterity will have no cause to blush for the con- 
duct of their progenitors. 



OPERATIONS W 1865. 



On the 2nd of January 1865, 1 had a consultation with Gen. 
Lee at Richmond, about the difficulties of my position in the 
Valley, and he told me that he had left me there with the 
small command which still remained, in order to produce the 
impression that the force was much larger than it really was, 
and he instructed me to do the best I could. 

Before I returned from Richmond, Rosser started, with 
between 300 and 400 picked cavalry, for the post of Beverly 
in Western Virginia, and, on the 11th, surprised and captured 
the place, securing over five hundred prisoners and some 
stores. This expedition was made over a very mountainous 
country, amid the snows of an unusually severe winter. Rosser's 
loss was very light, but Lieutenant Colonel Cook of the 8th 
Virginia cavalry, a most gallant and efficient officer, lost his 
leg in the attack, and had to be left behind. 

The great drought during the summer of 1864, had made 
the corn crop in the Valley a very short one, and, as Sheridan 
had destroyed a considerable quantity of small grain and hay, 
I found it impossible to sustain the horses of my cavalry and 
artillery where they were, and forage could not be obtained 
from elsewhere. I was therefore compelled to send Fitz Lee's 
two brigades to General Lee, and Lomax's cavalry was 
brought from across the Blue Ridge, where the country 
was exhausted of forage, and sent west into the counties of 
Pendleton, Highland, Bath, Alleghany, and Greenbrier, where 
hay could be obtained. Rosser's brigade had to be tempora- 
rily disbanded, and the men allowed to go to their homes with 
their horses, to sustain them, with orders to report when called 
on. — One or two companies, whose homes were down the 



130 



OPERATIONS IN 1865. 



Valley, being required to picket and scout in front of New 
Market. The men and horses of Lieutenant Colonel King's 
artillery were sent to South Western Virginia to be wintered, 
and most of the horses of the other battalions were sent off, 
under care of some of the men, who undertook to forage them 
until spring. Nelson's battalion, with some pieees of artillery 
with their horses, was retained with me, and the remaining 
officers and men of the other battalions were sent, under the 
charge of Colonel Carter, to General Lee, to man stationary 
batteries on his lines. Brigadier General Long, who had been 
absent on sick leave for some time and had returned, remained 
with me, and most of the guns which were without horses 
were sent to Lynchburg by railroad. This was a deplorable 
state of things, but it could not be avoided, as the horses of 
the cavalry and artillery would have perished had they been 
kept in the Valley. 

Echols' brigade of Wharton's division was subsequently 
sent to South Western Virginia, to report to General Echols for 
special duty, and McNeil's company of partizan rangers and 
Woodson's company of unattached Missouri cavalry were sent 
to the County of Hardy — Major Harry Gilmor being likewise 
ordered to that County, with the remnant of his battalion, to 
take charge of the whole, and operate against the Baltimore 
and Ohio railroad ; but he was surprised and captured there, 
at a private house, soon after his arrival. Two very small 
brigades of Wharton's division, and Nelson's battalion with 
the few pieces of artillery which had been retained, were left 
as my whole available force, and these were in winter quarters 
near Fishersville, on the Central railroad between Staunton 
and Waynesboro. The telegraph to New Market and the 
signal stations from there to the lower Valley were kept up, 
and a few scouts sent to the rear of the enemy, and in this 
way was my front principally picketed, and I kept advised of 
the enemy's movements. Henceforth my efficient and ener- 
getic signal officer, Captain Wilburn, was the commander 
of my advance picket line. 

The winter was a severe one, and all material operations 



OPERATIONS IN 1865. 131 



were suspended until its close. Late in February, Lieutenant 
Jesse McNeil, who was in command of his father's old company, 
with forty or fifty men of that company and Woodson's, made 
a dash into Cumberland, Maryland, at night, and captured 
and brought off Major Generals Crook and Kelly with a staff 
officer of the latter, though there were at the time several thous- 
and troops in and around Cumberland. The father of this gallant 
young officer had performed many daring exploits during the 
war, and had accompanied me into Maryland, doing good ser 
vice. When Sheridan was at Harrisonburg in October 1864 9 
Captain McNeil had burned the bridge at Edinburg in his 
rear, and had attacked and captured the guard at the bridge 
at Mount Jackson, but in this affair he received a very severe 
wound from which he subsequently died. Lieutenant Baylor 
of Rosser's brigade, who was in Jefferson County with his 
company, made one or two dashes on the enemy's outposts 
during the winter, and, on one occasion, captured a train 
loaded with supplies, on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. 

On the 20th of February, an order was issued by Gen. Lee, 
extending my command over the Department of South West- 
ern Virginia and East Tennessee, previously commanded by 
General Breckenridge — the latter having been made Secretary 
of War. 

On the 27th, Sheridan started from Winchester up the 
Valley with a heavy force, consisting according to the 
statement of Grant, in his report, of " two divisions of 
cavalry, numbering about 5,000 each." I had been informed 
of the preparations for a movement of some kind, some days 
previous, and the information had been telegraphed to General 
Lee. As soon as Sheridan started, I was informed of the fact 
by signal and telegraph, and orders were immediately sent by 
lelegraph to Lomax, whose headquarters were at Millboro, on 
the Central railroad, forty miles west of Staunton, to get to- 
gether all of his cavalry as soon as possible. Rosser was also 
directed to collect all of his men that he could, and an order 
was sent by telegraph to General Echols, in South-western 
Virginia, to send his brigade by rail to Lynchburg. My own 



132 



iRATiojsrs m 1865. 



headquarters were at Staunton, but there were no troops at 
that place except a local provost guard, and a company of re- 
serves, composed of boys under 18 years of age, which was 
acting under the orders of the Conscript Bureau. Orders were 
therefore given for the immediate removal of all stores from 
that place. Rosser succeeded in collecting a little over 100 
men, and with these he attempted to check the enemy at North 
River, near Mount Grawford, on the 1st of March, but was un- 
able to do so. On the afternoon of that day, the enemy 
approached to within three or four miles of Staunton, and I 
then telegraphed to Lomax to concentrate his cavalry at Pound 
Gap, in Rockbridge County, and to follow and annoy the 
enemy should he move towards Lynchburg, and rode out of 
town towards Waynesboro, after all the stores had been re- 
moved, 

Wharton and Nelson were ordered to move to Waynesboro 
by light next morning, and on that morning (the 2nd) their 
commands were put in position on a ridge covering Waynes- 
boro on the west, and just outside of the town. My object, in 
taking this position, was to secure the removal of five pieces 
of artillery for which there were no horses, and some stores 
still in Waynesboro, as well as to present a bold front to the 
enemy, and ascertain the object of his movement, which I 
could not do very well if I took refuge at once in the moun- 
tain. The last report for Wharton's command showed 1,200 
men for duty; but, as it was exceedingly inclement, and 
raining and freezing, there were not more than 1,000 muskets 
on the line, and Nelson had six pieces of artillery. I did not 
intend making my final stand on this ground, yet I was satis- 
fied that if my men would fight, which I had no reason to 
doubt, I could hold the enemy in check until night, and then 
cross the river and take position in Rockfish Gap ; for I had 
done more difficult things than that during the war. About 
12 o'clock in the day, it was reported to me that the enemy 
was advancing, and I rode out at once on the lines, and soon 
discovered about a brigade of cavalry coming up, on the road 
from Staunton, on which the artillery opened, when it retired 



OPERATIONS IN 1865. 



133 



out of range. The enemy manoeuvred for some time in our 
front, keeping out of reach of our guns until late in the after- 
noon, when I discovered a force moving to our left. I imme- 
diately sent a messenger with notice of this fact to General 
Wharton, who was on that flank, and with orders for him to 
look out and provide for the enemy's advance ; and another 
messenger, with notice to the guns on the left, and directions 
for them to fire towards the advancing force, which could not 
be seen from where they were. The enemy soon made an 
attack on our left flank, and I discovered the men on that flank 
giving back. Just then, General Wharton, who had not re- 
ceived my message, rode up to me and I pointed out to him 
the disorder in his line, and ordered him to ride immediately 
to that point and rectify it. Before he got back, the troops 
gave way on the left, after making very slight resistance, and 
soon everything was in a state of confusion and the men com- 
menced crossing the river. I rode across it myself to try and 
stop them at the bridge and check the enemy, but they could 
not be rallied, and the enemy forded the river above and got 
in our rear. I now saw that everything was lost, and, after 
the enemy had got between the mountain and the position 
where I was, and retreat was thus cut off, I rode aside into 
the woods, and in that way escaped capture. I went to the 
top of a hill to reconnoitre, and had the mortification of seeing 
the greater part of my command being carried off as prisoners, 
and a force of the enemy moving rapidly towards Rockfish Gap. 
I then rode with the greater part of my staff and 15 or 20 others, 
including General Long, across the mountain, north of the Gap, 
with the hope of arriving at Greenwood depot, to which the 
stores had been removed, before the enemy reached that place ; 
but, on getting near it, about dark, we discovered the enemy 
in possession. We then rode to Jarman's Gap, about three 
miles from the depot, and remained there all night, as the 
night was exceedingly dark, and the ice rendered it impossible 
for us to travel over the rugged roads. 

The only solution of this affair which I can give, is that my 
men did not fight as I had expected them to do. Had they 



134 



OPERATIONS IN 1865. 



done so, I am satisfied that the enemy could have been re- 
pulsed ; and I was and still am of opinion that the attack at 
Waynesboro was a mere demonstration, to cover a movement 
to the south towards Lynchburg. Yet some excuse is to be 
made for my men, as they knew that they were weak and the 
enemy very strong. 

The greater part of my command was captured, as was also 
the artillery, which, with five guns on the cars at Greenwood, 
made eleven pieces. Very few were killed or wounded on 
either side. The only person killed on our side, that I have 
ever heard of, was Colonel William H. Harman, who had for- 
merly been in the army, but then held a civil appointment ; 
and he was shot in the streets of Waynesboro, either after he 
had been made prisoner, as some said, or while he was at- 
tempting to make his escape after everything was over. My 
aide, Lieut. Wm. G. Calloway, who had been sent to the left 
with one of the messages, and my medical director, Surgeon 
H. McGuire, had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the 
enemy. All the waggons of Wharton's command were ab- 
sent getting supplies; but those we had with us, including 
the ordnance and medical waggons, and my own baggage 
waggon, fell into the hands of the enemy.* 

On the Srd, I rode, with the party that was with me, to- 



* Grant, in speaking of this affair, says : " He (Sheridan) entered Staunton 
on the 2nd, the enemy having retreated on Waynesboro. Thence he pushed 
on to Waynesboro, where he found the enemy in force in an entrenched 
position, under General Early. Without stopping to make a reconnois- 
sance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried, and 1,600 
prisoners, 11 pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, 200 
waggons and teams loaded with subsistence, and ll battle-flags, were captur- 
ed." This is all very brilliant ; but, unfortunately for its truth, Sheridan 
was not at Waynesboro, but was at Staunton, where he had stopped with 
a part of his force ; while the affair at Waynesboro was conducted by one 
of his subordinates. The strength of my force has already been stated, and it 
was not in an entrenched position. I am not able to say how many prisoners 
were taken, but I know that they were more than my command numbered, as a 
very considerable number of recently exchanged and paroled prisoners were at 
the time in the Valley, on leave of absence from General Lee's army. I not 
only did not have 200 waggons or anything like it, but had no use for them. 
Where the 17 battle-flags could have been gotten, I cannot imagine. 



OPERATIONS IN 1865. 



135 



wards Charlottesville ; but, on getting near that place, we 
found the enemy entering it. We had then to turn back and 
go by a circuitous route under the mountains to Gordonsville, 
as the Rivanna River and other streams were very much swol- 
len. On arriving at Gordonsville, I found General Wharton, 
who had made his escape to Charlottesville on the night of the 
affair at Waynesboro, and he was ordered to Lynchburg, by 
the way of the Central and South-Side railroads, to take com- 
mand of Echols' brigade, and aid in the defence of the city. 
General Long was ordered to report to General Lee at Peters- 
burg. 

The affair at Waynesboro diverted Sheridan from Lynch- 
burg, which he could have captured without difficulty, had he 
followed Hunter's route and notjumped at the bait unwillingly 
offered him, by the capture of my force at the former place. 
His deflection from the direct route to the one by Charlottes- 
ville, was without adequate object, and resulted in the aban- 
donment of the effort to capture Lynchburg, or to cross the 
James River to the south side. He halted at Charlottesville 
for two or three days, and then moved towards James River 
below Lynchburg, when, being unable to cross that river, he 
crossed over the Rivanna, at its mouth, and then moved by the 
way of Frederick's Hall on the Central railroad, and Ashland 
on the R. F. & P. railroad, across the South and North An- 
nas, and down the Pamunkey to the White House. 

At Gordonsville, about 200 cavalry were collected under 
Col. Morgan of the 1st. Virginia Cavalry, and, with this force, 
I watched the enemy for several days while he was at Char- 
lottesville, and when he was endeavouring to cross the James 
River. When Sheridan had abandoned this effort, and on the 
day he reached the vicinity of Ashland, while I was riding on 
the Louisa Court House and Richmond road, towards the 
bridge over the South Anna, with about 20 cavalry, I came 
very near being captured, by a body of 300 cavalry sent after 
me, but I succeeded in eluding the enemy with most of those 
who were with me, and reached Richmond at two o'clock 
next morning, after passing twice between the enemy's camps 



136 



OPERATIONS IN 1865. 



and his pickets. My Adjutant General, Captain Moore, how- 
ever, was captured, but made his escape. 

Lomax had succeeded in collecting a portion of his cavalry 
and reaching Lynchburg, where he took position on the north 
bank of the river, but the enemy avoided that place. Rosser 
had collected a part of his brigade and made an attack, near 
New Market, on the guard which was carrying back the pris- 
oners captured at Waynesboro, with the view of releasing them, 
but he did not succeed in that object, though the guard was 
compelled to retire in great haste. He then moved towards 
Richmond on Sheridan's track. 

After consultation with General Lee, at his head-quarters 
near Petersburg, Rosser's and McCausland's brigades were 
ordered to report to him under the command of General Rosser, 
and I started for the Valley, by the way of Lynchburg, to reor- 
ganize what was left of my command. At Lynchburg, a 
despatch was received from General Echols, stating that 
Thomas was moving in East Tennessee, and threatening South 
Western Virginia with a heavy force, and I immediately went 
on the cars to Wytheville. From that place I went with Gen- 
eral Echols to Bristol, on the state line between Virginia and 
Tennessee, and it was ascertained beyond doubt that some 
important movement by the enemy was on foot. We then re- 
turned to Abingdon, and while 1 was engaged in endeavouring 
to organize the small force in that section, so as to meet the 
enemy in the best way we could, I received, on the 30th March, 
a telegraphic despatch from General Lee, directing me to turn 
over the command in South Western Virginia to General 
Echols, and in the Valley to General Lomax, and informing 
me that he would address a letter to me at my home. I com- 
plied at once with this order, and thus terminated my military 
career. 



CONCLUSION. 



In the afternoon of the 30th March, after having turned over 
the command to General Echols, I rode to Marion in S my the 
County, and was taken that night with a cold and cough so 
violent as to produce hemorrhage from the lungs, and prostrate 
me for several days in a very dangerous condition. While I 
was in this situation, a heavy cavalry force under Stoneman, 
from Thomas' army in Tennessee, moved through North Car- 
olina to the east, and a part of it came into Virginia from the 
main column, and struck the Virginia and Tennessee rail-road 
at New River, east of Wytheville ; whence, after destroying 
the bridge, it moved east, cutting off all communication with 
Richmond, and then crossed over into North Carolina. As 
soon as I was in a condition to be moved, I was carried on the 
railroad to Wytheville, and was proceeding thence to my home, 
in an ambulance under the charge of a surgeon, when I re 
ceived, most unexpectedly, the news of the surrender of Gen- 
eral Lee's army. Without the slightest feeling of irreverence, 
I will say, that the sound of the last trump would not have 
been more unwelcome to my ears. 

Under the disheartening influence of the sad news I had 
received, I proceeded to my home, and I subsequently re- 
ceived a letter from General Lee, dated on the 30th of March, 
explaining the reasons for relieving me from command. As 
a copy of that letter has been published in Virginia, without 
any knowledge or agency on my part, it is appended to this 
narrative. The letter itself, which was written on the very 
day of the commencement of the attack on General Lee's lines 
which resulted in the evacuation of Richmond, and just ten 
days before the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, 
has a historical interest ; for it shows that our great com- 
mander, even at that late day, was anxiously and earnestly 
contemplating the continuation of the struggle with unabated 



138 



CONCLUSION. 



vigour, and a full determination to make available every ele- 
ment of success. 

Immediately after the battle of Cedar Creek, I had written 
a letter to General Lee, stating my willingness to be relieved 
from command, if he deemed it necessary for the public in- 
terests, and I should have been content with the course pur- 
sued towards me, had his letter not contained the expressions 
of personal confidence in me which it does; for I knew that, 
in everything he did as commander of our armies, General 
Lee was actuated solely by an earnest and ardent desire for 
the success of the cause of his country. As to those among 
my countrymen who judged me harshly, 1 have not a word 
of reproach. When there was so much at stake, it was not 
unnatural that persons entirely ignorant of the facts, and 
forming their opinions from the many false reports set afloat 
in a time of terrible war and public suffering, should pass 
erroneous and severe judgments on those commanders who 
met with reverses. 

I was not embraced in the terms of General Lee's surrender 
or that of General Johnston, and, as the order relieving me from 
command had also relieved me from all embarrassment as to 
the troops which had been under me, as soon as I was in a 
condition to travel, I started on horse-back for the Trans-Miss- 
issipi Department, to join the army of General Kirby Smith, 
should it hold out ; with the hope of at least meeting an honor- 
able death while fighting under the flag of my country. Before 
I reached that Department, Smith's army had also been sur- 
rendered, and, without giving a parole or incurring any obli- 
gation whatever to the United States authorities, after a long, 
weary, and dangerous ride from Virginia, through the States of 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Missis- 
sippi, Arkansas and Texas, I finally succeeded in leaving the 
country ; a voluntary exile rather than submit to the rule of 
our enemies. 

J. A. EARLY 



APPENDIX. 



A. 

LETTER FROM GENERAL LEE. 

"Hd. Qrs., C. S. Armies, 

"30th March, 1865. 

" Lt.-General J. A. Early, Eranklin Co., Va. 

" General,— My telegram will have informed you that I deem a 
change of Commanders in your Department necessary; out it is due 
to your zealous and patriotic services that I should explain the reasons 
that prompted my action. The situation of affairs is such that we 
can neglect no means calculated to devolop the resources we possess 
to the greatest extent, and make them as efficient as possible. To 
this end, it is essential that we should have the cheerful and hearty 
support of the people, and the full confidence of the soldiers, without 
which our efforts would be embarrassed and our means of resistance 
weakened. I have reluctantly arrived at the conclusion that you 
cannot command the united and willing co-operation which is so 
essential to success. Your reverses in the Valley, of which the public 
and the army judge chiefly by the results, have, I fear, impaired your 
influence both with the people and the soldiers, and would add greatly 
to the difficulties which will, under any circumstances, attend our 
military operations in S. W. Virginia. While my own confidence in 
your ability, zeal, and devotion to the cause is unimpaired, I have 
nevertheless felt that I could not oppose what seems to be the current 
of opinion, without injustice to your reputation and injury to the 
service. I therefore felt constrained to endeavour to find a com- 
mander who would be more likely to develop the strength and resources 
of the country, and inspire tbe soldiers with confidence ; and, to ac«* 
complish this purpose, I thought it proper to yield my own opinion, 
and to defer to that of those to whom alone we can look for support. 

I am sure that you will understand and appreciate my motives, and 



140 



APPENDIX. 



no one will be more ready than yourself to acquiesce in any measures 
which the interests of the country may seem to require, regardless of 
all personal considerations. 

Thanking you for the fidelity and energy with which you have 
always supported my efforts, and for the courage and devotion you 
have ever manifested in the service of the country, 
I am, very respectfully and truly, 

Your ob't serv't, 

R. E. LEE, 

Gen'l." 

Since the foregoing narrative was written, I have seen, in a news- 
paper published in the United States, the following communication : — 

" Hd. Qrs., Battalion U. S. Infantry, 
" Camp near Lynchburg, Va., 
" Feb. 7, 1866. 
st C. "W. Button, Esq., Editor Lynchburg Virginian. 

" Sir, — I have received a communication from the War Department, 
Adjutant-General's Office, relative to a newspaper slip, containing a 
copy of General Lee's letter to General Early, on removing him from 
command. The letter is dated Headquarters C. S. Armies, March 
30, addressed to Lieut. -Gen. Early, Franklin C. H., Virginia, and is 
said to be in your possession, it having appeared in your paper. The 
Secretary of War considers that the original letter properly belongs 
to the Archive office. 

I am directed by Major-General Terry, commanding this Depart- 
ment, to procure said letter, and I therefore call your attention to the 
matter, and request that you deliver to me the original letter in your 
possession, in compliance with my instructions. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

A. E. LATIMER, 
Brevet Major and Captain 11th U. S. Infantry, 
Commanding Post." 

This demand for General Lee's private letter to me, and the attempt 
to enforce it by military power, show how wide has been the depart- 
ure from the original principles of the United States Government, and 
to what petty and contemptible measures that Government, as at 
present administered, resorts in domineering over a disarmed and 



APPENDIX. 



141 



helpless people. I have the pleasure of informing the Hon. Secretary 
of War, and the keeper of the " Archive Office," that the original 
letter is in ray possession, heyond the reach of provost marshals and 
agents of the Freedman's Bureau, or even Holt with his Bureau of 
Military Justice and his suborners of perjury. 



B. 

STATISTICS SHOWING THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF 
THE TWO SECTIONS DURING THE WAR. 

The census of the United States for 1860 showed an aggregate free 
population of 27,185,109 ; of this, 488,283 were free blacks, of which 
the larger proportion were in the Southern States, but it is not neces- 
sary to consider that element in this estimate, though to do so would 
make it more favourable for the Confederate States. Of the above 
27,185,109 of free population, there were in the States forming the 
Southern Confederacy, as follows : — 



Alabama 529,164 

Arkansas 324,323 

Florida 78,686 

Georgia. 595,097 

Kentucky 930,223 

Louisiana 376,913 

Mississippi 354,699 

Missouri 1,058,352 

North Carolina 661,586 

South Carolina 301,271 

Tennessee 834,063 

Texas 420,651 

Virginia.... 1,105,196 

Aggregate 7,570,224 



Kentucky undertook to assume a neutral position, but she was soon; 
overrun by Federal troops, and her government and a very large pro- 
portion of her population took sides with the North. Those of her 
citizens who were not awed by Federal bayonets, formed a state gov- 
ernment and joined the Confederacy — many of her young men going 
into the Confederate army ; but in fact, whatever may have been the 
sympathies of the people, her moral influence as well as the benefit of 
her physical strength were given to the Federal Government. The- 
L 



142 



APPENDIX. 



legitimate Government of Missouri sided with the South, as very prob- 
ably did the majority of her people, but she was also overrun at a very 
early stage of the war by Federal troops, and her legitimate Govern- 
ment subverted by force; and the benefit of her resources and physical 
strength was likewise given to the United States, notwithstanding the 
fact that a large number of her men joined the Confederate army. 
Perhaps the number of men added to the strength of the Confederate 
army from Kentucky and Missouri, did not acceed the accession to the 
Federal army from Western "Virginia, Eastern Tennessee, and some 
other of the Southern States, and that, in estimating the relative 
strength of the two parties at the beginning, it would be proper to re- 
ject Kentucky and Missouri from the estimate of the Confederate 
strength. The free population of these two States amounted to 
1,988,575, and without them there would be left on the Confederate 
side a free population of 5,581,649 against a similar population of 
21,603,460 on the Federal side, which would make the odds against 
us very nearly four to one but I will divide the population of these 
States equally between the parties, and this will give a free population 
of 6,575,937 Confederates, against a similar population of 20,609,172 
Federals, which makes the odds more than three to one against us in 
the beginning, without considering the fact that the Northern people 
had possession of the Government, with the army and navy and all 
the resources of that Government, while the Confederate States had to 
organize a new Government, and provide an army and the means of 
supplying it with arms as well as every thing else. Notwithstanding 
this immense odds against us, I presume there is scarcely a Confederate, 
even now, who does not feel confident that if it had been, " hands off 
and a fair fight," we would have prevailed ; but an immense horde of 
foreign mercenaries, incited by high bounties and the hope of plunder 
held out to them, flocked to the Federal army ; and thus was its size 
continually growing, while the Confederate army had to rely on the 
original population to keep up its strength. Any accession of troops 
from Maryland was more than counterbalanced by those obtained from 
"Western Virginia by the Federals, without couuting East Tennessee or 
other quarters. The Federal Government was not satisfied with re- 
cruiting its army from abroad, but, as the country was overrun, the 
southern negroes were forced into its service, and thus, by the aid of 
its foreign mercenaries and the negro recruits, it was enabled finally to 
exhaust the Confederate army. 



APPENDIX. 



IIS 



To show the immense strength of the Federal army, the following 
extracts are taken from the report of the Federal Secretary of War, 
Stanton, which was sent to the Congress at its session beginning on the 
first Monday in December, 18f)5. In that report he says ; — 

"Official reports show that on the 1st of May, 1864, the aggregate 
national military force of all arms, officers and men, was nine hundred 



and seventy thousand seven hundred and ten, to wit :-— 

Available force present for duty 662,345 

On detached service in the different military departments. 109,348 

In field hospitals or, unfit for duty 41,266 

In general hospitals or on sick leave at home. 75,978 

Absent on furlough or as prisoners of war , 66,290 

Absent without leave 15,483 



Grand aggregate 970,710 

"The aggregate available force present for duty Ma}^ 1st, 1864, 
was distributed in the different commands as follows : — 

Department of Washington 42,124 

Army of the Potomac 120,386 

Department of Virginia and North Carolina 59,139 

Department of the South t 18,165 

Department of the Gulf « 61,865 

Department of Arkansas .... 23,666 

Department of the Tennessee 74,174- 

Departmcntof the Missouri 15,770 

Department of the North- West 5,295 

Department of Kansas * . 4,798 

Head-quarters Military Division of the Mississippi 476 

Department of the Cumberland 119,948 

Department of the Ohio 35,416 

Northern Department , 9,540 

Department of West Virginia 30,782 

Department of the East 2,828 

Department of the Susquehanna 2,970 

Middle Department 5,627 

Ninth Army Corps 20,780 

Department of New Mexico 3,454 

Deprrtment of the Pacific 5,141 



Total 662,345." 

And again : — 



"Official reports show that on the 1st of March, 1865, the aggre- 
gate military force of all arms, officers and men, was nine hundred and 
sixty-five thousand five hundred and ninety-one, to wit : — 



144 



APPENDIX. 



Available force present for duty 602,598 

On detached service in the different military departments . 132,538 

In field hospitals and unfit for duty 35,628 

In general hospitals or on sick leave. 143,419 

Absent on furlough or as prisoners of war 31,695 

Absent without leave 19,683 

Grand aggregate 965.591 

"This force was augmented on the 1st of May, 1865, by enlist- 
ments, to the number of one million five hundred and sixteen of all 
arms, officers and men, (1,000,516)/' 

And again he says : — 

" The aggregate quotas charged against the several States, 
under all calls made by the President of the United States, 
from the 15th day of April, 1861, to the 14th day of April, 
1865, at which time drafting and recruiting ceased, was. . 2,759,049 

" The aggregate number of men credited on the several calls, 
and put into service of the United States, in the army, navy, 
and marine corps, during the above period, was 2,656,553 

u Leaving a deficiency on all calls, when the war closed, of 102,596 " 

This does not include that portion of the Federal forces consisting of 
the regular army, and the negro troops raised in the Southern States ; 
which were not raised by calls on the States. It is impossible for me 
to state the number of troops called into the service of the Confed- 
erate Government during the war, as all its records fell into the hands 
of the United States authorities, or were destroyed, but I think I can 
safely assert that the " available force present for duty " in the Fed- 
eral army, at the beginning or close of the last year of the war, 
exceeded the entire force called into the Confederate service during the 
whole war ; and when it is considered that the troops called into the 
United States service during that time, numbered more than one-third 
of the entire free population of the Confederate States, men, women 
and children, the world can appreciate the profound ability of the 
leaders, and the great heroism of the soldiers, of that army which 
finally overcame the Confederate army, by the " mere attrition " of 
numbers, after a prolonged struggle of four years. They can be ex- 
celled only by the magnanimity of the conquerors. 



